Book, Chapter
1 Gre | selected, not those who are Princes, but those who by their
2 1, II | virtu they believed that Princes should have nothing else
3 1, X | fortune or virtu become Princes, if they read the history
4 1, X | Caesar; and those who are Princes, rather as Agesilaus, Timoleon,
5 1, X | under the laws [and] as good Princes, than those who lived an
6 1, X | in peace and war, so many Princes slain by the sword, so many
7 1, XI | of Religion. And because Princes are short lived, it will
8 1, XII | LACKING, WAS RUINED~Those Princes or those Republics that
9 1, XII | every good institution. The Princes of a Republic or a Kingdom
10 1, XII | Camillus and by the other Princes of the City.~If the Princes
11 1, XII | Princes of the City.~If the Princes of the Republic had maintained
12 1, XII | but has been under so many Princes and Lords, from which there
13 1, XVI | offense, not knowing the Princes or being known by them,
14 1, XVI | true that I judge those Princes unfelicitous who, to assure
15 1, XVI | to him (speaking of those Princes who have become Tyrants
16 1, XIX | institutions: and those Princes are weak who are not able
17 1, XIX | and not Numa. Let all the Princes who have a State take example
18 1, XX | CONTINUOUS SUCCESSIONS OF PRINCES OF VIRTU ACHIEVE GREAT RESULTS;
19 1, XX | continuous successions of Princes of virtu are sufficient
20 1, XX | but an infinite number of Princes of great virtu who are successors
21 1, XXI | LACK THEIR OWN ARMS~Present Princes and modern Republics, who
22 1, XXIX | eternal infamy. Yet many Princes are found who err in this
23 1, XXIX | therefore, is so natural in Princes that they cannot defend
24 1, XXIX | by those People and those Princes who, because of suspicion,
25 1, XXIX | suspicion much less than do Princes, having less reason for
26 1, XXX | with his men, corrupt the Princes [Leaders] of his army, and
27 1, XXXII | Therefore Republics as well as Princes ought to think ahead what
28 1, XXXIII| deferred for a longer time. And Princes ought to open their eyes
29 1, XXXVI | army of which they had been Princes. Which custom is contrary
30 1, XL | the Ten] became absolute Princes [Masters] of Rome. Next
31 1, XLVII | fourteen [1414] when the Princes of the City had been driven
32 1, LIII | a conspiracy of [other] Princes made against them, before
33 1, LV | they kill them as being Princes of corruption and the cause
34 1, LVIII | individual men, and especially Princes, can be accused of that
35 1, LVIII | and there have been many Princes, but of the good and wise
36 1, LVIII | only a few, I say, of those Princes who have been able to break
37 1, LVIII | and as was also seen of Princes held to be wise, who have
38 1, LVIII | blamed any more than that of Princes, for they all err equally
39 1, LVIII | among other Tyrants and Princes, where so much inconstancy
40 1, LVIII | the People, when they are Princes, are changeable and ungrateful,
41 1, LVIII | there are in particular Princes: And to accuse the People
42 1, LVIII | accuse the People and the Princes together can be the truth;
43 1, LVIII | truth; but to except the Princes would be a deception: For
44 1, LVIII | are less ungrateful than Princes. But as to prudence and
45 1, LVIII | Cities where the people are Princes, make the greatest progress
46 1, LVIII | better than those of the Princes.~Nor do I want that there
47 1, LVIII | all the disorders of the Princes, all the glories of the
48 1, LVIII | People, all those of the Princes, it will be seen that the
49 1, LVIII | goodness and in glory. And if Princes are superior to the people
50 1, LVIII | say that the States of the Princes have lasted a long time,
51 1, LVIII | observed in the People than in Princes: if the discussion is to
52 1, LVIII | in the People than in the Princes, and those that are fewer
53 1, LVIII | happens in the case of bad Princes, where the present evil
54 1, LVIII | while they reign; of the Princes they talk with a thousand
55 1, LIX | there occurs every day that Princes or Republics make leagues
56 1, LIX | this kind have been the Princes of the Kingdom of Naples
57 1, LIX | in the Republics than in Princes: For even if the Republics
58 1, LIX | spirit and the same wants as Princes, their movements being slower
59 1, LIX | to form resolutions than Princes, and because of this they
60 1, LIX | observance of accords than Princes. And it is possible to cite
61 1, LIX | Macedonian and the other Princes who had looked for more
62 1, LIX | people make fewer errors than Princes, and because of this, they
63 1, LIX | can be trusted more than Princes.~
64 2, I | reputation, that any neighboring Princes or Peoples by themselves
65 2, I | would be had by all those Princes who would proceed as the
66 2, I | Greece, by Eumences and other Princes into Asia, and by the Massilians
