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| Alphabetical [« »] terminology 1 terms 21 than 214 that 893 the 1555 their 66 theirs 2 | Frequency [« »] 1301 is 1042 it 958 and 893 that 883 of 704 to 606 in | Anselmus Cantuariensis Monologium IntraText - Concordances that |
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1 Pre| reason. It contains nothing that is inconsistent with the 2 Pre| and especially nothing that is inconsistent with those 3 Pre| LXXVIII., where it is stated that the Trinity may be said 4 Pre| consist of three substances, that is, three persons.~CERTAIN 5 Pre| in writing some thoughts that I had offered them in familiar 6 Pre| rather than with my ability, that they have prescribed such 7 Pre| this meditation; in order that nothing in Scripture should 8 Pre| of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion 9 Pre| It was their wish also, that I should not disdain to 10 Pre| inspired by their affection that, so far as I was able, I 11 Pre| undertaking in the hope that whatever I might accomplish 12 Pre| worthless thing. For I know that in this book I have not 13 Pre| an end to the entreaties that followed me so urgently. 14 Pre| out, contrary to my hope, that not only the brethren mentioned 15 Pre| have not been able to find that I have made in it any statement 16 Pre| shall appear to any man that I have offered in this work 17 Pre| in this work any thought that is either too novel or discordant 18 Pre| light of those.~In stating that the supreme Trinity may 19 Pre| designate by the word substance that attribute of God which we 20 Pre| Whatever I have said on that point, however, is put in 21 Pre| prayer and earnest entreaty, that if any shall wish to copy 22 Pre| meditation itself. For I believe that one will be much helped 23 Pre| It is my opinion, too, that one who has first seen this 24 Pre| offered here any thought that is contrary to his own belief.~ ~ 25 1 | existence, and the fact that in any way their existence 26 1 | creatures, he still believes that he can at least convince 27 1 | to be good, it is natural that this man should, at some 28 1 | eye to the examination of that cause by which these things 29 1 | judges them to be good. So that, as reason leads the way 30 1 | although, on the grounds that I shall see fit to adopt, 31 1 | absolutely necessary, but merely that it can appear so for the 32 1 | faculties, must we not believe that there is some one thing, 33 1 | who are willing to see, that whatsoever things are said 34 1 | attribute in such a way that in mutual comparison they 35 1 | Since it is certain, then, that all goods, if mutually compared, 36 1 | by virtue of one quality, that a horse is called good, 37 1 | and by virtue of another, that he is called good, because 38 1 | therefore good, how is it that a strong, swift robber is 39 1 | truly good, are good through that same being through which 40 1 | all goods exist, whatever that being is. But who can doubt 41 1 | It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good 42 1 | through another being than that which they themselves are, 43 1 | itself. For it is supreme, in that it so surpasses other beings, 44 1 | surpasses other beings, that it is neither equalled nor 45 1 | equalled nor excelled. But that which is supremely good 46 1 | good, and supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing 47 2 | just as it has been proved that there is a being that is 48 2 | proved that there is a being that is supremely good, since 49 2 | is necessarily inferred that there is something supremely 50 2 | material object is great, but that which, the greater it is, 51 2 | good, there must be a being that is greatest and best, i. 52 3 | things such through something that is one and the same, and 53 3 | things such through something that is one and the same; but 54 3 | exists through something that is one and the same. For, 55 3 | the same. For, everything that is, exists either through 56 3 | altogether inconceivable that anything should not exist 57 3 | through which all things that are exist. But if there 58 3 | one, but rather through that one being through which 59 3 | But, there can be no doubt that, in that case, they exist 60 3 | can be no doubt that, in that case, they exist through 61 3 | this one, cannot exist.