Book,  Chapter

 1      I,  I     | universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can
 2      I,  I     |   fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps
 3      I,  II    |    these may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and
 4      I,  III   |         last day, the very same persons, to be happy or miserable
 5     II,  I     |      when he is waking, are two persons: since waking Socrates has
 6     II,  I     | sleeping and waking man are two persons. The soul, during sound
 7     II,  I     |         are not two as distinct persons as Castor and Hercules,
 8     II,  I     |        the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think
 9     II,  I     |    nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul’s
10     II,  I     |       absurdity of two distinct persons, which follows from this
11     II,  I     |      has been said, to make two persons in one man. And if one considers
12     II,  I     |    comes by degrees to know the persons it daily converses with,
13     II,  XX    |      have most of them, in most persons, operations on the body,
14     II,  XXI   |         and offensive: and many persons would with reason prefer
15     II,  XXV   |      Caius, compared to several persons, may be truly be said to
16     II,  XXVII |       of substance, no more two persons, than a man be two men by
17     II,  XXVII |       same, it can be different persons?~And to this I answer: First,
18     II,  XXVII |     remaining, there can be two persons. As to the second part of
19     II,  XXVII |       there may be two distinct persons; which question seems to
20     II,  XXVII |       must needs make different persons. Suppose a Christian Platonist
21     II,  XXVII |     reflects will perceive.~18. Persons, not substances, the objects
22     II,  XXVII |  different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense
23     II,  XXVII |         thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained
24     II,  XXVII |   individual man, should be two persons. To help us a little in
25     II,  XXVII |     same man to be two distinct persons, as any two that have lived
26     II,  XXVII |    would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato? And
27     II,  XXVII |         night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial
28     II,  XXVII |         the former instance two persons with the same body. So that
29     II,  XXVII |         a part of two different persons; and the same person preserved
30     II,  XXVII |        by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves,
31     II,  XXVIII|          and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes
32     II,  XXXIII|        are very few inquisitive persons who read this, who have
33    III,  III   |  occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper
34    III,  III   |         names, and why. Besides persons, countries also, cities,
35    III,  III   |      than that the ideas of the persons children converse with (
36    III,  III   |       them alone) are, like the persons themselves, only particular.
37    III,  III   |   determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time and
38    III,  III   |    father and mother, and those persons they have been used to,
39    III,  V     |         of independent ideas of persons, habits, tapers, orders,
40    III,  IX    |     proposal; and had they been persons less ingenious, they might
41    III,  XI    |        which comes from several persons applying the same name to
42     IV,  III   |      not different in different persons.~Secondly, Another thing