Book, Chapter
1 Gre | dedicate] their works to some Prince, and blinded by ambition
2 Gre | nothing was lacking to be a Prince than the Principality, and
3 1 | will not be found either Prince, or Republic, or Captain,
4 1, I | without any particular Prince who should organize them,
5 1, I | either by a Republic or by a Prince to relieve their towns of [
6 1, I | or they are built by a Prince, not to live there but for
7 1, I | through the courtesy of the Prince.~The builders of Cities
8 1, I | any people either under a Prince or by themselves are constrained
9 1, II | caused them to select a Prince, not seeking the most stalwart
10 1, II | when they began to make the Prince by succession and not by
11 1, II | of delight. So that the Prince began to be hated, and because
12 1, II | conspiracies against the Prince were not made by weak and
13 1, II | the dishonest life of that prince.~The multitude therefore
14 1, II | armed itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him,
15 1, II | them. And the memory of the Prince and the injuries received
16 1, II | wanting to restore that of the Prince, the [people] turned to
17 1, II | neither the powerful Few nor a Prince should have any authority.
18 1, VI | like Sparta, have created a Prince for life, and established
19 1, VII | Francesco Valori, who was as a Prince in that City [and] who being
20 1, IX | with the authority of their Prince, attack those who should
21 1, X | Let he who has become a Prince in a Republic also consider
22 1, X | very instructive to any Prince in pointing out to him the
23 1, X | it came to ruin. Let a Prince therefore place himself
24 1, X | Emperors], he will see a Prince secure in thy midst of secure
25 1, X | triumph of the world, the Prince full of reverence and glory,
26 1, X | follow the good. And truly, a Prince seeking the glory of the
27 1, XI | were discussed as to which Prince Rome should be more obligated,
28 1, XI | sustained through fear of a Prince, which may supply the want
29 1, XI | will easily fall as he [Prince] fails in virtu. Whence
30 1, XI | therefore, is not in having a Prince who governs prudently while
31 1, XII | entirely to one Republic or one Prince, as has happened to France
32 1, XII | governed by one Republic or one Prince, is solely the Church, for
33 1, XII | Italy and make herself its Prince. And on the other hand,
34 1, XIV | did not peck away, and the Prince of the Pollari seeing the
35 1, XIV | dart by chance killed the Prince of the Pollari: which thing
36 1, XVI | ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, IF BY SOME ACCIDENT BECOMES
37 1, XVI | people used to living under a Prince to preserve their liberty
38 1, XVI | feeding on the riches of the Prince, [and] who when they are
39 1, XVI | above, in speaking of a Prince here and of a Republic there,
40 1, XVI | to speak a little more.~A Prince, therefore, wanting to gain
41 1, XVI | liberty. The first desire the Prince is able to satisfy entirely,
42 1, XVI | regain their liberty, the Prince, not being able to satisfy
43 1, XVI | of the people. And when a Prince does this, and the people
44 1, XVI | that were ordained. That Prince, therefore, or that Republic,
45 1, XVII | City which exists under a Prince, even though that Prince
46 1, XVII | Prince, even though that Prince with all his lives [family]
47 1, XVII | it should happen that one Prince destroy the other, for [
48 1, XVIII | anything else to become Prince of that City, and to be
49 1, XVIII | man, and the becoming of a Prince of a Republic by violence
50 1, XVIII | good] men wants to become Prince through bad means, even
51 1, XVIII | a bad one, having become Prince, wants to work for good
52 1, XIX | CHAPTER XIX~A WEAK PRINCE WHO SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT
53 1, XIX | WHO SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT PRINCE CAN BE MAINTAINED, BUT ANY
54 1, XIX | it is possible for a weak Prince succeeding an excellent
55 1, XXI | XXI~HOW MUCH BLAME THAT PRINCE AND REPUBLIC MERIT WHO LACK
56 1, XXI | results from the defect of the Prince, and not from any local
57 1, XXVI | CHAPTER XXVI~A NEW PRINCE IN A CITY OR PROVINCE TAKEN
58 1, XXVI | EVERYTHING ANEW~Whoever becomes Prince either of a City or a State,
59 1, XXVI | Principality is (he being a new Prince) to do everything anew in
60 1, XXVI | from a petty King became Prince of Greece. And those who
61 1, XXIX | UNGRATEFUL, A PEOPLE OR A PRINCE~It appears to me apropos
62 1, XXIX | ingratitude more, a People or a Prince. And to discuss this part
63 1, XXIX | For when a People or a Prince has sent out one of its