~But that these beings exist mutually 62 3 | an irrational conception that anything should exist through 63 3 | excludes the supposition that there are more beings than 64 3 | which all things exist, that being, through which all 65 3 | Since, then, all things that are exist through this one 66 3 | through another is less than that, through which all things 67 3 | through itself. Therefore, that which exists through itself 68 3 | highest degree of all. But that which is greatest of all, 69 3 | whatever has any existence -- that must be supremely good, 70 4 | whether he will or no, that not all are embraced in 71 4 | single degree of dignity; but that certain among them are distinguished 72 4 | degree. For, he who doubts that the horse is superior in 73 4 | although it cannot be denied that some natures are superior 74 4 | nevertheless reason convinces us that some nature is so preeminent 75 4 | preeminent among these, that it has no superior. For, 76 4 | degrees is infinite, so that there is among them no degree, 77 4 | reaches this conclusion: that the multitude of natures 78 4 | some nature or natures, that there is none in comparison 79 4 | which is one and the same, that one cause, through which 80 4 | is itself what they are, that is, the very essence of 81 4 | with essence.~If, however, that through which these natures 82 4 | so great is another than that which they are, then, certainly, 83 4 | certainly, they are less than that through which they are so 84 4 | something else is less than that through which it is great. 85 4 | Therefore, they are not so great that there is nothing else greater 86 4 | kind. We conclude, then, that there is some nature which 87 4 | is so superior to others that it is inferior to none. 88 4 | is inferior to none. But that which is such is the greatest 89 4 | showed us not long since, that which exists through itself, 90 4 | beings; either conversely, that which is the highest exists 91 4 | being. But it is manifest that there cannot be more than 92 4 | or subsisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing 93 5 | from it. ~Seeing, then, that the truth already discovered 94 5 | this Nature, and all things that have any existence, derive 95 5 | through it.~But it is clear that one may say, that what derives 96 5 | clear that one may say, that what derives existence from 97 5 | derives existence from both. That is, it is endowed with existence 98 5 | artificer in another sense than that in which it exists through, 99 5 | artificer.~It follows, then, that just as all existing beings 100 5 | the supreme Nature, and as that Nature exists through itself, 101 6 | Since it is evident, then, that this Nature is whatever 102 6 | in some sort, less than that through which it obtains 103 6 | What is to be inferred? For that which cannot have come into 104 6 | this matter.~For, seeing that this my meditation has suddenly 105 6 | almost foolish objection that occurs to me, in my argument; 106 6 | in my argument; in order that by leaving no ambiguity 107 6 | what follows; and in order that if, perchance, I shall wish 108 6 | acquiesce in what it finds here.~That this Nature, then, without 109 6 | it would be absurd to say that whatever is is nothing. 110 6 | is utterly inconceivable that what is something should 111 6 | nothing. But it is evident that in no wise does anything 112 6 | through something, then that through which it exists 113 6 | exist before it. Seeing that this Being, then, does not 114 6 | nothing, through something, that through which it exists 115 6 | understood as existing before that good, without which nothing 116 6 | it is sufficiently clear that this good, without which 117 6 | is not even conceivable that this Nature was preceded 118 6 | nothing, there is no doubt that either, whatever it is, 119 6 | It is unnecessary to show that both these suppositions 120 6 | the way in which one says that the light lights or is lucent, 121 6 | essence, and to be and being, that is, existing or subsisting. 122 7 | remains the discussion of that whole class of beings that 123 7 | that whole class of beings that exist through another, as 124 7 | for this reason, namely, that there being another creative 125 7 | has already been shown, that whatever things are should 126 7 | ought to inquire whether that whole class of beings which 127 7 | material. But I do not doubt that all this solid world, with 128 7 | see in actual objects, so that their formless, or even 129 7 | their own forms. -- I say that I do not doubt this. But 130 7 | whence this very material that I have mentioned, the material 131 7 | material of this material, then that is more truly the material 132 7 | even conceivable except that highest of all beings, which 133 7 | this supreme Being. Hence, that which has no existence at 134 7 | so through another than that through which all things 135 7 | false.