Book,  Chapter

 1     II,  VI |       Perception, or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.~The power of
 2     II,  VI |    Understanding, and the power of volition is called the Will; and
 3     II,  XIX|       large of reasoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are
 4     II,  XXI| forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance
 5     II,  XXI|       actions of understanding and volition. For when we say the will
 6     II,  XXI|            by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty;
 7     II,  XXI|            there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may
 8     II,  XXI|          may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.
 9     II,  XXI|       consequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion
10     II,  XXI|           agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not
11     II,  XXI|        motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he
12     II,  XXI|            is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his
13     II,  XXI|     constraint.~10. Belongs not to volition. Again: suppose a man be
14     II,  XXI|           not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the
15     II,  XXI|            power by any thought or volition to stop; and therefore in
16     II,  XXI|             in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation
17     II,  XXI|          action is contrary to his volition, it is called restraint.
18     II,  XXI|           that have no thought, no volition at all, are in everything
19     II,  XXI|           is also but a power.~15. Volition. Such is the difficulty
20     II,  XXI|          distinctly enough express volition, unless he will reflect
21     II,  XXI|         best to express the act of volition, does it not precisely.
22     II,  XXI|          can say he ever wills it? Volition, it is plain, is an act
23     II,  XXI|     thought may be the occasion of volition, or exercising the power
24     II,  XXI|         Secondly, That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom
25     II,  XXI|           of willing or the act of volition, when any action in his
26     II,  XXI|           act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal
27     II,  XXI|           upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance
28     II,  XXI|          voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the
29     II,  XXI|        thoughts, he cannot forbear volition; he must determine one way
30     II,  XXI|           The ideas of liberty and volition must be defined. To avoid
31     II,  XXI|           the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in our understandings,
32     II,  XXI|            of any action, upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence
33     II,  XXI|           choose or will.~28. What volition and action mean. Secondly,
34     II,  XXI|             we must remember, that volition or willing is an act of
35     II,  XXI|  endeavoured to express the act of volition, by choosing, preferring,
36     II,  XXI|          signify desire as well as volition, for want of other words
37     II,  XXI|          proper name is willing or volition; yet, it being a very simple
38     II,  XXI|          that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing
39     II,  XXI|       reaches no further; and that volition is nothing but that particular
40     II,  XXI|          which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from
41     II,  XXI|         ever.~57. Power to suspend volition explains responsibility
42     II,  XXI|            of a man consecutive to volition, it is further inquired,—
43     II,  XXI|      liberty to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of
44     II,  XXI|           into. The ideas of will, volition, liberty, and necessity,