Par.

  1 Pre|           discusses, under the form of a meditation, the Being
  2 Pre|             a meditation, the Being of God, basing his argument
  3 Pre|       argument not on the authority of Scripture, but on the force
  4 Pre|         Scripture, but on the force of reason. It contains nothing
  5 Pre|      inconsistent with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and especially
  6 Pre|             inconsistent with those of St. Augustine. --The Greek
  7 Pre|      Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, that is,
  8 Pre|             meditation on the Being of God, and on some other topics
  9 Pre|             subject, under the form of a meditation on these themes.
 10 Pre|         such a form for the writing of this meditation; in order
 11 Pre|           be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, but that
 12 Pre|             whatever the conclusion of independent investigation
 13 Pre|             enforced by the cogency of reason, and plainly expounded
 14 Pre|      plainly expounded in the light of truth. It was their wish
 15 Pre|            enjoined on me difficult of execution. Overcome at last,
 16 Pre|           by the modest importunity of their entreaties and by
 17 Pre|          not contemptible sincerity of their zeal; and reluctant
 18 Pre|          reluctant as I was because of the difficulty of my task
 19 Pre|           because of the difficulty of my task and the weakness
 20 Pre|            my task and the weakness of my talent, I entered upon
 21 Pre|      inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, or
 22 Pre|            or especially with those of St. Augustine. Wherefore,
 23 Pre|           ideas, or as a maintainer of falsehood; but let him first
 24 Pre|            my treatise in the light of those.~In stating that the
 25 Pre|      Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, I have
 26 Pre|            substance that attribute of God which we designate by
 27 Pre|        however, is put in the mouth of one debating and investigating
 28 Pre|            accordance with the wish of those whose request I was
 29 Pre|            preface at the beginning of the book, before the body
 30 Pre|           the book, before the body of the meditation itself. For
 31 Pre|            understanding the matter of this book, if he has taken
 32 Pre|          book, if he has taken note of the intention, and the method
 33 1  |           and greatest, and highest of all existing beings. ~IF
 34 1  |          unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature
 35 1  |          knowledge of the existence of one Nature which is highest
 36 1  |             Nature which is highest of all existing beings, which
 37 1  |             goodness, the very fact of their existence, and the
 38 1  |          and if he has no knowledge of many other things, which
 39 1  |           at least convince himself of these truths in great part,
 40 1  |         very ordinary, by the force of reason alone.~And, although
 41 1  |            s eye to the examination of that cause by which these
 42 1  |          rationally to those truths of which, without reason, he
 43 1  |             to possess it by virtue of some fact, which is not
 44 1  |          except through the quality of justness, which is not one
 45 1  |         they are all good by virtue of something which is conceived
 46 1  |        something which is conceived of as the same in different
 47 1  |             good, the one by virtue of one thing, the other by
 48 1  |          thing, the other by virtue of another. For, apparently
 49 1  |          apparently it is by virtue of one quality, that a horse
 50 1  |            is strong, and by virtue of another, that he is called
 51 1  |            be called good by virtue of his strength, and good by
 52 1  |        strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness
 53 1  |         great, that is, the highest of all existing beings.~ ~
 54 2  |            best, i. e., the highest of all existing beings.~ ~
 55 3  |          itself, and is the highest of all existing beings. ~THEREFORE,
 56 3  |          should not exist by virtue of something.~Whatever is,
 57 3  |              some power or property of existing through self (existendi
 58 3  |      existence. For not even beings of a relative nature exist
 59 3  |       exists in the greatest degree of all things.~There is, then,
 60 3  |     greatest and the highest degree of all. But that which is greatest
 61 3  |          But that which is greatest of all, and through which exists
 62 3  |    supremely great, and the highest of all existing beings.~ ~
 63 4  |             one observes the nature of things be perceives, whether
 64 4  |         embraced in a single degree of dignity; but that certain
 65 4  |         distinguished by inequality of degree. For, he who doubts
 66 4  |           does not deserve the name of man. Therefore, although
 67 4  |             For, if the distinction of degrees is infinite, so
 68 4  |            can be found, our course of reasoning reaches this conclusion:
 69 4  |      conclusion: that the multitude of natures themselves is not
 70 4  |           are more natures than one of this sort, and they are
 71 4  |             this sort, and they are of equal degree.~But, if they
 72 4  |           that is, the very essence of these natures; or else it
 73 4  |             be more than one nature of this kind. We conclude,
 74 4  |            is the greatest and best of all existing beings. Hence,
 75 4  |         nature which is the highest of all existing beings. This,
 76 4  |        things exist, is the highest of all existing beings; either
 77 4  |       supreme, that is, the highest of all existing beings.~ ~
 78 6  |             existence with the help of any external cause, yet
 79 6  |           not admit the same ground of existence. Let us first
 80 6  |              whatever exists in any of these three ways exists
 81 6  |         another than itself, and is of later existence, and, in
 82 6  |          already made, in the light of reason, regarding the supreme
 83 6  |            wise be true in the case of supreme Substance; yet,
 84 6  |             connected demonstration of this matter.~For, seeing
 85 6  |            wish to convince any one of the truth of my speculations,
 86 6  |       convince any one of the truth of my speculations, even one
