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Alphabetical [« »] terms 21 than 214 that 893 the 1555 their 66 theirs 2 them 42 | Frequency [« »] ----- ----- ----- 1555 the 1301 is 1042 it 958 and | Anselmus Cantuariensis Monologium IntraText - Concordances the |
Par.
1 Pre| Anselm discusses, under the form of a meditation, the 2 Pre| the form of a meditation, the Being of God, basing his 3 Pre| basing his argument not on the authority of Scripture, 4 Pre| authority of Scripture, but on the force of reason. It contains 5 Pre| that is inconsistent with the writings of the Holy Fathers, 6 Pre| inconsistent with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and especially 7 Pre| those of St. Augustine. --The Greek terminology is employed 8 Pre| where it is stated that the Trinity may be said to consist 9 Pre| regarding meditation on the Being of God, and on some 10 Pre| with this subject, under the form of a meditation on 11 Pre| prescribed such a form for the writing of this meditation; 12 Pre| Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, 13 Pre| itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent 14 Pre| be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason, and plainly 15 Pre| and plainly expounded in the light of truth. It was their 16 Pre| undertake. And, reflecting on the matter, I have tried on 17 Pre| grounds to excuse myself; for the more they wanted this work 18 Pre| adaptable to practical use, the more was what they enjoined 19 Pre| at last, however, both by the modest importunity of their 20 Pre| their entreaties and by the not contemptible sincerity 21 Pre| reluctant as I was because of the difficulty of my task and 22 Pre| difficulty of my task and the weakness of my talent, I 23 Pre| my talent, I entered upon the work they asked for. But 24 Pre| prosecuted this work within the limits they set.~I was led 25 Pre| led to this undertaking in the hope that whatever I might 26 Pre| entreated me, as put an end to the entreaties that followed 27 Pre| to my hope, that not only the brethren mentioned above, 28 Pre| which is inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic 29 Pre| inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, or especially 30 Pre| novel or discordant with the truth, I ask him not to 31 Pre| diligently Augustine's books on the Trinity, and then judge 32 Pre| then judge my treatise in the light of those.~In stating 33 Pre| of those.~In stating that the supreme Trinity may be said 34 Pre| substances, I have followed the Greeks, who acknowledge 35 Pre| substances in one Essence, in the same faith wherein we acknowledge 36 Pre| Substance. For they designate by the word substance that attribute 37 Pre| God which we designate by the word person.~Whatever I 38 Pre| point, however, is put in the mouth of one debating and 39 Pre| to be in accordance with the wish of those whose request 40 Pre| to place this preface at the beginning of the book, before 41 Pre| preface at the beginning of the book, before the body of 42 Pre| beginning of the book, before the body of the meditation itself. 43 Pre| book, before the body of the meditation itself. For I 44 Pre| helped in understanding the matter of this book, if 45 Pre| if he has taken note of the intention, and the method 46 Pre| note of the intention, and the method according to which 47 1 | unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature 48 1 | its omnipotent goodness, the very fact of their existence, 49 1 | of their existence, and the fact that in any way their 50 1 | powers are very ordinary, by the force of reason alone.~And, 51 1 | turn his mind's eye to the examination of that cause 52 1 | So that, as reason leads the way and follows up these 53 1 | in this way: although, on the grounds that I shall see 54 1 | shall see fit to adopt, the conclusion is reached as 55 1 | that it can appear so for the time being.~It is easy, 56 1 | diversity we experience by the bodily senses, and discern 57 1 | another in another, but to be the same in different cases, 58 1 | as just, except through the quality of justness, which 59 1 | which is conceived of as the same in different goods, 60 1 | seem to be called good, the one by virtue of one thing, 61 1 | by virtue of one thing, the other by virtue of another. 62 1 | strength do not appear to be the same thing.~But if a horse, 63 1 | promotes beauty.~But, since the reasoning which we have 64 1 | supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing 65 2 | CHAPTER II.