~Again, everything that derives existence from material 136 7 | another, and exists later than that other. Therefore, since 137 7 | than itself, it follows that nothing derives material 138 7 | Hence, since everything that is other than this supreme 139 7 | than it, it is impossible that anything other than it in 140 7 | Furthermore: doubtless that is in no wise good, through 141 7 | Since, then, it is evident that the essence of those things 142 7 | another, it is manifest that it derives existence from 143 7 | material. Hence, seeing that whatever is exists through 144 7 | it follows, necessarily, that nothing besides it exists, 145 7 | else is or has been, except that supreme Being and the beings 146 7 | aid than itself. But all that it has created, it has doubtless 147 7 | then, it is most patent that the essence of all beings, 148 7 | Essence, was created by that supreme Essence, and derives 149 7 | nothing can be more clear than that this supreme Essence nevertheless 150 8 | How it is to be understood that this Nature created all 151 8 | source anything is created, that source is the cause of what 152 8 | experience, by every one, that the belief can be wrested 153 8 | created from it. But how could that which had no existence, 154 8 | can be convinced, and how, that anything is created out 155 8 | since it is inconceivable that anything should be created 156 8 | nothing; just as all agree that nothing comes from nothing. 157 8 | Whence, it evidently follows, that whatever is created is created 158 8 | it apparently follows, that whatever has been created 159 8 | will thus be something, that which was something in the 160 8 | brought me to this conclusion, that all other beings were so 161 8 | created by this Substance, that that from which they were 162 8 | by this Substance, that that from which they were created 163 8 | created was nothing. Hence, if that from which they were created, 164 8 | obstacle -- can the statement that any substance was created 165 8 | wish it to be understood, that what is said to have been 166 8 | is given, "of nothing," that is, he does not speak at 167 8 | may properly be given; that is, it never was created. 168 8 | case of any of those things that actually were created.~There 169 8 | cannot be true; namely, that if anything is said to have 170 8 | itself (de nihilo ipso), that is, from what does not exist 171 8 | nothing, when we understand that it was indeed created, but 172 8 | was indeed created, but that there is not anything whence 173 8 | afflicted without cause, that he is afflicted "over nothing."~ 174 8 | understood in this sense, that with the exception of the 175 8 | things have been created by that Being from nothing, that 176 8 | that Being from nothing, that is, not from anything; just 177 8 | inconsistency or any contradiction, that what has been created by 178 8 | from nothing, in the way that one frequently says a rich 179 8 | made from a poor man, or that one has recovered health 180 8 | recovered health from sickness; that is, he who was poor before, 181 8 | inconsistency, the statement that the creative Being created 182 8 | things from nothing, or that all were created through 183 8 | through it from nothing; that is, those things which before 184 8 | indeed, from the very word that we use, saying that it created 185 8 | word that we use, saying that it created them or that 186 8 | that it created them or that they were created, we understand 187 8 | were created, we understand that when this Being created 188 8 | it created something, and that when they were created, 189 8 | we say, "Lo, he has made that man out of nothing"; that 190 8 | that man out of nothing"; that is, the man who was before 191 8 | nothing is now, by virtue of that other's making, truly reckoned 192 9 | BUT I seem to see a truth that compels me to distinguish 193 9 | rule. It is evident, then, that before the world was created, 194 9 | Hence, although it is clear that the being that were created 195 9 | is clear that the being that were created were nothing 196 9 | creation, to this extent, that they were not what they 197 10 | usage, it is recognised that we can express the same 198 10 | sensible use of sensible signs, that is, signs which are perceptible 199 10 | s race. But the words of that kind of expression, which 200 10 | or expresses it as does that likeness which is expressed 201 10 | approaches the object as that expression which consists 202 10 | reason it may be thought that such an expression of objects 203 10 | Substance before their creation, that they might be created; and 204 10 | created; and exists, now that they have been created, 205 10 | they have been created, that they may be known through 206 11 | though it is most certain that the supreme Substance expressed, 207 11 | mental concept, yet I see that this analogy is very incomplete.