|
While the
Florentines were thus anxious, fortune disclosed the means of securing
themselves against the patriarch’s malevolence. The republic everywhere
exercised the very closest espionage over epistolary communication, in order to
discover if any persons were plotting against the state. It happened that
letters were intercepted at Monte Pulciano, which had been written by the
patriarch to Niccolo without the pope’s knowledge; and although they were written
in an unusual character, and the sense so involved that no distinct idea could
be extracted, the obscurity itself, and the whole aspect of the matter so
alarmed the pontiff, that he resolved to seize the person of the cardinal, a
duty he committed to Antonio Rido, of Padua, who had the command of the castle
of St. Angelo, and who, after receiving his instructions, soon found an
opportunity of carrying them into effect. The patriarch, having determined to
go into Tuscany, prepared to leave Rome on the following day, and ordered the
castellan to be upon the drawbridge of the fortress in the morning, for he
wished to speak with him as he passed. Antonio perceived this to be the
favorable moment, informed his people what they were to do, and awaited the arrival
of the patriarch upon the bridge, which adjoined the building, and might for
the purpose of security be raised or lowered as occasion required. The
appointed time found him punctual; and Antonio, having drawn him, as if for the
convenience of conversation, on to the bridge, gave a signal to his men, who
immediately raised it, and in a moment the cardinal, from being a commander of
armies, found himself a prisoner of the castellan. The patriarch’s followers at
first began to use threats, but being informed of the pope’s directions they
were appeased. The castellan comforting him with kind words, he replied, that
“the great do not make each other prisoners to let them go again; and that
those whom it is proper to take, it is not well to set free.” He shortly
afterward died in prison. The pope appointed Lodovico, patriarch of Aquileia,
to command his troops; and, though previously unwilling to interfere in the
wars of the league and the duke, he was now content to take part in them, and
engaged to furnish four thousand horse and two thousand foot for the defense of
Tuscany.
The
Florentines, freed from this cause for anxiety, were still apprehensive of
Niccolo, and feared confusion in the affairs of Lombardy, from the differences
of opinion that existed between the count and the Venetians. In order the
better to become acquainted with the intentions of the parties, they sent Neri
di Gini Capponi and Giuliano Davanzati to Venice, with instructions to assist
in the arrangement of the approaching campaign; and ordered that Neri, having
discovered how the Venetians were disposed, should proceed to the count, learn
his designs, and induce him to adopt the course that would be most advantageous
to the League. The ambassadors had only reached Ferrara, when they were told
that Niccolo Piccinino had crossed the Po with six thousand horse. This made
them travel with increased speed; and, having arrived at Venice, they found the
Signory fully resolved that Brescia should be relieved without waiting for the
return of spring; for they said that “the city would be unable to hold out so
long, the fleet could not be in readiness, and that seeing no more immediate
relief, she would submit to the enemy; which would render the duke universally
victorious, and cause them to lose the whole of their inland possessions.” Neri
then proceeded to Verona to ascertain the count’s opinion, who argued, for many
reasons, that to march to Brescia before the return of spring would be quite
useless, or even worse; for the situation of Brescia, being considered in
conjunction with the season, nothing could be expected to result but disorder
and fruitless toil to the troops; so that, when the suitable period should
arrive, he would be compelled to return to Verona with his army, to recover
from the injuries sustained in the winter, and provide necessaries for the
summer; and thus the time available for the war would be wasted in marching and
countermarching. Orsatto Justiniani and Giovanni Pisani were deputed on the
part of Venice to the count at Verona, having been sent to consider these
affairs, and with them it was agreed that the Venetians should pay the count
ninety thousand ducats for the coming year, and to each of the soldiers forty
ducats; that he should set out immediately with the whole army and attack the
duke, in order to compel him, for his own preservation, to recall Niccolo into
Lombardy. After this agreement the ambassadors returned to Venice; and the
Venetians, having so large an amount of money to raise, were very remiss with
their commissariat.
In the
meantime, Niccolo Piccinino pursued his route, and arrived in Romagna, where he
prevailed upon the sons of Pandolfo Malatesti to desert the Venetians and enter
the duke’s service. This circumstance occasioned much uneasiness in Venice, and
still more at Florence; for they thought that with the aid of the Malatesti
they might resist Niccolo; but finding them gone over to the enemy, they were
in fear lest their captain, Piero Giampagolo Orsini, who was in the territories
of the Malatesti, should be disarmed and rendered powerless. The count also
felt alarmed, for, through Niccolo’s presence in Tuscany, he was afraid of
losing La Marca; and, urged by a desire to look after his own affairs, he
hastened to Venice, and being introduced to the Doge, informed him that the
interests of the League required his presence in Tuscany; for the war ought to
be carried on where the leader and forces of the enemy were, and not where his
garrisons and towns were situated; for when the army is vanquished the war is
finished; but to take towns and leave the armament entire, usually allowed the
war to break out again with greater virulence; that Tuscany and La Marca would
be lost if Niccolo were not vigorously resisted, and that, if lost, there would
be no possibility of the preservation of Lombardy. But supposing the danger to
Lombardy not so imminent, he did not intend to abandon his own subjects and
friends, and that having come into Lombardy as a prince, he did not intend to
return a mere condottiere. To this the Doge replied, it was quite manifest
that, if he left Lombardy, or even recrossed the Po, all their inland
territories would be lost; in that case they were unwilling to spend any more
money in their defense. For it would be folly to attempt defending a place
which must, after all, inevitably be lost; and that it is less disgraceful and
less injurious to lose dominions only, then to lose both territory and money.