64 1, XXIX | glory, that People or that Prince is bound in turn to reward
65 1, XXIX | then both the People and Prince merit some excuse. And much
66 1, XXIX | his enemies, and with the Prince’s very own subjects, that
67 1, XXIX | suddenly aroused in the Prince after the victory of his
68 1, XXIX | insolently. So that the Prince cannot think otherwise than
69 1, XXIX | great conquest. And if a Prince cannot defend himself from
70 1, XXIX | his life was adored as a Prince. But the ingratitude shown
71 1, XXX | CHAPTER XXX~WHAT MEANS A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC OUGHT TO USE
72 1, XXX | NOT TO BE TOUCHED BY IT~A Prince, to avoid the necessity
73 1, XXX | himself in the hands of the Prince, guarding himself from any
74 1, XXX | ambitious act, so that he [the Prince] despoiled of every suspicion
75 1, XXX | very own and not of his Prince, obtaining for himself the
76 1, XXX | cannot be given as that of a Prince; that is, that it cannot
77 1, XXXII | CHAPTER XXXII~A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT NOT TO DEFER BENEFITING
78 1, XXXII | himself otherwise, whether Prince or Republic, and especially
79 1, XXXII | Republic, and especially a Prince, and then on this fact believes
80 1, XXXIII | called him back and made him Prince of the Republic, to which
81 1, XXXVIII| be the one that should be Prince of [make] the decisions
82 1, XLV | is to a Republic or to a Prince to keep the minds of their
83 1, XLIX | foreigner, who, sent by a Prince performed such an office.
84 1, LI | CHAPTER LI~A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT TO FEIGN TO DO THROUGH
85 1, LVII | against the decision of their Prince: but afterwards, when they
86 1, LVII | either their liberty or their Prince much loved by them, but
87 1, LVIII | AND MORE CONSTANT THAN A PRINCE~Nothing is more vain and
88 1, LVIII | that same result in any Prince, for it is the verdict of
89 1, LVIII | and not otherwise than a Prince, or even better than a Prince,
90 1, LVIII | Prince, or even better than a Prince, although he be esteemed
91 1, LVIII | And on the other hand, a Prince loosened from the [control]
92 1, LVIII | of better judgment than a Prince: And not without reason
93 1, LVIII | or which appear useful, a Prince also errs many times in
94 1, LVIII | better selection than a Prince, but a people will never
95 1, LVIII | corrupt habits: to which a Prince may be persuaded easily
96 1, LVIII | which is not seen in a Prince. And on both of these two
97 1, LVIII | have always been under a Prince, as Rome did after the driving
98 1, LVIII | regulated by laws; for a Prince who can do what he wants
99 1, LVIII | discussion is to be had of a Prince obligated by laws, and of
100 1, LVIII | no one who can talk to a Prince, nor is there any other
101 1, LVIII | People, and that of the Prince needs the sword, there will
102 1, LVIII | common good, those of a Prince are [directed] against those
103 1, LVIII | Republic, or those made with a Prince, can be trusted.~
104 1, LIX | REPUBLIC OR THOSE MADE WITH A PRINCE~As there occurs every day
105 1, LIX | between a Republic and a Prince, it appears to me proper
106 1, LIX | a Republic or that of a Prince. In examining everything,
107 1, LIX | be observed either by a Prince or by a Republic: I believe
108 1, LIX | less injury, than by the Prince. Where there is fear, therefore,
109 1, LIX | in either a Republic or a Prince it is found that they observe
110 1, LIX | can very well occur that a Prince, who is a friend of a powerful
111 1, LIX | is a friend of a powerful Prince [and] who may not then have
112 1, LIX | usefulness has caused a Prince to break his faith, and
113 2, I | in all the world either a Prince or a Republic that could,
114 2, I | certain thing that as a Prince or a People arrives at so
115 2, I | Principalities [Treatise on the Prince], for there we have debated
116 2, II | and so hated the title of Prince, that when the Veientians
117 2, II | happens when there is a Prince, where much of the time
118 2, II | the other states. Which a Prince who subjugates you does
119 2, II | does not do unless that Prince is some barbarous Prince,
120 2, II | Prince is some barbarous Prince, a destroyer of countries
121 2, IV | accept a stipend from this Prince or that, who hires them
122 2, VIII | existence of each. For to a Prince or a Republic that assaults
123 2, IX | want to make war against a Prince, and have between us a signed
124 2, X | but cannot so finish it, a Prince ought before he undertakes
125 2, XI | MAKE AN ALLIANCE WITH A PRINCE WHO HAS MORE REPUTATION