 87 6  |           my speculations, even one of the slower minds, through
 88 6  |          minds, through the removal of every obstacle, however
 89 6  |              since it was the cause of good. But no good can be
 90 6  |           it seems best to conceive of this subject in the way
 91 6  |            are the mutual relations of the light and to light and
 92 6  |              such are the relations of essence, and to be and being,
 93 7  |          now remains the discussion of that whole class of beings
 94 7  |      discussion of that whole class of beings that exist through
 95 7  |         because it was the material of all. For, there is no need
 96 7  |        bringing about the existence of all things: since it is
 97 7  |            whether that whole class of beings which exist through
 98 7  |            just as we see, consists of earth, water, fire, and
 99 7  |           air. These four elements, of course, can be conceived
100 7  |            course, can be conceived of without these forms which
101 7  |          appears to be the material of all bodies, distinguished
102 7  |             mentioned, the material of the mundane mass, derives
103 7  |           if there is some material of this material, then that
104 7  |             more truly the material of the physical universe.~If,
105 7  |              If, then, the universe of things, whether visible
106 7  |     conceivable except that highest of all beings, which exists
107 7  |            itself, and the universe of beings which exist, not
108 7  |             all is not the material of anything.~From its own nature
109 7  |           But if, from the material of the supreme Nature itself,
110 7  |         existence from the material of the supreme good, inasmuch
111 7  |            evident that the essence of those things which exist
112 7  |             patent that the essence of all beings, except the supreme
113 7  |           through itself, the world of material things, so numerous
114 8  |            that source is the cause of what is created from it,
115 8  |             assistance to the being of what it effects. This is
116 8  |        firmly believed, as a result of experience, by every one,
117 8  |          very nothing was the cause of what was created from it.
118 8  |             no aid to the existence of anything ever had its source
119 8  |             anything is created out of nothing?~Moreover, nothing
120 8  |             For, from the discovery of a certain Substance existing
121 8  |     existing in the greatest degree of all existing beings, my
122 8  |             to be our understanding of the term nothing? -- For
123 8  |            suffices for the removal of the present obstacle --
124 8  |          asks regarding a dumb man, of what he speaks, the answer
125 8  |       speaks, the answer is given, "of nothing," that is, he does
126 8  |          unintelligible in the case of any of those things that
127 8  |   unintelligible in the case of any of those things that actually
128 8  |           which is, indeed, capable of supposition, but cannot
129 8  |             that with the exception of the supreme Being all things
130 8  |             For so, beholding a man of very lowly fortunes exalted
131 8  |            he has made that man out of nothing"; that is, the man
132 8  |           nothing is now, by virtue of that other's making, truly
133 9  |             creation in the thought of the Creator. ~BUT I seem
134 9  |        unless there is, in the mind of the creative agent, some
135 9  |      created, it was in the thought of the supreme Nature, what,
136 9  |           supreme Nature, what, and of what sort, and how, it should
137 10 |              This thought is a kind of expression of the objects
138 10 |             is a kind of expression of the objects created (locutio
139 10 |            to make. ~BUT this model of things, which preceded their
140 10 |             creation in the thought of the creator, what else is
141 10 |         what else is it than a kind of expression of these things
142 10 |           than a kind of expression of these things in his thought
143 10 |          something after the manner of his craft, he first expresses
144 10 |      concept? But by the expression of the mind or reason I mean,
145 10 |            here, not the conception of words signifying the objects,
146 10 |             the mind, by the vision of conception, of the objects
147 10 |           the vision of conception, of the objects themselves,
148 10 |          either by the sensible use of sensible signs, that is,
149 10 |         within ourselves insensibly of these signs which, when
150 10 |          mind, whether by the power of imagining material bodies
151 10 |        imagining material bodies or of understanding thought, according
152 10 |          according to the diversity of these objects themselves.~
153 10 |            in another, when I think of the same words in silence;
154 10 |            either through the image of his body, or through the
155 10 |           reason; through the image of his body, when the mind
156 10 |             however, when it thinks of his universal essence, which
157 10 |            Now, the first two kinds of expression are in the language
158 10 |      expression are in the language of one's race. But the words
159 10 |           one's race. But the words of that kind of expression,
160 10 |          But the words of that kind of expression, which I have
161 10 |       necessary for the recognition of an object, and where they
162 10 |         cannot be, no other word is of any use for the description
163 10 |             use for the description of an object.~For, without
164 10 |             For, with the exception of those objects, which we
165 10 |      instance -- with the exception of these, I say, no other word
166 10 |             expressed by the vision of the mind thinking of the
167 10 |         vision of the mind thinking of the object itself.~This
168 10 |             Hence, if no expression of any object whatever so nearly
169 10 |           expression which consists of this sort of words, nor
170 10 |         which consists of this sort of words, nor can there be
171 10 |             there be in the thought of any another word so like
172 10 |             that such an expression of objects existed with (apud)