That if the loss of their inland possessions should actually result, it would
then be seen how highly important to the preservation of Romagna and Tuscany
the reputation of the Venetians had been. On these accounts they were of quite
a different opinion from the count; for they saw that whoever was victor in
Lombardy would be so everywhere else, that conquest would be easily attainable
now, when the territories of the duke were left almost defenseless by the
departure of Niccolo, and that he would be ruined before he could order
Niccolo’s recall, or provide himself with any other remedy; that whoever
attentively considered these things would see, that the duke had sent Niccolo
into Tuscany for no other reason than to withdraw the count from his
enterprise, and cause the war, which was now at his own door, to be removed to
a greater distance. That if the count were to follow Niccolo, unless at the
instigation of some very pressing necessity, he would find his plan successful,
and rejoice in the adoption of it; but if he were to remain in Lombardy, and
allow Tuscany to shift for herself, the duke would, when too late, see the
imprudence of his conduct, and find that he had lost his territories in
Lombardy and gained nothing in Tuscany. Each party having spoken, it was
determined to wait a few days to see what would result from the agreement of
the Malatesti with Niccolo; whether the Florentines could avail themselves of
Piero Giampagolo, and whether the pope intended to join the League with all the
earnestness he had promised. Not many days after these resolutions were
adopted, it was ascertained that the Malatesti had made the agreement more from
fear than any ill-will toward the League; that Piero Giampagolo had proceeded
with his force toward Tuscany, and that the pope was more disposed than ever to
assist them. This favorable intelligence dissipated the count’s fears, and he
consented to remain in Lombardy, and that Neri Capponi should return to
Florence with a thousand of his own horse, and five hundred from the other
parties. It was further agreed, that if the affairs of Tuscany should require
the count’s presence, Neri should write to him, and he would proceed thither to
the exclusion of every other consideration. Neri arrived at Florence with his
forces in April, and Giampagolo joined them the same day.
In the
meantime, Niccolo Piccinino, the affairs of Romagna being settled, purposed
making a descent into Tuscany, and designing to go by the mountain passes of
San Benedetto and the valley of Montone, found them so well guarded by the
contrivance of Niccolo da Pisa, that his utmost exertions would be useless in
that direction. As the Florentines, upon this sudden attack, were unprovided
with troops and officers, they had sent into the defiles of these hills many of
their citizens, with infantry raised upon the emergency to guard them, among
whom was Bartolomeo Orlandini, a cavaliere, to whom was intrusted the defense
of the castle of Marradi and the adjacent passes. Niccolo Piccinino, finding
the route by San Benedetto impracticable, on account of the bravery of its
commander, thought the cowardice of the officer who defended that of Marradi
would render the passage easy. Marradi is a castle situated at the foot of the
mountains which separate Tuscany from Romagna; and, though destitute of walls,
the river, the mountains, and the inhabitants, make it a place of great
strength; for the peasantry are warlike and faithful, and the rapid current
undermining the banks has left them of such tremendous height that it is
impossible to approach it from the valley if a small bridge over the stream be
defended; while on the mountain side the precipices are so steep and
perpendicular as to render it almost impregnable. In spite of these advantages,
the pusillanimity of Bartolomeo Orlandini rendered the men cowardly and the
fortress untenable; for as soon as he heard of the enemy’s approach he
abandoned the place, fled with all his forces, and did not stop till he reached
the town of San Lorenzo. Niccolo, entering the deserted fortress, wondered it
had not been defended, and, rejoicing over his acquisition, descended into the
valley of the Mugello, where he took some castles, and halted with his army at
Pulicciano. Thence he overran the country as far as the mountains of Fiesole;
and his audacity so increased that he crossed the Arno, plundering and
destroying everything to within three miles of Florence.