126 2, XI | also would happen to that Prince who should undertake some
127 2, XII | was held to be a most wise Prince in his time, and when two
128 2, XII | again, therefore, that that Prince who has his people armed
129 2, XII | out to meet it. But that [Prince] who has his subjects unarmed
130 2, XIII | action except that to a Prince who wants to do great things,
131 2, XIV | Latins. And therefore a Prince ought never to forego his
132 2, XV | to be of benefit to every Prince and every Republic; for
133 2, XIX | were not subject to any Prince, ransomed themselves in
134 2, XX | PERILS ARE BROUGHT TO THAT PRINCE OR THAT REPUBLIC WHICH AVAILS
135 2, XX | soldiers are those which a Prince or a Republic send to your
136 2, XX | most harmful, because that Prince or that Republic which calls
137 2, XX | those who are sent you by a Prince, as I have said, under their
138 2, XX | from the malignity of the Prince who sends them or from their
139 2, XX | placed there as a guard. A Prince or a Republic ought, therefore,
140 2, XX | deceived. And an ambitious Prince or Republic cannot have
141 2, XXI | advantage also results to the Prince who, not having at hand
142 2, XXI | censure or infamy upon the Prince, in this manner, comes to
143 2, XXIII | unhappy states to which a Prince or a Republic can be reduced
144 2, XXIII | For that Republic or that Prince which should measure them
145 2, XXIII | would be a shame for that Prince to show that he did not
146 2, XXIII | for his own security, a Prince has no other remedy but
147 2, XXIII | dangers to hold them, for the Prince who does not castigate evil-doers
148 2, XXIV | harmful, I say that that Prince or that Republic which is
149 2, XXIV | good part because of that Prince or that Republic have the
150 2, XXIV | more tritely. Either you, a Prince, want to keep the people
151 2, XXIV | these fortresses, or you, a Prince or a Republic, want to keep
152 2, XXIV | war. I want to turn to the Prince, and I say to him that such
153 2, XXIV | so that a wise and good Prince, in order to keep himself
154 2, XXIV | inhabited by women”.~The Prince, therefore, who has good
155 2, XXIV | necessary one. But when the Prince does not have a good army,
156 2, XXIV | any account of them. That Prince, therefore, who can raise
157 2, XXV | oppress them and become their Prince. And if this part is well
158 2, XXVIII | HOW DANGEROUS IT IS FOR A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC, NOT TO AVENGE
159 2, XXVIII | every Republic and every Prince ought to be careful in making
160 2, XXVIII | ruin, if he lives under a Prince and has any courage within
161 2, XXXI | desires and passions. A Prince, therefore, ought to go
162 2, XXXII | good government which that Prince bestows on those who have
163 3, I | by an execution against a Prince of that Kingdom, and at
164 3, II | who are discontent with a Prince have to learn that they
165 3, II | the good fortune of that Prince with him, and will afford
166 3, II | thinking, to please the Prince. And as I have not spoken
167 3, IV | CHAPTER IV~A PRINCE DOES NOT LIVE SECURELY IN
168 3, IV | as to the first, every Prince can be advised that he will
169 3, VI | make open war against a Prince, but the ability to conspire
170 3, VI | against a country or against a Prince. It is of these two that
171 3, VI | treat of that against a Prince, and first we will examine
172 3, VI | for in the case of that Prince who has aroused this universal
173 3, VI | is aroused against him. A Prince ought therefore to avoid
174 3, VI | benevolence that they see the Prince to have. Injuries that happen
175 3, VI | most dangerous man for the Prince, as we shall relate in detail
176 3, VI | offense, and against which the Prince ought to guard himself,
177 3, VI | makes men conspire against a Prince, [and] that is the desire
178 3, VI | rising in a man to kill the Prince. This alone, of the three
179 3, VI | carried to the ears of the Prince. Such a decision [plot]
180 3, VI | or not, familiar with the Prince: for it is permitted to
181 3, VI | a Noble and known to the Prince. A poor and abject Spaniard
182 3, VI | those most familiar with the Prince: for others, unless they
183 3, VI | and not familiar with the Prince lack all that hope and opportunities
184 3, VI | having an easy access to the Prince) that it is impossible that
185 3, VI | have cause for harming a Prince, attend to vilifying him,
186 3, VI | men, or familiars of the Prince. Of the many who have conspired,
187 3, VI | to conspire against the Prince, but their conspiracies
