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I. The Interests of Science
as Justification for Research and the Use of New Methods.
7.
Scientific knowledge has its own value in the domain of medical science no less
than in other scientific domains, such as, for example, physics, chemistry,
cosmology and psychology. It is a value which must certainly not be minimized,
a value existing quite independently of the usefulness or use of the acquired
knowledge. Moreover, knowledge as such and the full understanding of any truth
raise no moral objection. By virtue of this principle, research and the
acquisition of truth for arriving at new, wider and deeper knowledge and
understanding of the same truth are in themselves in accordance with the moral
order.
8. But
this does not mean that all methods, or any single method, arrived at by
scientific and technical research offers every moral guarantee. Nor, moreover,
does it mean that every method becomes licit because it increases and deepens
our knowledge. Sometimes it happens that a method cannot be used without
injuring the rights of others or without violating some moral rule of absolute
value. In such a case, although one rightly envisages and pursues the increase
of knowledge, morally the method is not admissible. Why not? Because science is
not the highest value, that to which all other orders of values-or in the same order
of value, all particular values-should be subordinated. Science itself,
therefore, as well as its research and acquisitions, must be inserted in the
order of values. Here there are well defined limits which even medical science
cannot transgress without violating higher moral rules. The confidential
relations between doctor and patient, the personal right of the patient to the
life of his body and soul in its psychic and moral integrity are just some of
the many values superior to scientific interest. This point will become more
obvious as We proceed.
9.
Although one must recognize in the "interests of science" a true
value that the moral law allows man to preserve, increase and widen, one cannot
concede the following statement: "Granted, obviously, that the doctor's
intervention is determined by scientific interest and that he observes the
rules of his profession, there are no limits to the methods for increasing and
deepening medical science." Even on this condition, one cannot just
concede this principle.
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