The
Florentines, however, were not dismayed. Their first concern was to give
security to the government, for which they had no cause for apprehension, so
universal was the good will of the people toward Cosmo; and besides this, they
had restricted the principal offices to a few citizens of the highest class,
who with their vigilance would have kept the populace in order, even if they
had been discontented or desirous of change. They also knew by the compact made
in Lombardy what forces Neri would bring with him, and expected the troops of
the pope. These prospects sustained their courage till the arrival of Neri di
Gino, who, on account of the disorders and fears of the city, determined to set
out immediately and check Niccolo. With the cavalry he possessed, and a body of
infantry raised entirely from the people, he recovered Remole from the hands of
the enemy, where having encamped, he put a stop to all further depredations,
and gave the inhabitants hopes of repelling the enemy from the neighborhood.
Niccolo finding that, although the Florentines were without troops, no
disturbance had arisen, and learning what entire composure prevailed in the
city, thought he was wasting time, and resolved to undertake some other enterprise
to induce them to send forces after him, and give him a chance of coming to an
engagement, by means of which, if victorious, he trusted everything would
succeed to his wishes.
Francesco,
Count di Poppi, was in the army of Niccolo, having deserted the Florentines,
with whom he was in league, when the enemy entered the Mugello; and though with
the intention of securing him as soon as they had an idea of his design, they
increased his appointments, and made him commissary over all the places in his
vicinity; still, so powerful is the attachment to party, that no benefit or
fear could eradicate the affection he bore toward Rinaldo and the late
government; so that as soon as he knew Niccolo was at hand he joined him, and
with the utmost solicitude entreated him to leave the city and pass into the
Casentino, pointing out to him the strength of the country, and how easily he
might thence harass his enemies. Niccolo followed his advice, and arriving in
the Casentino, took Romena and Bibbiena, and then pitched his camp before
Castel San Niccolo. This fortress is situated at the foot of the mountains
which divide the Casentino from the Val d’Arno; and being in an elevated
situation, and well garrisoned, it was difficult to take, though Niccolo, with
catapults and other engines, assailed it without intermission. The siege had
continued more than twenty days, during which the Florentines had collected all
their forces, having assembled under several leaders, three thousand horse, at
Fegghine, commanded by Piero Giampagolo Orsini, their captain, and Neri Capponi
and Bernardo de’ Medici, commissaries. Four messengers, from Castel San
Niccolo, were sent to them to entreat succor. The commissaries having examined
the site, found it could not be relieved, except from the Alpine regions, in
the direction of the Val d’Arno, the summit of which was more easily attainable
by the enemy than by themselves, on account of their greater proximity, and
because the Florentines could not approach without observation; so that it
would be making a desperate attempt, and might occasion the destruction of the
forces. The commissaries, therefore, commended their fidelity, and ordered that
when they could hold out no longer, they should surrender. Niccolo took the
fortress after a siege of thirty-two days; and the loss of so much time, for
the attainment of so small an advantage, was the principle cause of the failure
of his expedition; for had he remained with his forces near Florence, he would
have almost deprived the government of all power to compel the citizens to
furnish money: nor would they so easily have assembled forces and taken other
precautions, if the enemy had been close upon them, as they did while he was at
a distance. Besides this, many would have been disposed to quiet their apprehensions
of Niccolo, by concluding a peace; particularly, as the contest was likely to
be of some duration. The desire of the Count di Poppi to avenge himself on the
inhabitants of San Niccolo, long his enemies, occasioned his advice to
Piccinino, who adopted it for the purpose of pleasing him; and this caused the
ruin of both. It seldom happens, that the gratification of private feelings,
fails to be injurious to the general convenience.
Niccolo,
pursuing his good fortune, took Rassina and Chiusi. The Count di Poppi advised
him to halt in these parts, arguing that he might divide his people between
Chiusi, Caprese, and the Pieve, render himself master of this branch of the
Apennines, and descend at pleasure into the Casentino, the Val d’Arno, the Val
di Chiane, or the Val di Tavere, as well as be prepared for every movement of
the enemy. But Niccolo, considering the sterility of these places, told him,
“his horses could not eat stones,” and went to the Borgo San Sepolcro, where he
was amicably received, but found that the people of Citta di Castello, who were
friendly to the Florentines, could not be induced to yield to his overtures.
Wishing to have Perugia at his disposal, he proceeded thither with forty horse,
and being one of her citizens, met with a kind reception. But in a few days he
became suspected, and having attempted unsuccessfully to tamper with the legate
and people of Perugia, he took eight thousand ducats from them, and returned to
his army. He then set on foot secret measures, to seduce Cortona from the
Florentines, but the affair being discovered, his attempts were fruitless.
Among the principal citizens was Bartolomeo di Senso, who being appointed to
the evening watch of one of the gates, a countryman, his friend, told him, that
if he went he would be slain. Bartolomeo, requesting to know what was meant, he
became acquainted with the whole affair, and revealed it to the governor of the
place, who, having secured the leaders of the conspiracy, and doubled the
guards at the gates, waited till the time appointed for the coming of Niccolo,
who finding his purpose discovered, returned to his encampment.
|