Book,  Chapter

 1      I,  I    |     knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till
 2      I,  I    |         that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are
 3      I,  I    |           those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore
 4      I,  I    |      acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being
 5      I,  II   |         were innate; or so much as self-evident, which every innate principle
 6      I,  II   |          were innate or so much as self-evident.~5. Instance in keeping
 7      I,  II   |      reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.~23.
 8      I,  III  |         that concern practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable
 9     II,  I    |            be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether
10     II,  I    |          soul always thinks,” be a self-evident proposition, that everybody
11     II,  I    |         thinks? For if it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof.
12     IV,  III  |       wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary
13     IV,  VII  |            1. Maxims or axioms are self-evident propositions. There are
14     IV,  VII  |      science: and because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate,
15     IV,  VII  |             there our knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be
16     IV,  VII  |           the credit of maxims are self-evident, but a great many, even
17     IV,  VII  |           propositions are equally self-evident. For, First, The immediate
18     IV,  VII  |            this affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have
19     IV,  VII  |          capable of making as many self-evident propositions, as we have
20     IV,  VII  |            is a circle,” be not as self-evident a proposition as that consisting
21     IV,  VII  |           co-existence we have few self-evident propositions. Secondly,
22     IV,  VII  |         many propositions that are self-evident, though some there are:
23     IV,  VII  |           of body, I think it is a self-evident proposition, that two bodies
24     IV,  VII  |         demonstrative, much less a self-evident knowledge: and, therefore,
25     IV,  VII  |      necessarily follow, that such self-evident truths must be first known
26     IV,  VII  |            on general, innate, and self-evident principles. What principle
27     IV,  VII  |           which, if we add all the self-evident propositions which may be
28     IV,  VII  |            or confirm less general self-evident propositions.~(2) It is
29     IV,  VII  |            propositions which were self-evident, or to be received for true;
30     IV,  VII  |          reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding than
31     IV,  VII  | propositions—most of them, indeed, self-evident—were introduced into the
32     IV,  VII  |            they deny these general self-evident principles received by all
33     IV,  VII  |        reason why, amongst so many self-evident propositions, the most general
34     IV,  VII  |           can. Those universal and self-evident principles being only our
35     IV,  VII  |          affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and so cannot be
36     IV,  VII  |        without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon this ground
37     IV,  VIII |           and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster, i.e.
38     IV,  VIII |         identical propositions are self-evident, show a great concern for
39     IV,  VIII |         that they are all true and self-evident. I grant further, that the
40     IV,  VIII |       equally certain, and equally self-evident. But yet they cannot but
41     IV,  XII  |           so fair, to use none but self-evident and undeniable. If this
42     IV,  XVI  |          mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable
43     IV,  XVIII|         immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident
44     IV,  XVIII|            shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know
45     IV,  XVIII|   inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has
46     IV,  XIX  |           true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs
47     IV,  XIX  |    proposition; and if it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light