Sect.,  Part, Paragraph

 1  IV,   II, 32 |     begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose,
 2   V,    I, 36 |         after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore,
 3   V,    I, 37 |           and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another,
 4   V,    I, 37 |         other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support
 5  VI,    0, 47 |         to the future, in all our inferences; where the past has been
 6 VII,    I, 48 |      obscurity and confusion, the inferences are always much shorter
 7 VII,    I, 48 |      mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought,
 8 VIII,    I, 69|       experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and
 9 VIII,    I, 69|           a source whence we draw inferences concerning them. But in
10 VIII,    I, 70|          human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended
11 VIII,    I, 72| characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we
12 VIII,   II, 75|          to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions,
13 VIII,   II, 75|           actions, and that those inferences are founded on the experienced
14  IX,    0, 84 |           are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are
15   X,    I, 97 |        together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from
16  XI,    0, 116|         of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes,
17  XI,    0, 121|       from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and
18  XI,    0, 121|     animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected
19  XI,    0, 121|      expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded in experience
20  XI,    0, 124|          can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the