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When their
demonstrations of gratitude had subsided, the Venetian senate, by the aid of
Neri di Gino, began to consider the route the count ought to take, and how to
provide him with necessaries. There were four several roads; one by Ravenna,
along the beach, which on account of its being in many places interrupted by
the sea and by marshes, was not approved. The next was the most direct, but
rendered inconvenient by a tower called the Uccellino, which being held for the
duke, it would be necessary to capture; and to do this, would occupy more time
than could be spared with safety to Verona and Brescia. The third was by the
brink of the lake; but as the Po had overflowed its banks, to pass in this
direction was impossible. The fourth was by the way of Bologna to Ponte
Puledrano, Cento, and Pieve; then between the Bondeno and the Finale to
Ferrara, and thence they might by land or water enter the Paduan territory, and
join the Venetian forces. This route, though attended with many difficulties,
and in some parts liable to be disputed by the enemy, was chosen as the least
objectionable. The count having received his instructions, commenced his march,
and by exerting the utmost celerity, reached the Paduan territory on the
twentieth of June. The arrival of this distinguished commander in Lombardy
filled Venice and all her dependencies with hope; for the Venetians, who only
an instant before had been in fear for their very existence, began to
contemplate new conquests.
The count,
before he made any other attempt, hastened to the relief of Verona; and to
counteract his design, Niccolo led his forces to Soave, a castle situated
between the Vincentino and the Veronese, and entrenched himself by a ditch that
extended from Soave to the marshes of the Adige. The count, finding his passage
by the plain cut off, resolved to proceed by the mountains, and thus reach
Verona, thinking Niccolo would imagine this way to be so rugged and elevated as
to be impracticable, or if he thought otherwise, he would not be in time to
prevent him; so, with provisions for eight days, he took the mountain path, and
with his forces, arrived in the plain, below Soave. Niccolo had, even upon this
route, erected some bastions for the purpose of preventing him, but they were
insufficient for the purpose; and finding the enemy had, contrary to his
expectations, effected a passage, to avoid a disadvantageous engagement he
crossed to the opposite side of the Adige, and the count entered Verona without
opposition.
Having happily
succeeded in his first project, that of relieving Verona, the count now
endeavored to render a similar service to Brescia. This city is situated so
close to the Lake of Garda, that although besieged by land, provisions may
always be sent into it by water. On this account the duke had assembled a large
force in the immediate vicinity of the lake, and at the commencement of his
victories occupied all the places which by its means might relieve Brescia. The
Venetians also had galleys upon the lake, but they were unequal to a contest
with those of the duke. The count therefore deemed it advisable to aid the
Venetian fleet with his land forces, by which means he hoped to obtain without
much difficulty those places which kept Brescia in blockade. He therefore
encamped before Bardolino, a fortress situated upon the lake, trusting that
after it was taken the others would surrender. But fortune opposed this design,
for a great part of his troops fell sick; so, giving up the enterprise, he went
to Zevio, a Veronese castle, in a healthy and plentiful situation. Niccolo,
upon the count’s retreat, not to let slip an opportunity of making himself master
of the lake, left his camp at Vegasio, and with a body of picked men took the
way thither, attacked the Venetian fleet with the utmost impetuosity, and took
nearly the whole of it. By this victory almost all the fortresses upon the lake
fell into his hands.
The Venetians,
alarmed at this loss, and fearing that in consequence of it Brescia would
surrender, solicited the count, by letters and messengers, to go to its relief;
and he, perceiving that all hope of rendering assistance from the lake was cut
off, and that to attempt an approach by land, on account of the ditches,
bastions, and other defenses erected by Niccolo, was marching to certain
destruction, determined that as the passage by the mountains had enabled him to
relieve Verona, it should also contribute to the preservation of Brescia.
Having taken this resolution, the count left Zevio, and by way of the Val
d’Acri went to the Lake of St. Andrea, and thence to Torboli and Peneda, upon
the Lake of Garda. He then proceeded to Tenna, and besieged the fortress, which
it was necessary to occupy before he could reach Brescia.
Niccolo, on
being acquainted with the count’s design, led his army to Peschiera. He then,
with the marquis of Mantua and a chosen body of men, went to meet him, and
coming to an engagement, was routed, his people dispersed, and many of them
taken, while others fled to the fleet, and some to the main body of his army.