~ 208 11 | uniting in this idea the parts that he has gathered in his memory 209 11 | substance and in the artisan: that the former expression, without 210 11 | only what it is through that expression, while whatever 211 11 | unless it were something that it is not through this expression 212 12 | shows, it is equally certain that whatever the supreme Substance 213 12 | evidently necessary, than that this expression of the supreme 214 13 | it. ~IT is certain, then, that through the supreme Nature 215 13 | rational mind can doubt that all creatures live and continue 216 13 | the sustenance afforded by that very Being through whose 217 13 | endowed with the existence that they have. For, by a like 218 13 | like course of reasoning to that by which it has been gathered 219 13 | which it has been gathered that all existing beings exist 220 13 | through some one being, hence that being alone exists through 221 13 | I say, it can be proved that whatever things live, live 222 13 | through some one being; hence that being alone lives through 223 13 | since it cannot but be that those things which have 224 13 | live through another, and that by which they have been 225 14 | must be true, it follows that, where this Being is not, 226 14 | and in all. But seeing that it is manifestly absurd 227 14 | it is manifestly absurd that as any created being can 228 14 | has created; it is clear that this Being itself, is what 229 15 | which of all the statements that may be made regarding anything 230 15 | nothing, any should be found that could worthily be applied 231 15 | any rate, no one can doubt that no such expression describes 232 15 | describes what is essential to that in regard to which it is 233 15 | Therefore, it is manifest that this very expression, that 234 15 | that this very expression, that this Nature, is the highest 235 15 | any other relative term that can, in like manner, be 236 15 | clearly seen from the fact that this Nature exists through 237 15 | itself, whatever there be that is good or great. If, then, 238 15 | conceived of as not supreme, that still it shall be in no 239 15 | all beings, it is manifest that the term supreme, taken 240 15 | itself, does not describe that Being which is altogether 241 15 | separately whatever there is that is not of a relative nature, 242 15 | nature, either it is such that, to be it is in general 243 15 | than not to be it, or such that, in some cases, not to be 244 15 | better than not to be so; that is, it is better to be wise 245 15 | be wise. For, everything that is not wise, simply in so 246 15 | is wise, since everything that is not wise would be better 247 15 | better than not to be so, that is, better than not to be 248 15 | gold.~But, from the fact that the supreme Nature may be 249 15 | conceived of as not supreme, that supreme is neither in general 250 15 | this fact it is evident that there are many relative 251 15 | sufficient, for my purpose, that undoubtedly none of these, 252 15 | whatever else there is, that, if it is taken independently, 253 15 | it is impious to suppose that the substance of the supreme 254 15 | better, it must be true that this substance is whatever 255 15 | not it. For, it alone is that, than which there is nothing 256 15 | were any of those things that are in the scope of the 257 15 | further inquiry as to what that supreme Nature is, if it 258 16 | it is the same to be just that it is to be justice; and 259 16 | with regard to attributes that can be expressed in the 260 16 | magnitude; because everything that is just is so through justness, 261 16 | justness.~It seems, then, that by participation in this 262 16 | participation in this quality, that is, justness, the supremely 263 16 | truth already established, that it is good, or great or 264 16 | what can be more clear than that this Nature is itself justness? 265 16 | it is the same as saying that it is just through itself. 266 16 | else is understood than that it is just through justness. 267 16 | understand the statement, that the Nature which is itself 268 16 | said of the supreme Nature that it possesses justness, but 269 16 | possesses justness, but that it is justness, when it 270 16 | but what it is, it follows that, when it is called just, 271 16 | it is.~Therefore, seeing that it is the same to say of 272 16 | say of the supreme Being, that it is just and that it is 273 16 | Being, that it is just and that it is justness; and, when 274 16 | justness; and, when it is said that it is justness, it is nothing 275 16 | nothing else than saying that it is just; it makes no 276 16 | it is.~But it is obvious that whatever good thing the 277 17 | is simple in such a way that all things that can be said 278 17 | such a way that all things that can be said of its essence 279 17 | it to be inferred, then, that if the supreme Nature is 280 17 | Or is it true, rather, that there are not more goods 281 17 | at all supreme. If, then, that Nature is compounded of 282 17 | than one, all these facts that are true of every composite 283 17 | whole cogency of the truth that was shown above refutes 284 17 | clear argument.~Since, then, that Nature is by no means composite 285 17 | the whole of what man is.