~The same subject continued. ~ 66 2 | is great, but that which, the greater it is, is the better 67 2 | which, the greater it is, is the better or the more worthy, -- 68 2 | it is, is the better or the more worthy, --wisdom, for 69 2 | greatest and best, i. e., the highest of all existing 70 3 | exists through itself, and is the highest of all existing 71 3 | something that is one and the same, and all great things 72 3 | something that is one and the same; but whatever is, apparently 73 3 | something that is one and the same. For, everything that 74 3 | nature exist thus mutually, the one through the other. For, 75 3 | mutually, the one through the other. For, though the terms 76 3 | through the other. For, though the terms master and servant 77 3 | with mutual reference, and the men thus designated are 78 3 | not at all exist mutually, the one through the other, since 79 3 | mutually, the one through the other, since these relations 80 3 | relations exist through the subjects to which they are 81 3 | truth altogether excludes the supposition that there are 82 3 | through itself exists in the greatest degree of all things.~ 83 3 | being which alone exists in the greatest and the highest 84 3 | exists in the greatest and the highest degree of all. But 85 3 | and supremely great, and the highest of all existing 86 4 | CHAPTER IV.~The same subject continued. ~ 87 4 | FURTHERMORE, if one observes the nature of things be perceives, 88 4 | For, he who doubts that the horse is superior in its 89 4 | man more excellent than the horse, assuredly does not 90 4 | assuredly does not deserve the name of man. Therefore, 91 4 | has no superior. For, if the distinction of degrees is 92 4 | reaches this conclusion: that the multitude of natures themselves 93 4 | some cause which is one and the same, that one cause, through 94 4 | what they are, that is, the very essence of these natures; 95 4 | But that which is such is the greatest and best of all 96 4 | certain nature which is the highest of all existing 97 4 | all other things exist, is the highest of all existing 98 4 | conversely, that which is the highest exists through itself, 99 4 | existence at all; and which is the supreme good being, the 100 4 | the supreme good being, the supreme great being, being 101 4 | subsisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing 102 5 | it. ~Seeing, then, that the truth already discovered 103 5 | something exists through the same thing; and what exists 104 5 | matter, and exists through the artificer, may also be said 105 5 | to derive existence from the artificer, since it exists 106 5 | through matter and from the artificer in another sense 107 5 | exists through, and from, the artificer.~It follows, then, 108 5 | are what they are, through the supreme Nature, and as that 109 6 | brought into existence with the help of any external cause, 110 6 | is conceivable. ~SINCE the same meaning is not always 111 6 | is not always attached to the phrase, "existence through" 112 6 | through" something, or, to the phrase, "existence derived 113 6 | existing beings exist through the supreme Nature, or derive 114 6 | through another, do not admit the same ground of existence. 115 6 | existence.~But, in no wise does the supreme Nature exist through 116 6 | anything else. Therefore, the supreme Nature could be 117 6 | could itself or an other be the matter whence it should 118 6 | although, in accordance with the observations I have already 119 6 | I have already made, in the light of reason, regarding 120 6 | light of reason, regarding the supreme Substance, I should 121 6 | could in no wise be true in the case of supreme Substance; 122 6 | to this point, I may have the better assured strength 123 6 | wish to convince any one of the truth of my speculations, 124 6 | speculations, even one of the slower minds, through the 125 6 | the slower minds, through the removal of every obstacle, 126 6 | other nature, then it is not the supreme Nature, but some 127 6 | great good, since it was the cause of good. But no good 128 6 | which there is no good, is the supreme Nature which is 129 6 | suppositions are false. The supreme Substance, then, 130 6 | conceive of this subject in the way in which one says that 131 6 | way in which one says that the light lights or is lucent, 132 6 | from itself. For, as are the mutual relations of the 133 6 | the mutual relations of the light and to light and lucent ( 134 6 | lucere, lucens), such are the relations of essence, and 135 6 | existing or subsisting. So the supreme Being, and to be 136 6 | supreme Being, and to be in the highest degree, and being 137 6 | highest degree, and being in the highest degree, bear much 138 6 | highest degree, bear much the same relations, one to another, 139 6 | relations, one to another, as the light and to light and lucent.