II

THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST REGARDING THE HUMAN PERSONALITY

We now reach the questions of medical deontology, of which you have asked Us the solution, that is to say, first concerning the licitness of certain techniques and the manner of applying certain psychological tests, then regarding the principles of a religious and moral order which are fundamental for the psychologist and the patient. We will in this respect observe that the questions of deontology dealt with here also concern anyone who has the faculty of reasoning and, in a general way, anyone capable of making a conscious psychic act.

Tests and other psychological methods of investigation have contributed enormously to the knowledge of the human personality and have been of considerable service to it. One might then think that there does not exist in this domain any particular problem of medical morals and that everything can be approved without reservation. No one will in fact deny that modern psychology in general deserves approval from the religious and moral point of view.

But, if one takes into consideration specifically its objectives and the means which psychology uses to achieve them, one will be led to make a distinction. Its objectives, that is to say the scientific study of human psychology and the healing of psychic diseases only deserve praise; but the means used sometimes give grounds for justifiable reservations, such as We mentioned previously concerning the publication in America of the work "Ethical Standards for Psychologists."

The best psychologists are aware of the fact that the most clever use of existing methods does not succeed in penetrating the area of the psyche which constitutes, one might say, the center of the personality and which always remains a mystery. At this point, the psychologist cannot but acknowledge with modesty the limitations of his possibilities and respect the individuality of the man on whom he must pass judgment; he should strive to perceive the divine plan in every man and help develop it insofar as it is possible. Human personality with its specific characteristics is in fact the most noble and wondrous work of creation.

Now, to whomever takes cognizance of your works, it would appear that certain moral problems arise here: you reveal in fact several times the objections raised against the intrusion of the psychologist into the intimacy of the personalities of other beings.

Thus for instance the use of narcosynthesis, already questioned in psychotherapy, is considered illicit in legal proceedings as well as the use of the instrument for the detection of lies, known as "Lie-detector" or "polygraph."²

One author will denounce the harmful consequences of violent emotive tensions, provoked in a subject for experimental reasons, but he will also affirm that preference should be given to the interest of scientific progress over that of the individual person who serves as subject for the experiment.

Some in psychiatric research and treatment carry out intrusions without the previous consent of the patient, or without the patient being aware of their exact bearing. And the revelation of the real elements of their personality can, in the case of some people, provoke serious traumatisms.

In short, it can be said that one must sometimes deplore the unjustified intrusion of the psychologist in the depths of the personality and the serious psychic harm resulting therefrom to the patient and even to third parties.

It sometimes happens that the complete consent of the interested person is not secured, and that in order to justify disputable proceedings the priority of science over moral values and over the interests of the individuals (in other words the priority of the common good over the individual good) is alleged.

We are, therefore, going to examine the value of the principles which even good psychologists invoke to Justify certain disputable proceedings.

1) The Interest of Science and the Importance of the Psychologist

Moral law teaches that scientific demands do not by themselves alone justify the indiscriminate use of psychological techniques and methods, even by serious psychologists and for useful objectives.

The reason for this is that people concerned with the processes of psychological investigation must take into account not only scientific laws, but also transcendant norms. In fact, the primary question is not psychology itself and its possible progress but the human person who applies it and who obeys high social, moral and religious norms.

The same also holds true for the other branches of science; mathematics, for instance, or physics are in themselves alien to morals and therefore do not come under these norms, but the person who dedicates himself to their study and applies their laws is never removed from the moral field, because at no time does his free action cease to prepare his transcendent destiny.

Psychology as a science can only make its demands prevail insofar as the echelon of values and higher norms to which We have referred and which includes right, justice equity, respect of human dignity, and well ordered charity for oneself and for others, is respected. There is nothing mysterious in these norms. They are clear for any honest conscience and are formulated by natural reasoning and by Revelation. Inasmuch as they are observed, there is nothing to prevent the just demands of the science of psychology in favor of modern methods of investigation from being asserted.

2) The Consent of the Subject

The second principle under discussion is that of the rights of the person who lends himself to psychological experiments or treatments. In itself, the contents of the psyche is the exclusive property of the person himself (here regarding experiments and treatments) and is known only to him. But he already reveals something of it by his behavior.

When the psychologist concerns himself with what has been thus revealed, he does not violate the intimate psyche of the patient. He can also act with complete freedom when the patient consciously expresses a part of it and thereby indicates that he attaches no importance to the secret. But there is a considerable part of his interior world that a person reveals only to a few confidents and which he defends against the intrusion of others.

Certain matters will be kept secret at all cost from everyone, no matter whom. And then there are other matters which he could not bring himself to consider.

Psychology also shows that there exists a region of the intimate psyche-particularly tendencies and dispositions - concealed to such an extent that the individual will never know of them or even suspect their existence. And in the same way as it is illicit to take what belongs to others or to make an attempt against a person's corporal integrity without his consent, neither is one allowed to enter his interior domain without his permission, whatever may be the techniques or methods used.

