Book,  Chapter

 1      I,  II   |          a law that is not a free agent. And upon that ground they
 2     II,  XX   |           a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain
 3     II,  XXI  |        the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular
 4     II,  XXI  |           not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according
 5     II,  XXI  |           is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that
 6     II,  XXI  |        any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the
 7     II,  XXI  |        not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion
 8     II,  XXI  |     herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition,
 9     II,  XXI  |       prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate
10     II,  XXI  |        consider the man as a free agent again.~13. Necessity, what.
11     II,  XXI  |          takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when
12     II,  XXI  |           be denied that whatever agent has a power to think on
13     II,  XXI  |           will be a substance, an agent, or at least to suppose
14     II,  XXI  |        does the action; it is the agent that has power, or is able
15     II,  XXI  |           be free.~21. But to the agent, or man. To return, then,
16     II,  XXI  |     direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power
17     II,  XXI  |  determination directs, is a free agent: such determination abridges
18     II,  XXI  |       subject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of
19     II,  XXI  |     impression from some external agent; and such power is not properly
20     II,  XXI  |        Sometimes the substance or agent puts itself into action
21     II,  XXI  |           only from some external agent. So that the active power
22     II,  XXVI |      received from, some external agent, or cause, and working by
23     II,  XXVII|         annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot
24     II,  XXVII|        perhaps done by some other agent—why, I say, such a representation
25     IV,  III  | appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass
26     IV,  III  |    determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be,
27     IV,  III  |           determination of a free agent. The things that, as far
28     IV,  XX   |        guided by an understanding agent, should frequently constitute
29     IV,  XXI  |          a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any