~That supreme Being, however, 286 17 | means anything in such a way that it is not this same thing, 287 17 | it is. Therefore, nothing that is truly said of the supreme 288 18 | truths already made plain, that in no wise does it derive 289 18 | from and through itself, that by no means is there one 290 18 | no means identical with that from or through which it 291 18 | from, itself.~Seeing, then, that it has a beginning neither 292 18 | incorruptible. But we have proved that it is supremely immortal 293 18 | its will. But certainly that is not a simple, unmixed 294 18 | unmixed good. Therefore, that very Being, which is certainly 295 18 | it was not true, namely, that something was destined to 296 18 | shall not be true, namely, that something has existed. But, 297 18 | impossible even to conceive that truth has either beginning 298 18 | before it began it was true that truth did not exist, and 299 18 | be ended it will be true that truth will not exist. Yet, 300 18 | not exist. Yet, anything that is true cannot exist without 301 19 | follow it.~But, he who says that nothing existed before it 302 19 | to make this statement, "that there was before it a time 303 19 | when nothing existed, and that there will be after it a 304 19 | Therefore, when nothing existed, that Being did not exist, and 305 19 | when nothing shall exist, that Being will not exist. How 306 19 | exist. How is it, then, that it does not take inception 307 19 | from nothing or how is it that it will not come to nothing? -- 308 19 | not come to nothing? -- if that Being did not yet exist, 309 19 | For, if it is established that the supreme Being succeeds 310 19 | rather be declared, then, that nothing did not exist before 311 19 | before the supreme Being, and that nothing will not exist after 312 19 | exist after it, rather than that, when a place is given before 313 19 | or after it to nothing, that Being which through itself 314 19 | this one assertion, namely, that nothing existed before the 315 19 | sense of this statement is that, before the supreme Being, 316 19 | of the same statement is that, before the supreme Being, 317 19 | assertion either in this way, that nothing, as an entity in 318 19 | be false; or in this way, that not anything has taught 319 19 | true.~Hence, the statement that nothing existed before that 320 19 | that nothing existed before that Being must be received in 321 19 | should it be so explained, that it shall be understood that 322 19 | that it shall be understood that there was any time when 323 19 | there was any time when that Being did not exist, and 324 19 | nothing did exist; but, so that it shall be understood that, 325 19 | that it shall be understood that, before that Being, there 326 19 | understood that, before that Being, there was not anything. 327 19 | is found in the statement that nothing will exist after 328 19 | nothing will exist after that Being.~If, then, this interpretation 329 19 | interpretation of the term nothing, that has been given, is carefully 330 19 | the conclusion is reached, that nothing existed before or 331 20 | has been concluded above that this creative Nature exists 332 20 | through all; and from the fact that it neither began, nor will 333 20 | cease to be, it follows that it always has been, and 334 20 | carefully where and when that Nature exists.~The supreme 335 20 | obviously contradictory, than that what exists most really 336 20 | It is, therefore, false that it exists nowhere and never. 337 20 | there is no need to state that this is false. Hence, the 338 20 | proposition is also false, that that Being exists nowhere 339 20 | proposition is also false, that that Being exists nowhere and 340 20 | Whence it will follow, that there is some place and 341 20 | at all exists. But seeing that this is false -- for place 342 20 | time. But, if it is said that it of itself exists finitely, 343 20 | some place and time, but that, through its power, it is 344 20 | For, since it is manifest that its power is nothing else 345 20 | exist everywhere and always, that is, in every place and at 346 21 | either it is to be understood that it exists as a whole at 347 21 | individual places and times; or, that it exists as a whole, in 348 21 | places and at all times that it exists by parts in individual 349 21 | the former alternative, that is, how the supreme Nature 350 21 | distinguished from place that there are individual places, 351 21 | are individual places, so that which exists as a whole, 352 21 | place, is so distinct from that which exists as a whole 353 21 | time, in another place, that there are indiviual wholes. 354 21 | place, there is no part that does not exist in that place. 