~ ~ 140 7 | from it. ~THERE now remains the discussion of that whole 141 7 | to how they exist through the supreme Substance, whether 142 7 | them all, or because it was the material of all. For, there 143 7 | aided in bringing about the existence of all things: 144 7 | confused, nature appears to be the material of all bodies, 145 7 | material that I have mentioned, the material of the mundane 146 7 | mentioned, the material of the mundane mass, derives its 147 7 | then that is more truly the material of the physical 148 7 | more truly the material of the physical universe.~If, then, 149 7 | physical universe.~If, then, the universe of things, whether 150 7 | other material than from the supreme Nature or from itself, 151 7 | exists through itself, and the universe of beings which 152 7 | existence at all is not the material of anything.~From 153 7 | anything.~From its own nature the universe cannot derive existence, 154 7 | existence, since, if this were the case, it would in some sort 155 7 | from itself.~But if, from the material of the supreme 156 7 | if, from the material of the supreme Nature itself, any 157 7 | being can derive existence, the supreme good is subject 158 7 | wise good, through which the supreme good is subjected 159 7 | nature derives existence from the material of the supreme 160 7 | existence from the material of the supreme good, inasmuch as 161 7 | whencesoever, except through the supreme Being, the supreme 162 7 | through the supreme Being, the supreme good is subjected 163 7 | change and corruption through the supreme Being itself. Hence, 164 7 | supreme Being itself. Hence, the supreme Being, which is 165 7 | supreme Being, which is itself the supreme good, is by no means 166 7 | existence in a material way from the supreme Nature.~Since, then, 167 7 | then, it is evident that the essence of those things 168 7 | existence as if materially, from the supreme Essence, nor from 169 7 | whatever is exists through the supreme Being, nor can anything 170 7 | except that supreme Being and the beings created by it, it 171 7 | it is most patent that the essence of all beings, except 172 7 | essence of all beings, except the supreme Essence, was created 173 7 | alone and through itself, the world of material things, 174 8 | created, that source is the cause of what is created 175 8 | affords some assistance to the being of what it effects. 176 8 | experience, by every one, that the belief can be wrested from 177 8 | nothing, this very nothing was the cause of what was created 178 8 | If, however, no aid to the existence of anything ever 179 8 | posited in opposition to the whole argument propounded 180 8 | whole argument propounded in the preceding chapter. Hence, 181 8 | that which was something in the highest degree will be nothing. 182 8 | will be nothing. For, from the discovery of a certain Substance 183 8 | certain Substance existing in the greatest degree of all existing 184 8 | been ascertained regarding the supreme Being, is nothing.~ 185 8 | be our understanding of the term nothing? -- For I have 186 8 | and this suffices for the removal of the present obstacle -- 187 8 | suffices for the removal of the present obstacle -- can 188 8 | present obstacle -- can the statement that any substance 189 8 | man, of what he speaks, the answer is given, "of nothing," 190 8 | one who enquires regarding the supreme Being, or regarding 191 8 | to whence it was created, the answer, "from nothing" may 192 8 | answer is unintelligible in the case of any of those things 193 8 | over nothing."~If, then, the conclusion reached in the 194 8 | the conclusion reached in the preceding chapter is understood 195 8 | in this sense, that with the exception of the supreme 196 8 | that with the exception of the supreme Being all things 197 8 | conclusion consistently follows the preceding arguments, so, 198 8 | what has been created by the creative Substance was created 199 8 | created from nothing, in the way that one frequently 200 8 | without inconsistency, the statement that the creative 201 8 | inconsistency, the statement that the creative Being created all 202 8 | something. For, indeed, from the very word that we use, saying 203 8 | out of nothing"; that is, the man who was before reputed 204 9 | before their creation in the thought of the Creator. ~ 205 9 | creation in the thought of the Creator. ~BUT I seem to 206 9 | any, unless there is, in the mind of the creative agent, 207 9 | there is, in the mind of the creative agent, some example, 208 9 | evident, then, that before the world was created, it was 209 9 | world was created, it was in the thought of the supreme Nature, 210 9 | it was in the thought of the supreme Nature, what, and 211 9 | although it is clear that the being that were created 212 9 | were not nothing, so far as the creator's thought is concerned, 213 10 | a kind of expression of the objects created (locutio 214 10 | created (locutio rerum), like the expression which an artisan 215 10 | preceded their creation in the thought of the creator, 216 10 | creation in the thought of the creator, what else is it 217 10 | to make something after the manner of his craft, he 218 10 | through a concept? But by the expression of the mind or 219 10 | But by the expression of the mind or reason I mean, here, 220 10 | reason I mean, here, not the conception of words signifying 221 10 | conception of words signifying the objects, but the general 222 10 | signifying the objects, but the general view in the mind, 223 10 | but the general view in the mind, by the vision of conception, 224 10 | general view in the mind, by the vision of conception, of 225 10 | vision of conception, of the objects themselves, whether 226 10 | recognised that we can express the same object in three ways. 227 10 | express objects either by the sensible use of sensible 228 10 | which are perceptible to the bodily senses; or by thinking 229 10 | insensibly, but by expressing the things themselves inwardly 230 10 | in our mind, whether by the power of imagining material 231 10 | understanding thought, according to the diversity of these objects 232 10 | another, when I think of the same words in silence; and 233 10 | silence; and in another, when the mind regards the man himself, 234 10 | another, when the mind regards the man himself, either through 235 10 | himself, either through the image of his body, or through 236 10 | of his body, or through the reason; through the image 237 10 | through the reason; through the image of his body, when 238 10 | image of his body, when the mind imagines his visible 239 10 | his visible form; through the reason, however, when it 240 10 | rational, mortal animal.~Now, the first two kinds of expression 241 10 | kinds of expression are in the language of one's race. 242 10 | language of one's race. But the words of that kind of expression, 243 10 | known, are natural, and are the same among all nations. 244 10 | other word is necessary for the recognition of an object, 245 10 | other word is of any use for the description of an object.~ 246 10 | they may also be said to be the truer, the more like they 247 10 | be said to be the truer, the more like they are to the 248 10 | the more like they are to the objects to which they correspond, 249 10 | which they correspond, and the more expressively they signify 250 10 | these objects. For, with the exception of those objects, 251 10 | them, like certain sounds , the vowel a for instance -- 252 10 | vowel a for instance -- with the exception of these, I say, 253 10 | word appears so similar to the object to which it is applied, 254 10 | likeness which is expressed by the vision of the mind thinking 255 10 | expressed by the vision of the mind thinking of the object 256 10 | of the mind thinking of the object itself.~This last, 257 10 | then, should be called the especially proper and primary 258 10 | primary word, corresponding to the thing. Hence, if no expression 259 10 | whatever so nearly approaches the object as that expression 260 10 | words, nor can there be in the thought of any another word 261 10 | any another word so like the object, whether destined 262 10 | objects existed with (apud) the supreme Substance before 263 11 | CHAPTER XI.~The analogy, however, between 264 11 | analogy, however, between the expression of the Creator 265 11 | between the expression of the Creator and the expression 266 11 | expression of the Creator and the expression of the artisan 267 11 | Creator and the expression of the artisan is very incomplete. ~ 268 11 | it is most certain that the supreme Substance expressed, 269 11 | as it were, within itself the whole created world, which 270 11 | is very incomplete.~For the supreme Substance took absolutely 271 11 | creatures what they are; while the artisan is wholly unable 272 11 | part; nor can he perform the work mentally conceived, 273 11 | or representation, frame the idea of some sort of animal, 274 11 | yet, by no means has he the power to do this, except 275 11 | by uniting in this idea the parts that he has gathered 276 11 | these inner expressions of the works they are to create 277 11 | are to create differ in the creative substance and in 278 11 | creative substance and in the artisan: that the former 279 11 | and in the artisan: that the former expression, without 280 11 | sole cause, could suffice the Artificer for the performance 281 11 | suffice the Artificer for the performance of his work, 282 11 | performance of his work, while the latter is neither first, 283 11 | nor sufficient, cause for the inception of the artisan' 284 11 | cause for the inception of the artisan's work. Therefore, 285 11 | has been created through the former expression is only 286 11 | has been created through the latter would not exist at 287 12 | XII.~This expression of the supreme Being is the supreme 288 12 | of the supreme Being is the supreme Being. ~BUT since, 289 12 | equally certain that whatever the supreme Substance created, 290 12 | whether separately, by the utterance of separate words, 291 12 | words, or all at once, by the utterance of one word; what 292 12 | that this expression of the supreme Being is no other 293 12 | supreme Being is no other than the supreme Being? Therefore, 294 12 | supreme Being? Therefore, the consideration of this expression 295 12 | discussed, I think some of the properties of this supreme 296 13 | things were created through the supreme Being, so all live 297 13 | certain, then, that through the supreme Nature whatever 298 13 | long as they do exist, by the sustenance afforded by that 299 13 | act they are endowed with the existence that they have. 300 13 | been created except through the creative, present Being, 301 14 | being can in no wise exceed the immeasurableness of what 302 14 | creates and cherishes it, so the creative and cherishing 303 14 | cannot, in anyway, exceed the sum of the things it has 304 14 | anyway, exceed the sum of the things it has created; it 305 14 | we unite this truth with the truths already discovered, 306 15 | cannot be stated concerning the substance of this Being. ~ 307 15 | I am able, which of all the statements that may be made 308 15 | should be surprised if, among the names or words by which 309 15 | could worthily be applied to the Substance which is the creator 310 15 | to the Substance which is the creator of all; yet, we 311 15 | predication is made regarding the supreme Nature, it is not 312 15 | expression, that this Nature, is the highest of all beings, or 313 15 | truth is clearly seen from the fact that this Nature exists 314 15 | good or great. If, then, the supreme Nature can be so 315 15 | when it is conceived of as the highest of all beings, it 316 15 | beings, it is manifest that the term supreme, taken by itself, 317 15 | considerations show regarding the term supreme or highest 318 15 | taken by itself represents the essence of anything, let 319 15 | our attention be turned to the discussion of other kinds 320 15 | it. But I here understand the phrases, to be it and not 321 15 | it and not to be it, in the same way in which I understand 322 15 | and not to be bodily, and the like. Indeed, to be anything 323 15 | better if it were wise. In the same way, to be true is 324 15 | were it gold.~But, from the fact that the supreme Nature 325 15 | But, from the fact that the supreme Nature may be so 326 15 | taken by itself, describes the substance of the supreme 327 15 | describes the substance of the supreme Nature.~Since, then, 328 15 | impious to suppose that the substance of the supreme 329 15 | suppose that the substance of the supreme Nature is anything, 330 15 | any of those things which the bodily senses discern. For, 331 15 | they themselves are. For, the rational mind, as to which 332 15 | character, or how great, it is --the less this rational mind 333 15 | those things that are in the scope of the bodily senses, 334 15 | that are in the scope of the bodily senses, the greater 335 15 | scope of the bodily senses, the greater it is than any of 336 16 | XVI.~For this Being it is the same to be just that it 337 16 | that can be expressed in the same way: and none of these 338 16 | with other like cases, in the same way. Hence, the supreme 339 16 | in the same way. Hence, the supreme Nature itself is 340 16 | quality, that is, justness, the supremely good Substance 341 16 | But this is contrary to the truth already established, 342 16 | through justness, it is the same as saying that it is 343 16 | if it is inquired what the supreme Nature, which is 344 16 | how we are to understand the statement, that the Nature 345 16 | understand the statement, that the Nature which is itself justness 346 16 | possessing justness. Since, on the other hand, it cannot properly 347 16 | cannot properly be said of the supreme Nature that it possesses 348 16 | Therefore, seeing that it is the same to say of the supreme 349 16 | it is the same to say of the supreme Being, that it is 350 16 | when one is asked regarding the supreme Nature, what it 351 16 | supreme Nature, what it is, the answer, Just, is not less 352 16 | is not less fitting than the answer, Justness. Moreover, 353 16 | see to have been proved in the case of justness, the intellect 354 16 | in the case of justness, the intellect is compelled to 355 16 | that whatever good thing the supreme Nature is, it is 356 16 | supreme Nature is, it is in the highest degree. It is, therefore, 357 17 | its essence are one and the same in it: and nothing 358 17 | inferred, then, that if the supreme Nature is so many 359 17 | requires for its subsistence the things of which it is compounded, 360 17 | and, indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence, because, 361 17 | But this impious falsehood the whole cogency of the truth 362 17 | falsehood the whole cogency of the truth that was shown above 363 17 | one of them is, therefore, the same as all, whether taken 364 17 | whatever is attributed to the essence of the supreme Substance 365 17 | attributed to the essence of the supreme Substance is one; 366 17 | these, taken by itself, is the whole of what man is.~That 367 17 | nothing that is truly said of the supreme Being is accepted 368 18 | begins to exist. Therefore, the supreme Nature does not 369 18 | unmixed good, at whose will the supreme good perishes. But 370 18 | But this Being is itself the true and simple, unmixed 371 18 | Being, which is certainly the supreme good, will not die 372 18 | with nor against its will the supreme Nature is to have 373 18 | it have an end.~Again, if the supreme nature has an end 374 18 | beginning or end. Hence, the same follows as regards 375 18 | same follows as regards the supreme Nature, since it 376 18 | Nature, since it is itself the supreme Truth.~ ~ 377 19 | are again confronted by the term nothing, and whatever 378 19 | reasoning thus far, with the concordant attestation of 379 19 | concluded nothing to be. For, if the propositions duly set forth 380 19 | above have been confirmed by the fortification of logically 381 19 | anything existed before the supreme Being, nor will 382 19 | nothing already existed; and the same Being shall no longer 383 19 | if it is established that the supreme Being succeeds nothing [ 384 19 | supposed actually to precede the supreme Being in existence. 385 19 | supreme Being in existence. The fallacy involved is shown 386 19 | stormed by nothing; and the supreme good, which has 387 19 | been sought and found by the light of truth, be lost 388 19 | nothing did not exist before the supreme Being, and that 389 19 | that nothing existed before the supreme Being, carries two 390 19 | statement is that, before the supreme Being, there was 391 19 | another understanding of the same statement is that, 392 19 | statement is that, before the supreme Being, not anything 393 19 | fly, which would be true.~The former interpretation, therefore, 394 19 | therefore, which is followed by the inconsistency discussed 395 19 | false. But there remains the other interpretation, which 396 19 | perfect consistency with the foregoing arguments, and 397 19 | arguments, and which, from the force of their whole correlation, 398 19 | correlation, must be true.~Hence, the statement that nothing existed 399 19 | Being must be received in the latter sense. Nor should 400 19 | there was not anything. The same sort of double signification 401 19 | signification is found in the statement that nothing will 402 19 | this interpretation of the term nothing, that has been 403 19 | preceded or will follow the supreme Being, and the conclusion 404 19 | follow the supreme Being, and the conclusion is reached, that 405 19 | will exist after it. Yet, the solidity of the truths already 406 19 | it. Yet, the solidity of the truths already established 407 19 | is in no wise impaired by the emptiness of nothing.~ ~ 408 20 | and through all; and from the fact that it neither began, 409 20 | when that Nature exists.~The supreme Being, then, exists 410 20 | that this is false. Hence, the former proposition is also 411 20 | themselves are existing things -- the supreme Nature cannot exist 412 21 | a part of it so exists, the other part transcending 413 21 | in a high degree alien to the supreme Nature. Hence, it 414 21 | are confronted, then, by the former alternative, that 415 21 | alternative, that is, how the supreme Nature can exist, 416 21 | places or times. But, since the law of place and the law 417 21 | since the law of place and the law of time, the investigation 418 21 | place and the law of time, the investigation of which it 419 21 | they advanced on exactly the same lines, here separate 420 21 | then, let us see whether the supreme Nature can exist, 421 21 | places. Then, let us make the same inquiry regarding the 422 21 | the same inquiry regarding the times at which it can exist.~ 423 21 | which exists as a whole at the same time, in another place, 424 21 | no part of what exists at the same time outside this place.~ 425 21 | no part of what exists at the same time outside that place. 426 21 | place, no part exists, at the same time, in another place. 