But one can also ask whether the consent of the patient is sufficient to give the psychologist unlimited access to his psyche.

If the consent is unfairly extorted, all action on the part of the psychologist will be illicit; if it is impaired by lack of freedom (due to ignorance, to error or to deception) all attempts to penetrate the depths of the soul will be immoral.

But if consent is given freely, the psychologist can in the majority of cases, but not always, act according to the principles of his science without contravening any moral norms. One must ascertain whether the interested person has not overstepped the limits of his competence and capacity in giving a valid consent.

Man, in fact, does not have an unlimited power over himself. Often in your works one quotes (without, however, giving the formula) the juridical principal: [volenti non fit injuria]: there is no injustice done to the person who consents.

Let Us first of all observe that the intervention of the psychologist might well injure the rights of a third party, for instance through the revelation of secrets (of state, of office, of family or of confession), or simply the rights of individuals or communities to their reputations.

It does not suffice that the psychologist himself or his assistants are sworn to secrecy, or that a secret can be entrusted sometimes to a cautious person for serious reasons. Because, as We already pointed out in Our address of April 13,1953, on psychotherapy and psychology, there are certain secrets which absolutely cannot be revealed, not even to one cautious person.

As for the principle [volenti non fit injuria] it puts only one obstacle in the way of the psychologist, namely, the right of the person to protect his interior world. But there may be other obstacles which continue to exist by virtue of moral obligations and which the subject involved cannot suppress at his pleasure: religiousness, self-respect, chastity and decency for instance.

In this case, though he does not violate any right, the psychologist is wanting morally. One must therefore examine with regard to each specific case whether one of these reasons of moral order is not opposed to his intervention and their bearing must be accurately estimated.

3) Heroic Altruism

What must one think of the motive of heroic altruism invoked to justify the unconditional application of psychological techniques of exploration and treatment?

The moral value of human action depends in the first place on its object. If this is immoral the action is also immoral; it is of no use to invoke the motive behind it or the aim pursued. If the object is indifferent to good, one can then question the motives or the end which confer new moral values on the action. But however noble a motive may be, it can never render an evil action good.

Thus, any psychological intervention must be examined from the point of view of its object in the light of the given indications. If this object is not in line with right and morals, the motive of heroic altruism does not make it acceptable: if the object is licit, a higher moral value in addition to the motive invoked, can be attributed to the action.

People who, urged by this motive, offer themselves for the most painful experiments so as to help others and be useful to them deserve admiration and should be imitated. But one must be wary of confusing the motive or the aim of the action with its object and of transferring to the latter a moral value which it does not deserve.

4) The General Interest and the Intervention of the Public Authorities

Can the general interest and the intervention of the public authorities authorize the psychologist to use just any method?

No one can deny that the public authorities can, with regard to individuals and for just motives, put to advantage the proven acquisitions and methods of psychology. But here the question reverts to the choice of certain techniques and methods.

A characteristic trait of the totalitarian states is to give no thought to the means employed but to use indiscriminately all that serves the aim pursued without any regard for the exigencies of moral law. We already have denounced in Our speech of October 3, 1953, to the Sixth International Congress of Criminal Law the aberrations still sadly displayed by the 20th Century in its acceptance of torture and violence in judiciary proceedings.

The fact that immoral procedures are imposed by the public authorities does not in any way make them legal. Therefore, when the public authorities create experimental or consulting offices, the principles which We have described apply to all the steps of a psychological order that they may have to take.

Insofar as the free researches and initiatives of these offices are concerned, the principles applicable to free research and individual initiatives and to the use of theoretical and applied psychology in general will be enforced.

As regards the competence of the public authority to impose psychological examinations, the general principles concerning the limitations of the competence of the public authority will be applied. In Our speeches of September 13, 1952, on the moral limitations of medical research and treatment (Discourses and Radio messages Vol. XIV, pages 320-325) and of September 30, 1954, to the [Solidalitas medicorum universalis] ([Discourses and Radio messages] Vol. XVI, pages 174-176), We enounced the principles which regulate the relations between the doctor and his patients and the public authorities, and examined particularly the possibility for the public authorities to grant rights to certain doctors and psychologists which exceed the usual ones of a doctor concerning his patients.

Decisions taken by the public authorities calling for children and youth to be submitted to certain examinations - assuming that the object of such examinations is licit-must take the educators into account if they are to be moral. These are the family and the Church who have a more immediate authority over the children and the youth than the state does.

Furthermore, neither the family nor the Church will oppose steps taken in the interest of the children; but they will not allow the state to act in this field without taking into account their own rights, as was declared by Our Predecessor Pius XI in the Encyclical [Divini illius Magistri] of December 31, 1929, and as We Ourselves have stressed on several occasions.