Book,  Chapter

 1     IV,  VI  |    penetrate further, and, on probabilities taken from wary observation,
 2     IV,  XVI |   manner, is very true. These probabilities rise so near to certainty,
 3     IV,  XVI |  probability. [Secondly], The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned
 4     IV,  XVII|     less, or no use at all in probabilities. For the assent there being
 5     IV,  XX  |  those evidences they have of probabilities; who cannot carry a train
 6     IV,  XX  |    less a rational assent to, probabilities they are concerned to know,
 7     IV,  XX  |     have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but
 8     IV,  XX  |      who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly
 9     IV,  XX  |       apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid
10     IV,  XX  |        nor be prevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them
11     IV,  XX  |     at a very dear rate. What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to
12     IV,  XX  |    III. Predominant passions. Probabilities which cross men’s appetites
13     IV,  XX  |  resist the force of manifest probabilities that make against them,
14     IV,  XX  |     evading the most apparent probabilities:~13. Two means of evading
15     IV,  XX  |      13. Two means of evading probabilities: I. Supposed fallacy latent
16     IV,  XX  |  contrary. Secondly, Manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent
17     IV,  XX  |     the verge of it. 15. What probabilities naturally determine the
18     IV,  XX  | follows, and closes with such probabilities. In other less clear cases,