188 3, VI | Messer Piero Gambacorti, Prince of Pisa, this Giacopo had
189 3, VI | made by great men against a Prince ought to have succeeded,
190 3, VI | for them not to succeed. A Prince, therefore, who wants to
191 3, VI | have easy access to the Prince, it remains to be discussed
192 3, VI | are discontent with the Prince. Of such trusted ones, one
193 3, VI | which a man has toward the Prince, you can be easily deceived
194 3, VI | faithful, his hate [for the Prince] must be very great or your
195 3, VI | constrains you to do to that Prince what you see the Prince
196 3, VI | Prince what you see the Prince would want to do to you, [
197 3, VI | seen, that threats injure a Prince more, and are the cause
198 3, VI | injury itself; from which a Prince ought to guard himself;
199 3, VI | surrounds the presence of a Prince, that it is an easy matter
200 3, VI | is it to be feared from a Prince free, with the majesty of
201 3, VI | appointed place where the Prince was, but none of them would
202 3, VI | from some humane act by the Prince humbling them. The failures
203 3, VI | that conspiring against one Prince is a doubtful, dangerous
204 3, VI | who will avenge the slain Prince. There may remain, then,
205 3, VI | people are friends of the Prince whom you have killed; for
206 3, VI | Republics are slower than a Prince, and are less apprehensive,
207 3, VI | afterwards make himself Prince. When this was learned,
208 3, VI | many, and not everyone is Prince of an army, as were Caesar,
209 3, VI | a little time he became Prince. Many others have employed
210 3, VI | was an invention of that Prince to give vent to his cruelty
211 3, VI | therefore, to omit advising that Prince or that Republic against
212 3, VI | necessity drives them. Nor can a Prince or a Republic who want,
213 3, VI | them to have time, the [Prince] or [Republic] will have
214 3, X | in order to appear as a Prince to them) to decide things,
215 3, X | the enemy, and a valiant Prince would rather try the fortune
216 3, X | had persuaded him. For a Prince who has an army put together,
217 3, XI | who were many, so also any Prince will have a remedy, who
218 3, XII | accustomed to live under a Prince and not free; and those
219 3, XIX | had temporarily become a Prince could not manage them with
220 3, XIX | never returns good to a Prince. And the way of avoiding [
221 3, XIX | the desire of rapine), no Prince desires it unless it is
222 3, XXI | arise and apt to cause a Prince to be ruined. For he who
223 3, XXI | love that they had for the Prince because of his humanity,
224 3, XXII | punishments are not imputed to a Prince, but to laws and institutions.
225 3, XXII | not to the cruelty of the Prince. So that Valerius was able
226 3, XXII | those who write about how a Prince has to govern approach more
227 3, XXII | if we have to consider a Prince, as Xenophon considers it,
228 3, XXII | and leave Manlius; for a Prince ought to seek obedience
229 3, XXII | existed in Cyrus. For, a Prince being individually greatly
230 3, XXII | Valerius is useful in a Prince, but pernicious in a citizen,
231 3, XXII | Manlius to be harmful in a Prince, but useful in a citizen
232 3, XXIII | easily be noted which make a Prince odious to his people, the
233 3, XXIII | to be hated. From which a Prince ought to guard against as
234 3, XXV | an army, rose above every Prince through the greatness of
235 3, XVII | First it is impossible for a Prince or a Republic to maintain
236 3, XXIX | mentioned above, of which the Prince was the cause. And that
237 3, XXIX | land. And Timastheus, their Prince, learning what gift this
238 3, XXXII | anyone sees a People or a Prince abandon all idea of an accord,
239 3, XXXIV | GREATER PRUDENCE THAN A PRINCE~At another time we have
240 3, XXXIV | distributors of offices than a Prince. I say, therefore, that
241 3, XXXIV | which does not happen to a Prince, for he would be told and
242 3, XXXV | exposed to in counselling a Prince to make himself head of
243 3, XXXV | and those who counsel a Prince, are placed between these
244 3, XXXV | them useful either to the Prince or to the City [Republic]
245 3, XXXV | is not reasonable that a Prince or a People will wish you
246 3, XXXV | happens to your City or your Prince, none the less it is to
247 3, XXXVIII| does not lack men; for that Prince who abounds in men but lacks
248 3, XLII | not, and whether or not a Prince ought to observe them in
249 3, XLII | use in the treatise on the Prince: therefore we will be silent
250 3, XLIV | to be noted that when a Prince desires to obtain something
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