355 21 | part that does not exist in that place. And that of which 356 21 | exist in that place. And that of which there is no part 357 21 | of which there is no part that does not exist in a given 358 21 | at the same time outside that place. But, of that of which 359 21 | outside that place. But, of that of which no part exists 360 21 | if no part of it can at that time exist in another place?~ 361 21 | the same time, it follows that, for individual places, 362 21 | individual places, it is evident that it does not at all exist, 363 21 | to-morrrow; it is properly said that it was and is and will be. 364 21 | present. How, then, shall that proposition be valid, which 365 21 | logical cogency above, namely, that that supreme Nature is in 366 21 | cogency above, namely, that that supreme Nature is in no 367 21 | how shall this be so, if that Nature is one thing, at 368 21 | will be future. Therefore that Being never was, nor will 369 21 | in all places or times that it exists, as a whole, at 370 21 | places and times; nor so that it exists, as a whole, in 371 21 | and places, it is manifest that it does not in any way exist, 372 21 | it has been demonstrated that it neither so exists in 373 21 | in every time or place, that a part exists in every, 374 21 | and time, it is impossible that it exists everywhere and 375 21 | has already been proved, that it cannot exist finitely, 376 21 | time. In no place or time, that is, nowhere and never does 377 21 | irrefutably established, not only that it exists through itself, 378 21 | beginning and without end, but that without it nothing anywhere 379 22 | shall these prepositions, that are so necessary according 380 22 | and time in some such way, that it is not prevented from 381 22 | different places or times, that there are not more wholes 382 22 | more wholes than one; and that its age, which does not 383 22 | so exist in space or time that they do not transcend extent 384 22 | with all truth asserted that one and the same whole cannot 385 22 | seems to be rightly said, that place is predicable only 386 22 | includes by containing it; and that time is predicable only 387 22 | attributed. For, seeing that place does not act upon 388 22 | is not irrational to say, that no place is its place, and 389 22 | to reach the conclusion, that the Substance which creates 390 22 | foolish, too, to say either, that space circumscribes the 391 22 | magnitude of truth, or, that time measures its duration -- 392 22 | extent at all?~Seeing, then, that this is the condition of 393 22 | condition of place or time; that only whatever is limited 394 22 | than one --seeing, I say, that this is the condition governing 395 22 | inevitable necessity requires that the supreme Being, as a 396 22 | like manner in this, or that other, place or time.~Nor, 397 22 | yet.~For, by no means is that Being compelled or forbidden 398 22 | two meanings, namely: (1) that these objects are present 399 22 | are said to be, and (2) that they are contained by these 400 22 | only is intended, namely, that it is present; not that 401 22 | that it is present; not that it is also contained. If 402 22 | be more fittingly said, that it exists with place or 403 22 | with place or time, than that it exists in place or time. 404 22 | time. For the statement that a thing exists in another 405 22 | exists in another implies that it is contained, more than 406 22 | than does the statement that it exists with another.~ 407 22 | dispel the contradiction that threatened us; as to how 408 22 | and nowhere and never, that is, in every place and time, 409 23 | place~BUT, since it is plain that this supreme Nature is not 410 23 | everywhere, in this sense, that it may be understood rather 411 23 | not places; as, when I say that the understanding is there 412 23 | everywhere, in this sense, that it is in all existing things, 413 23 | than in this sense, namely that it is merely in all places. 414 23 | in all existing things, that it is one and the same, 415 24 | time. ~IT is also evident that this supreme Substance is 416 24 | beginning and without end; that it has neither past, nor 417 24 | future, nor the temporal, that is, transient present in 418 24 | to this statement, than that it exists or lives eternally, 419 24 | exists or lives eternally, that is, it possesses interminable 420 24 | it has already been shown that this Substance is nothing 421 24 | consistent with the nature of that Substance alone, than an 422 24 | perceived from the single fact that true eternity belongs only 423 24 | eternity belongs only to that substance which alone, as 424 24 | being, from the very fact that all such have been created 425 25 | since even this very fact that it is greater than all other 426 25 | than all other natures and that it is unlike them seems 427 25 | instance. For it is certain that I am neither older nor younger 428 25 | It is made clear, then, that of all those facts, called 429 25 | all the immutability of that in whose case they occur. 