It was now nightfall, and Niccolo had escaped to Tenna, but he knew that if he
were to remain there till morning, he must inevitably fall into the enemy’s
hands; therefore, to avoid a catastrophe which might be regarded as almost
fatal, he resolved to make a dangerous experiment. Of all his attendants he had
only with him a single servant, a Dutchman, of great personal strength, and who
had always been devotedly attached to him. Niccolo induced this man to take him
upon his shoulders in a sack, as if he had been carrying property of his
master’s, and to bear him to a place of security. The enemy’s lines surrounded
Tenna, but on account of the previous day’s victory, all was in disorder, and
no guard was kept, so that the Dutchman, disguised as a trooper, passed through
them without any opposition, and brought his master in safety to his own
troops.
Had this
victory been as carefully improved as it was fortunately obtained, Brescia
would have derived from it greater relief and the Venetians more permanent
advantage; but they, having thoughtlessly let it slip, the rejoicings were soon
over, and Brescia remained in her former difficulties. Niccolo, having returned
to his forces, resolved by some extraordinary exertion to cancel the impression
of his death, and deprive the Venetians of the change of relieving Brescia. He
was acquainted with the topography of the citadel of Verona, and had learned
from prisoners whom he had taken, that it was badly guarded, and might be very
easily recovered. He perceived at once that fortune presented him with an
opportunity of regaining the laurels he had lately lost, and of changing the
joy of the enemy for their recent victory into sorrow for a succeeding
disaster. The city of Verona is situated in Lombardy, at the foot of the
mountains which divide Italy from Germany, so that it occupies part both of
hill and plain. The river Adige rises in the valley of Trento, and entering
Italy, does not immediately traverse the country, but winding to the left,
along the base of the hills, enters Verona, and crosses the city, which it
divides unequally, giving much the larger portion to the plain. On the mountain
side of the river are two fortresses, formidable rather from their situation
than from their actual strength, for being very elevated they command the whole
place. One is called San Piero, the other San Felice. On the opposite side of
the Adige, upon the plain, with their backs against the city walls, are two
other fortresses, about a mile distant from each other, one called the Old the
other the New Citadel, and a wall extends between them that may be compared to
a bowstring, of which the city wall is the arc. The space comprehended within
this segment is very populous, and is called the Borgo of St. Zeno. Niccolo
Piccinino designed to capture these fortresses and the Borgo, and he hoped to
succeed without much difficulty, as well on account of the ordinary negligence
of the guard, which their recent successes would probably increase, as because
in war no enterprise is more likely to be successful than one which by the
enemy is deemed impossible. With a body of picked men, and accompanied by the
marquis of Mantua, he proceeded by night to Verona, silently scaled the walls,
and took the New Citadel: then entering the place with his troops, he forced
the gate of S. Antonio, and introduced the whole of his cavalry. The Venetian
garrison of the Old Citadel hearing an uproar, when the guards of the New were
slaughtered, and again when the gate was forced, being now aware of the
presence of enemies, raised an alarm, and called the people to arms. The
citizens awaking in the utmost confusion, some of the boldest armed and
hastened to the rector’s piazza. In the meantime, Niccolo’s forces had pillaged
the Borgo of San Zeno; and proceeding onward were ascertained by the people to
be the duke’s forces, but being defenseless they advised the Venetian rectors
to take refuge in the fortresses, and thus save themselves and the place; as it
was more advisable to preserve their lives and so rich a city for better
fortune, than by endeavoring to repel the present evil, encounter certain
death, and incur universal pillage. Upon this the rectors and all the Venetian
party, fled to the fortress of San Felice. Some of the first citizens, anxious
to avoid being plundered by the troops, presented themselves before Niccolo and
the marquis of Mantua, and begged they would rather take possession of a rich
city, with honor to themselves, than of a poor one to their own disgrace;
particularly as they had not induced either the favor of its former possessors,
or the animosity of its present masters, by self-defense. The marquis and Niccolo
encouraged them, and protected their property to the utmost of their power
during such a state of military license. As they felt sure the count would
endeavor to recover the city, they made every possible exertion to gain
possession of the fortresses, and those they could not seize they cut off from
the rest of the place by ditches and barricades, so that the enemy might be
shut out.
