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BOOK FIVE
IN THE morning when thou risest unwillingly,
let this thought be
present- I
am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I
dissatisfied
if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for
which I
was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to
lie in the
bed-clothes and keep myself warm?- But this is more
pleasant.-
Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all
for action
or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the
little
birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put
in order
their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling
to do the
work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do
that which
is according to thy nature?- But it is necessary to take
rest
also.- It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds to this
too: she
has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou
goest
beyond these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts
it is not
so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou
lovest not
thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature
and her
will. But those who love their several arts exhaust themselves
in working
at them unwashed and without food; but thou valuest thy own
own nature
less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer
the dancing
art, or the lover of money values his money, or the
vainglorious
man his little glory. And such men, when they have a
violent
affection to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep
rather
than to perfect the things which they care for. But are the
acts which
concern society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of
thy
labour?
How easy it is to repel and to wipe away
every impression which is
troublesome
or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquility.
Judge every word and deed which are according
to nature to be fit
for thee;
and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any
people nor
by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or
said, do
not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have
their peculiar
leading principle and follow their peculiar movement;
which
things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own
nature and
the common nature; and the way of both is one.
I go through the things which happen
according to nature until I
shall fall
and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out
of which I
daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of
which my
father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my
nurse the
milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied
with food
and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it
for so
many purposes.
Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness
of thy wits.- Be it
so: but
there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I
am not
formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which
are
altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of
labour,
aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with
few
things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom
from trifling
magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou
art
immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of
natural
incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest
voluntarily
below the mark? Or art thou compelled through being
defectively
furnished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to
flatter,
and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try to please
men, and
to make great display, and to be so restless in thy mind? No,
by the gods:
but thou mightest have been delivered from these things
long ago.
Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being rather
slow and
dull of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about this
also, not
neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dulness.
One man, when he has done a service to
another, is ready to set it
down to
his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to
do this,
but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor,
and he
knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even
know what
he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced
grapes,
and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its
proper
fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked
the game,
a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done
a good
act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes
on to
another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in
season.-
Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus
without
observing it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary,
the
observation of what a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is
characteristic
of the social animal to perceive that he is working
in a
social manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also
should perceive
it.- It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not
rightly
understand what is now said: and for this reason thou wilt
become one
of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled
by a
certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the
meaning of
what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt
omit any
social act.
A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear
Zeus, down on the
ploughed
fields of the Athenians and on the plains.- In truth we
ought not to
pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble
fashion.
Just as we must understand when it is said,
That Aesculapius
prescribed
to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or
going
without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That
the nature
of the universe prescribed to this man disease or
mutilation
or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case
Prescribed
means something like this: he prescribed this for this
man as a
thing adapted to procure health; and in the second case it
means:
That which happens to (or, suits) every man is fixed in a
manner for
him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean
when we
say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen say of
squared
stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable,
when they
fit them to one another in some kind of connexion. For there
is
altogether one fitness, harmony. And as the universe is made up out
of all
bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing
causes
necessity (destiny) is made up to be such a cause as it is. And
even those
who are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for
they say,
It (necessity, destiny) brought this to such a
person.-
This then was brought and this was precribed to him. Let us
then
receive these things, as well as those which Aesculapius
prescribes.
Many as a matter of course even among his prescriptions
are
disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of health. Let the
perfecting
and accomplishment of the things, which the common nature
judges to
be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy
health.
And so accept everything which happens, even if it seem
disagreeable,
because it leads to this, to the health of the
universe
and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus (the universe).
For he
would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it
were not
useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything,
whatever
it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which
is
directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with
that which
happens to thee; the one, because it was done for thee
and
prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee,
originally
from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the
other,
because even that which comes severally to every man is to
the power
which administers the universe a cause of felicity and
perfection,
nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the
whole is
mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the
conjunction
and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes.
And thou
dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art
dissatisfied,
and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.
Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor
dissatisfied, if thou dost
not
succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but
when thou
bast failed, return back again, and be content if the
greater
part of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and
love this
to which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy
as if she
were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and
apply a
bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or
drenching
with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason,
and thou
wilt repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only
the things
which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have
something
else which is not according to nature.- It may be objected,
Why what
is more agreeable than this which I am doing?- But is not
this the very
reason why pleasure deceives us? And consider if
magnanimity,
freedom, simplicity, equanimity, piety, are not more
agreeable.
For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou
thinkest
of the security and the happy course of all things which
depend on
the faculty of understanding and knowledge?
Things are in such a kind of envelopment that
they have seemed to
philosophers,
not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether
unintelligible;
nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult
to
understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man
who never
changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,
and
consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they
may be in
the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber.
Then turn
to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly
possible
to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of
a man
being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and
dirt and
in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of
motion and
of things moved, what there is worth being highly prized
or even an
object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the
contrary
it is a man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the
natural dissolution and not to be vexed at
the delay, but to rest in
these
principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me which
is not
conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that
it is in
my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for
there is
no man who will compel me to this.
About what am I now employing my own soul? On
every occasion I
must ask
myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this
part of me
which they call the ruling principle? And whose soul have I
now? That
of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a
tyrant, or
of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?
What kind of things those are which appear
good to the many, we
may learn
even from this. For if any man should conceive certain
things as
being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice,
fortitude,
he would not after having first conceived these endure to
listen to
anything which should not be in harmony with what is
really
good. But if a man has first conceived as good the things which
appear to
the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as
very
applicable that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the
many
perceive the difference. For were it not so, this saying would
not offend
and would not be rejected in the first case, while we
receive it
when it is said of wealth, and of the means which further
luxury and
fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we
should
value and think those things to be good, to which after their
first
conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might be
aptly
applied- that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a
place to
ease himself in.