67 2, II | the Captains of armies and Princes of Republics. Our Religion
68 2, II | their own virtu to become Princes. They will see wealth multiplied
69 2, II | civilization, such as are oriental Princes: But if he has ordinary
70 2, VI | wars while other unwise Princes and Republics were impoverished [
71 2, VIII | because of the ambitions of Princes or of a Republic that seek
72 2, VIII | to feed them, [and] the Princes decided it should be necessary
73 2, X | acted on by not so prudent Princes to whom it is enough to
74 2, XI | noted that leagues made with Princes who have neither the convenience
75 2, XI | wrong proceedings which Princes undertake for the defense
76 2, XII | whether, if there are two Princes of almost equal strength,
77 2, XIII | Bernabo. And that which Princes are obliged to do at the
78 2, XIII | Romans with the distant Princes, who heard the Roman name
79 2, XIV | and] the other neighboring Princes will respect you more, and
80 2, XVIII | the faults of the Italian Princes who have made Italy slave
81 2, XVIII | their being armed, and the Princes disarmed. And as a large
82 2, XVIII | enough to cause the modern Princes to re-see things, and to
83 2, XIX | believed, the Republics and Princes would have erred less, would
84 2, XIX | which they call Free Towns, Princes, and the Emperor. And the
85 2, XIX | they do, as because those Princes [are unable to aid him]
86 2, XXIII | opportunities are given to Princes, I want to cite the words
87 2, XXIII | moment (as I have said). Princes ought to imitate this judgment,
88 2, XXIV | regard, and that of the Princes in our times, it appears
89 2, XXIV | not fortresses maintained Princes in their States, destroyed
90 2, XXVI | mentioned previously. Good Princes [Leaders] of the army and
91 2, XXVII | CHAPTER XXVII~TO PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS, IT OUGHT
92 2, XXVII | of that State [Florence]. Princes who are attacked cannot
93 2, XXX | TRULY POWERFUL REPUBLICS AND PRINCES DO NOT PURCHASE FRIENDSHIP
94 3, I | and those other prudent Princes, than what was reasonable
95 3, II | should not keep so close to Princes that their ruin should encompass
96 3, V | and to the Roman People.~Princes should understand, therefore,
97 3, V | themselves the lives of good Princes, such as Timoleon the Corinthian,
98 3, V | governed by the above named [Princes], whom they constrained
99 3, V | whom they constrained to be Princes as long as they lived, even
100 3, V | dispositions aroused against Princes, and of the Conspiracy made
101 3, V | worthy of being noted by Princes and Private Citizens.~
102 3, VI | matter of so much danger to Princes and Private Citizens. For
103 3, VI | it is seen that many more Princes have lost their lives and
104 3, VI | ending. So that, therefore, Princes may learn to guard themselves
105 3, VI | and ought to desire good Princes, but tolerate the ones they
106 3, VI | others against many other Princes: and in our times, Julio
107 3, VI | as to the above mentioned Princes.~But let us return to our
108 3, VI | conferred with six other Princes of that State seeking how
109 3, VI | and as it happens that bad Princes always fear that others
110 3, VI | than are those made against Princes; for in plotting them there
111 3, VI | him in order to kill him.~Princes, therefore, have no greater
112 3, X | arises because Republics and Princes have imposed this charge
113 3, X | important.~When these indolent Princes, or effeminate Republics,
114 3, XI | Spain: and both of these two Princes very willingly would have
115 3, XII | natural hatred the neighboring Princes and Republics have for one
116 3, XV | done by our Republics and Princes today, who sent more than
117 3, XX | and by the biographers of Princes, and by those who describe
118 3, XXVI | therefore, that absolute Princes and governors of Republics
119 3, XVII | the beginning, that the Princes of our time make, who, when
120 3, XXIX | THE PEOPLE ARISE FROM THE PRINCES.~Princes should not complain
121 3, XXIX | ARISE FROM THE PRINCES.~Princes should not complain of any
122 3, XXIX | from the wickedness of the Princes, and not from the wicked
123 3, XXIX | as was said. For those Princes being poor, but wanting
124 3, XXXI | From which it happens that Princes thus constituted, in adversity,
125 3, XXXIV | but is also necessary for Princes to enable them to maintain
126 3, XXXIV | make smaller errors that do Princes. Although it could happen
127 3, XXXIV | obtain, and err less than Princes: and the Citizen who desires
128 3, XXXV | modestly: so that if the Princes or the City follows it,
129 3, XXXV | the Republic or to their Princes, and they would not avoid
130 3, XLII | promises not observed among Princes when that force is removed,
131 3, XLIII | easily conjectured how much Princes can have confidence in them.~
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