Sect.,  Part, Paragraph

 1   V,    I, 37 |             or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.~
 2   V,    I, 38 |         theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real
 3   V,    I, 38 |             a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result
 4   V,    I, 38 |       accurately the nature of this belief, and of the customary conjunction,
 5   V,   II, 39 |          between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any
 6   V,   II, 39 |      difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or
 7   V,   II, 39 |        consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter
 8   V,   II, 40 |     experience of these sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name
 9   V,   II, 40 |            of it. I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid,
10   V,   II, 40 |          can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident that belief
11   V,   II, 40 |          belief, it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar
12   V,   II, 40 |           as we observed before, is belief; which is a term that every
13   V,   II, 40 |           farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the
14   V,   II, 40 |        allow, that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception
15   V,   II, 41 |            to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation
16   V,   II, 44 |            in these phaenomena, the belief of the correlative object
17   V,   II, 44 |             Now I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond
18  VI,    0, 46 |            begets a like species of belief or opinion.~ There is certainly
19  VI,    0, 46 |            still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side,
20  VI,    0, 46 |             be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event
21  VI,    0, 46 |            nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives that event the
22  VI,    0, 46 |             mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer
23  VI,    0, 46 |           constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.~
24  VI,    0, 47 |             sentiment which we call belief, and give its object the
25 VIII,    I, 71|            appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though
26  IX,    0, 84 |         manner, which we denominate belief. No other explication can
27   X,    I, 96 |          therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such
28   X,    I, 98 |           and mutual destruction of belief and authority.~ I should
29   X,    I, 100|            he pretend to command my belief or opinion.~ ~
30   X,   II, 102|       sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which
31  XI,    0, 111|          the objects of traditional belief, more than of argument or
32  XI,    0, 123|          many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and
33 XII,    I, 127|          opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in
34 XII,  III, 138| affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical