Par.

 1 2 |   physically great, as a material object is great, but that which,
 2 10|           we can express the same object in three ways. For we express
 3 10|         for the recognition of an object, and where they cannot be,
 4 10|         for the description of an object.~For, without absurdity,
 5 10|         appears so similar to the object to which it is applied,
 6 10|          the mind thinking of the object itself.~This last, then,
 7 10|           if no expression of any object whatever so nearly approaches
 8 10|          so nearly approaches the object as that expression which
 9 10|          another word so like the object, whether destined to be,
10 31|         less closely imitates the object of which it is the likeness.~
11 32|      Since every word by which an object is thus mentally expressed
12 32|           is the likeness of that object, if this is not the word
13 32|        word corresponding to some object. Therefore, if there were
14 33|         impression. For, whatever object the mind, either through
15 33|        truly does it think of the object itself; and, indeed, this
16 48|       memory. For, to think of an object of which we have remembrance,
17 48|         word corresponding to the object is the thought itself, formed
18 48|        after the likeness of that object from memory.~Hence, it may
19 49|      memory and conception of any object, unless, so far as reason
20 49|           as reason requires, the object itself is loved or condemned.
21 50|       conceive of himself. For no object is loved without remembrance
22 62|       give expression to some one object in thought, apparently there
23 62|       words corresponding to that object as there are thinkers; since
24 62|         word corresponding to the object thought of is not born of
25 62|     thought of is not born of the object itself, since that is absent
26 62|          likeness or image of the object which exists in the memory
27 62|  corporeal sense from the present object itself.~But in the supreme
28 64| investigating an incomprehensible object ought to be satisfied if
29 64|     enough to recognise that this object most certainly exists; nor
30 65|   regarding this incomprehensible object, and in some sort has nothing
31 65|         not see, one and the same object; we express and see it through
32 79|         appeased in behalf of any object, as the supremely good and