The Count
Francesco was with his army at Tenna; and when the report was first brought to
him he refused to credit it; but being assured of the fact by parties whom it
would have been ridiculous to doubt, he resolved, by the exertion of uncommon
celerity, to repair the evil negligence had occasioned; and though all his
officers advised the abandonment of Verona and Brescia, and a march to Vicenza,
lest he might be besieged by the enemy in his present situation, he refused,
but resolved to attempt the recovery of Verona. During the consultation, he
turned to the Venetian commissaries and to Bernardo de’ Medici, who was there as
commissary for the Florentines, and promised them the recovery of the place if
one of the fortresses should hold out. Having collected his forces, he
proceeded with the utmost speed to Verona. Observing his approach, Niccolo
thought he designed, according to the advice he had received, to go to Vicenza,
but finding him continue to draw near, and taking the direction of San Felice,
he prepared for its defense—though too late; for the barricades were not
completed; his men were dispersed in quest of plunder, or extorting money from
the inhabitants by way of ransom; and he could not collect them in time to
prevent the count’s troops from entering the fortress. They then descended into
the city, which they happily recovered, to Niccolo’s disgrace, and with the loss
of great numbers of his men. He himself, with the marquis of Mantua, first took
refuge in the citadel, and thence escaping into the country, fled to Mantua,
where, having assembled the relics of their army, they hastened to join those
who were at the siege of Brescia. Thus in four days Verona was lost and again
recovered from the duke. The count, after this victory, it being now winter and
the weather very severe, having first with considerable difficulty thrown
provisions into Brescia, went into quarters at Verona, and ordered, that during
the cold season, galleys should be provided at Torboli, that upon the return of
spring, they might be in a condition to proceed vigorously to effect the
permanent relief of Brescia.
The duke,
finding the war suspended for a time, the hope he had entertained of occupying
Brescia and Verona annihilated, and the money and counsels of the Florentines
the cause of this, and seeing that neither the injuries they had received from
the Venetians could alienate them, nor all the promises he had made attach them
to himself, he determined, in order to make them feel more closely the effects
of the course they had adopted, to attack Tuscany; to which he was strenuously
advised by the Florentine exiles and Niccolo. The latter advocated this from
his desire to recover the states of Braccio, and expel the count from La Marca;
the former, from their wish to return home, and each by suitable arguments
endeavored to induce the duke to follow the plan congenial to their own views.
Niccolo argued that he might be sent into Tuscany, and continue the siege of
Brescia; for he was master of the lake, the fortresses were well provided, and
their officers were qualified to oppose the count should he undertake any fresh
enterprise; which it was not likely he would do without first relieving
Brescia, a thing impossible; and thus the duke might carry on the war in
Tuscany, without giving up his attempts in Lombardy; intimating that the
Florentines would be compelled, as soon as he entered Tuscany, to recall the
count to avoid complete ruin; and whatever course they took, victory to the
duke must be the result. The exiles affirmed, that if Niccolo with his army
were to approach Florence, the people oppressed with taxes, and wearied out by
the insolence of the great, would most assuredly not oppose him, and pointed
out the facility of reaching Florence; for the way by the Casentino would be
open to them, through the friendship of Rinaldo and the Count di Poppi; and
thus the duke, who was previously inclined to the attempt, was induced by their
joint persuasions to make it. The Venetians, on the other hand, though the
winter was severe, incessantly urged the count to relieve Brescia with all his
forces. The count questioned the possibility of so doing, and advised them to
wait the return of spring, in the meantime strengthening their fleet as much as
possible, and then assist it both by land and water. This rendered the
Venetians dissatisfied; they were dilatory in furnishing provisions, and
consequently many deserted from their army.
The
Florentines, being informed of these transactions, became alarmed, perceiving
the war threatening themselves, and the little progress made in Lombardy. Nor
did the suspicion entertained by them of the troops of the church give them
less uneasiness; not that the pope was their enemy, but because they saw those
forces more under the sway of the patriarch, who was their greatest foe.
Giovanni Vitelleschi of Corneto was at first apostolic notary, then bishop of
Recanati, and afterward patriarch of Alexandria; but at last, becoming a
cardinal, he was called Cardinal of Florence. He was bold and cunning; and,
having obtained great influence, was appointed to command all the forces of the
church, and conduct all the enterprises of the pontiff, whether in Tuscany,
Romagna, the kingdom of Naples, or in Rome. Hence he acquired so much power
over the pontiff, and the papal troops, that the former was afraid of
commanding him, and the latter obeyed no one else. The cardinal’s presence at Rome,
when the report came of Niccolo’s design to march into Tuscany, redoubled the
fear of the Florentines; for, since Rinaldo was expelled, he had become an
enemy of the republic, from finding that the arrangements made by his means
were not only disregarded, but converted to Rinaldo’s prejudice, and caused the
laying down of arms, which had given his enemies an opportunity of banishing
him. In consequence of this, the government thought it would be advisable to
restore and indemnify Rinaldo, in case Niccolo came into Tuscany and were
joined by him. Their apprehensions were increased by their being unable to
account for Niccolo’s departure from Lombardy, and his leaving one enterprise
almost completed, to undertake another so entirely doubtful; which they could
not reconcile with their ideas of consistency, except by supposing some new
design had been adopted, or some hidden treachery intended. They communicated
their fears to the pope, who was now sensible of his error in having endowed
the cardinal with too much authority.
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