I am composed of the formal and the material;
and neither of them
will
perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence
out of
non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by
change
into some part of the universe, and that again will change into
another
part of the universe, and so on for ever. And by consequence
of such a change
I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for
ever in
the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so,
even if
the universe is administered according to definite periods
of
revolution.
Reason and the reasoning art (philosophy) are
powers which are
sufficient
for themselves and for their own works. They move then from
a first
principle which is their own, and they make their way to the
end which
is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts
are named
catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they
proceed by
the right road.
None of these things ought to be called a
man's, which do not belong
to a man,
as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's
nature
promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature
attaining
its end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these
things,
nor yet that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and
that which
aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if
any of
these things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man
to despise
them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be
worthy of
praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor
would he
who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these
things
were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives
himself
of, or of other things like them, or even when he is
deprived
of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss,
just in
the same degree he is a better man.
Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also
will be the character
of thy
mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with
a
continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that
where a
man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in
a palace;-
well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,
consider
that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted,
for this
it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried;
and its
end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the
end is,
there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now
the good
for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made
for
society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior
exist for
the sake of the superior? But the things which have life are
superior
to those which have not life, and of those which have life
the
superior are those which have reason.
To seek what is impossible is madness: and it
is impossible that the
bad should
not do something of this kind.
Nothing happens to any man which he is not
formed by nature to bear.
The same
things happen to another, and either because he does not
see that
they have happened or because he would show a great spirit he
is firm
and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and
conceit
should be stronger than wisdom.
Things themselves touch not the soul, not in
the least degree; nor
have they
admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:
but the
soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements
it may
think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which
present
themselves to it.
In one respect man is the nearest thing to
me, so far as I must do
good to
men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves
obstacles to
my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which
are
indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now
it is true
that these may impede my action, but they are no
impediments
to my affects and disposition, which have the power of
acting
conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes
every
hindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a
hindrance
is made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an
obstacle
on the road helps us on this road.
Reverence that which is best in the universe;
and this is that which
makes use
of all things and directs all things. And in like manner
also
reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the
same kind
as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of
everything
else, is this, and thy life is directed by this.
That which does no harm to the state, does no
harm to the citizen.
In the
case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the
state is
not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state
is harmed,
thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state.
Show him
where his error is.
Often think of the rapidity with which things
pass by and disappear,
both the
things which are and the things which are produced. For
substance
is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of
things are
in constant change, and the causes work in infinite
varieties;
and there is hardly anything which stands still. And
consider
this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the
past and
of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he
not a fool
who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and
makes
himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short
time.
Think of the universal substance, of which thou
hast a very small
portion;
and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible
interval
has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by
destiny,
and how small a part of it thou art.
Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it.
He has his own
disposition,
his own activity. I now have what the universal nature
wills me
to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.
Let the part of thy soul which leads and
governs be undisturbed by
the
movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it
not unite
with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those
affects to
their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind
by virtue
of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which
is all
one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for
it is
natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the
sensation
the opinion that it is either good or bad.
Live with the gods. And he does live with the
gods who constantly
shows to
them, his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned
to him,
and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath
given to
every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself.
And this
is every man's understanding and reason.
Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink?
Art thou angry with him
whose
mouth smells foul? What good will this danger do thee? He has
such a
mouth, he has such arm-pits: it is necessary that such an
emanation
must come from such things- but the man has reason, it will
be said, and
he is able, if he takes pain, to discover wherein he
offends- I
wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast
reason: by
thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him
his error,
admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and
there is
no need of anger. Neither tragic actor nor whore...
As thou intendest to live when thou art gone
out,...so it is in
thy power
to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away
out of
life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is
smoky, and
I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble?
But so
long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free,
and no man
shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to
do what is
according to the nature of the rational and social animal.
The intelligence of the universe is social.
Accordingly it has
made the
inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has
fitted the
superior to one another. Thou seest how it has
subordinated,
co-ordinated and assigned to everything its proper
portion,
and has brought together into concord with one another the
things
which are the best.
How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods,
thy parents, brethren,
children,
teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy
friends,
kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto
behaved to
all in such a way that this may be said of thee:
Never has wronged a man in deed or word.
And call
to recollection both how many things thou hast passed
through, and
how many things thou hast been able to endure: and that
the
history of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended:
and how
many beautiful things thou hast seen: and how many pleasures
and pains
thou hast despised; and how many things called honourable
thou hast
spurned; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown
a kind
disposition.
Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb
him who has skill and
knowledge?
What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows
beginning
and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance
and
through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the
universe.
Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a
skeleton, and either a
name or
not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things
which are
much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and
like
little dogs biting one another, and little children
quarrelling,
laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity
and
modesty and justice and truth are fled
Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.
What then
is there which still detains thee here? If the objects of
sense are
easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of
perception
are dull and easily receive false impressions; and the poor
soul
itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute
amidst
such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou
not wait
in tranquility for thy end, whether it is extinction or
removal to
another state? And until that time comes, what is
sufficient?
Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless them,
and to do
good to men, and to practise tolerance and self-restraint;
but as to
everything which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh
and
breath, to remember that this is neither thine nor in thy power.
Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow
of happiness, if thou
canst go
by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These
two things
are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of
man, and
to the soul of every rational being, not to be hindered by
another;
and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and
the
practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its
termination.
If this is neither my own badness, nor an
effect of my own
badness,
and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about
it? And
what is the harm to the common weal?
Do not be carried along inconsiderately by
the appearance of things,
but give
help to all according to thy ability and their fitness; and
if they
should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent,
do not
imagine this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit. But as
the old
man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child's top,
remembering
that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.
When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast
thou forgotten, man,
what these
things are?- Yes; but they are objects of great concern to
these
people- wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things?- I
was once a
fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.- But
fortunate means
that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune:
and a good
fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions,
good
actions.
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