430 25 | conclusion, also, may be reached, that it is susceptible of no 431 25 | this is undoubtedly true, that of the supremely immutable 432 26 | shall it be maintained that it is a substance of any 433 26 | is the difference between that Being, which is through 434 26 | different signification of that name is to be understood 435 27 | IT is, therefore, evident that in any ordinary treatment 436 27 | individual men the fact that they are men; does any one 437 27 | men; does any one conceive that, in the treatment of other 438 27 | treatment of other substances, that supreme Nature is included, 439 27 | common essence?~Yet, seeing that it not only most certainly 440 27 | certainly be maintained that this Being is spirit and 441 27 | and not body. But, seeing that one spirit has not any parts, 442 27 | accidents, it is impossible that it is divisible by any form 443 28 | preceding considerations, that the Spirit which exists 444 28 | attention it will be seen that that Spirit alone exists 445 28 | attention it will be seen that that Spirit alone exists simply, 446 28 | exist at all. For, seeing that of this Spirit, because 447 28 | terms of any alteration, that it was or will be, but simply 448 28 | was or will be, but simply that it is; it is not now, by 449 28 | interminably. Seeing, I say, that its existence is of this 450 28 | is no longer a fact; and that future existence is not 451 28 | not unreasonably denied that they exist simply, and perfectly, 452 28 | absolutely; and it is asserted that they are almost nonexistent, 453 28 | are almost nonexistent, that they scarcely exist at all.~ 454 28 | through another than himself, that is, than what he is himself, 455 28 | non-existent, because, through that Spirit which alone exists 456 29 | created.~For, though all that has been ascertained regarding 457 29 | this expression by the fact that it is proved to be identical 458 29 | him was created through that expression, how shall that 459 29 | that expression, how shall that expression be anything else 460 29 | discovered declare irrefutably that nothing at all ever could, 461 29 | creatures. But it is impossible that the expression of this Spirit 462 29 | being was created through that expression; but that expression 463 29 | through that expression; but that expression could not be 464 29 | creature exists later than that through which it is created, 465 29 | alternative remaining is, then, that this expression of the supreme 466 29 | since it is already manifest that the supreme Spirit is one 467 29 | consubstantial with him, that they are not two spirits, 468 30 | further doubt regarding that question which I dismissed 469 30 | with the supreme Nature that they are not two spirits, 470 31 | there arises a question that is not easy to answer, and 471 31 | ambiguity. For all words of that sort by which we express 472 31 | any objects in our mind, that is, conceive of them, are 473 31 | the likeness of the things that have been created through 474 31 | essence exists so supremely that in a certain sense it alone 475 31 | which, in comparison with that Essence, are in some sort 476 31 | through, and according to, that Word, a kind of imitation 477 31 | a kind of imitation of that supreme Essence is found.~ 478 31 | inference will rather be, that every created being exists 479 31 | way alive to excel those that are not alive, the sentient 480 31 | and rational, it is clear that, of all existing beings, 481 31 | of all existing beings, that which is in some way alive 482 31 | this supreme Nature, than that which is not alive at all; 483 31 | clear, for a like reason, that certain natures exist in 484 31 | than others. For, just as that is more excellent by nature 485 31 | excellent Being, so certainly that nature exists in a greater 486 31 | supreme Essence. And I think that this can easily be ascertained 487 31 | should conceive any substance that is alive, and sentient, 488 31 | finally of the bare existence that remains, who would fail 489 31 | would fail to understand that the substance that is thus 490 31 | understand that the substance that is thus destroyed, little 491 31 | degrees.~It is evident, then, that a living substance exists 492 31 | greater degree than one that is not living, a sentient 493 31 | nonrational. So, there is no doubt that every substance exists in 494 31 | according as it is more like that substance which exists supremely 495 31 | sufficiently clear, then, that in the Word, through which 496 31 | an imperfect imitation of that true Essence. Hence, it 497 31 | it necessarily follows, that this Word is not more nor 498 31 | more it is seen to approach that Word.~ ~ 499 32 | expressed is the likeness of that object, if this is not the 500 32 | corresponding to the objects that have been created through