427 21 | whole in different places at the same time, it follows that, 428 21 | places at once. Hence, if the supreme Nature exists as 429 21 | in one place, there is in the meantime no good and no 430 21 | absolutely nothing exists. But the absurdity of this supposition 431 21 | supposition is proved by the existence of places themselves, 432 21 | but something. Therefore, the supreme Nature does not 433 21 | times.~But, if neither at the same time nor at different 434 21 | distributed in parts according to the parts of time.~But its eternity 435 21 | nothing else than itself. The supreme Being, then, will 436 21 | into parts, according to the divisions of time. For, 437 21 | or future attributable to the creative Being, either its 438 21 | some place or time.~But, on the other hand, since it is 439 22 | be reconciled? Perhaps the supreme Nature exists in 440 22 | seems to be subject, except the beings which so exist in 441 22 | truth asserted that one and the same whole cannot exist 442 22 | different places or times; in the case of those beings which 443 22 | means compelled to submit to the law of place or time. No 444 22 | reasoning fail to reach the conclusion, that the Substance 445 22 | reach the conclusion, that the Substance which creates 446 22 | alien to, and free from, the nature and law of all things 447 22 | that space circumscribes the magnitude of truth, or, 448 22 | Seeing, then, that this is the condition of place or time; 449 22 | their bounds neither escapes the law of parts -- such as 450 22 | is in no wise confined by the restraint of place or time, 451 22 | seeing, I say, that this is the condition governing place 452 22 | place or time, no doubt the supreme Substance, which 453 22 | necessity requires that the supreme Being, as a whole, 454 22 | prevented from being present at the same time, and in like manner 455 22 | therefore vanished from the present, with the past, 456 22 | vanished from the present, with the past, which no longer is; 457 22 | is; nor does it pass with the present, which is, for an 458 22 | nor is it to come with the future, which is not yet.~ 459 22 | at any place or time -- the Being which, in no wise, 460 22 | space or time. For, when the supreme Being is said to 461 22 | space or time, although the form of expression regarding 462 22 | and temporal natures, is the same, because of the usage 463 22 | is the same, because of the usage of language, yet the 464 22 | the usage of language, yet the sense is different, because 465 22 | is different, because of the unlikeness of the objects 466 22 | because of the unlikeness of the objects of discussion. For 467 22 | objects of discussion. For in the latter case the same expression 468 22 | For in the latter case the same expression has two 469 22 | times themselves.~But in the case of the supreme Being, 470 22 | themselves.~But in the case of the supreme Being, the first 471 22 | case of the supreme Being, the first sense only is intended, 472 22 | it is also contained. If the usage of language permitted, 473 22 | exists in place or time. For the statement that a thing exists 474 22 | contained, more than does the statement that it exists 475 22 | it were circumscribed by the same places, and suffered 476 22 | and suffered change by the same times.~We have sufficient 477 22 | evidence, then, to dispel the contradiction that threatened 478 22 | threatened us; as to how the highest Being of all exists, 479 22 | place or time, according to the consistent truth of different 480 22 | truth of different senses of the terms employed.~ ~ 481 23 | this sense is supported by the truth of the fact, and is 482 23 | supported by the truth of the fact, and is not forbidden 483 23 | and is not forbidden by the proper signification of 484 23 | proper signification of the word of place?~For we often 485 23 | places; as, when I say that the understanding is there in 486 23 | understanding is there in the soul, where rationality 487 23 | no local limitation, does the mind contain anything, nor 488 23 | contained.~Hence, as regards the truth of the matter, the 489 23 | as regards the truth of the matter, the supreme Nature 490 23 | the truth of the matter, the supreme Nature is more appropriately 491 23 | all places. And since, as the reasons set forth above 492 23 | things, that it is one and the same, perfect whole in every 493 24 | neither past, nor future, nor the temporal, that is, transient 494 24 | parts. Is not, therefore, the term which seems to mean 495 24 | always; since, for it, it is the same to exist and to live, 496 24 | which is consistent with the nature of that Substance 497 24 | clearly perceived from the single fact that true eternity 498 24 | was not created, but is the creator, since true eternity 499 24 | conceived to be free from the limitations of beginning 500 24 | proved to be consistent with the nature of no created being,