173 11 |              between the expression of the Creator and the expression
174 11 |          Creator and the expression of the artisan is very incomplete. ~
175 11 |       conceived, if there is a lack of material, or of anything
176 11 |           is a lack of material, or of anything without which a
177 11 |      representation, frame the idea of some sort of animal, such
178 11 |         frame the idea of some sort of animal, such as has no existence;
179 11 |             these inner expressions of the works they are to create
180 11 |       Artificer for the performance of his work, while the latter
181 11 |             cause for the inception of the artisan's work. Therefore,
182 12 |        CHAPTER XII.~This expression of the supreme Being is the
183 12 |        separately, by the utterance of separate words, or all at
184 12 |           at once, by the utterance of one word; what conclusion
185 12 |           than that this expression of the supreme Being is no
186 12 |        Therefore, the consideration of this expression should not,
187 12 |             discussed, I think some of the properties of this supreme
188 12 |        think some of the properties of this supreme Substance should
189 13 |         have. For, by a like course of reasoning to that by which
190 13 |      themselves -- by a like course of reasoning, I say, it can
191 14 |         exceed the immeasurableness of what creates and cherishes
192 14 |           in anyway, exceed the sum of the things it has created;
193 15 |            concerning the substance of this Being. ~NOT without
194 15 |       earnestly as I am able, which of all the statements that
195 15 |      Substance which is the creator of all; yet, we must try and
196 15 |       Nature, it is not significant of its substance.~Therefore,
197 15 |         this Nature, is the highest of all beings, or greater than
198 15 |       natural essence.~For, if none of those things ever existed,
199 15 |          Nature can be so conceived of as not supreme, that still
200 15 |           than when it is conceived of as the highest of all beings,
201 15 |         conceived of as the highest of all beings, it is manifest
202 15 |            be true, in like manner, of other similar, relative
203 15 |      predications, then, since none of them taken by itself represents
204 15 |       itself represents the essence of anything, let our attention
205 15 |            turned to the discussion of other kinds of predication.~
206 15 |           discussion of other kinds of predication.~Now, certainly
207 15 |       whatever there is that is not of a relative nature, either
208 15 |           than gold, as he would be of inferior nature, were he
209 15 |          Nature may be so conceived of as not supreme, that supreme
210 15 |      purpose, that undoubtedly none of these, taken by itself,
211 15 |             describes the substance of the supreme Nature.~Since,
212 15 |             Since, then, it is true of whatever else there is,
213 15 |          suppose that the substance of the supreme Nature is anything,
214 15 |         material body, then, or any of those things which the bodily
215 15 |         sense can perceive what, or of what character, or how great,
216 15 |             would be if it were any of those things that are in
217 15 |        things that are in the scope of the bodily senses, the greater
218 15 |          the greater it is than any of these. For by no means should
219 15 |             Being be said to be any of those things to which something,
220 15 |            shows, be said to be any of those things to which everything,
221 15 |             if it is manifest which of all things it is, and which
222 16 |           in the same way: and none of these shows of what character,
223 16 |             and none of these shows of what character, or how great,
224 16 |           not shown what it is, but of what character, or how great
225 16 |        justness, we do not conceive of a just man as being justness,
226 16 |             cannot properly be said of the supreme Nature that
227 16 |            it is properly conceived of as being justness, but not
228 16 |            justness, it is not said of what character it is, but
229 16 |         called just, it is not said of what character it is, but
230 16 |          that it is the same to say of the supreme Being, that
231 16 |             been proved in the case of justness, the intellect
232 16 |    compelled to acknowledge as true of all attributes which are
233 16 |            are similarly predicated of this supreme Nature. Whatever
234 16 |             attribute is predicated of it, then, it is shown, not
235 16 |              then, it is shown, not of what character, or how great,
236 17 |             things that can be said of its essence are one and
237 17 |             and nothing can be said of its substance except in
238 17 |           substance except in terms of what it is. ~Is it to be
239 17 |             therefore be compounded of more goods than one? Or
240 17 |          its subsistence the things of which it is compounded,
241 17 |       indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence, because,
242 17 |           that Nature is compounded of more goods than one, all
243 17 |           these facts that are true of every composite must be
244 17 |         falsehood the whole cogency of the truth that was shown
245 17 |           one, but are one. Any one of them is, therefore, the
246 17 |           attributed to the essence of the supreme Substance is
247 17 |           in one way, and by virtue of one consideration. For,
248 17 |            in one way, or in virtue of one consideration. For,
249 17 |       another, rational; and no one of these, taken by itself,
250 17 |             by itself, is the whole of what man is.~That supreme
251 17 |             in any way, this is all of what it is. Therefore, nothing
252 17 |          nothing that is truly said of the supreme Being is accepted
253 17 |          Being is accepted in terms of quality or quantity, but
254 17 |         quantity, but only in terms of what it is. For, whatever
255 17 |             whatever it is in terms of either quality or quantity
256 17 |           another element, in terms of what it is; hence, it would
257 18 |          supreme good, will not die of its own will. If, however,
258 18 |            let him who can conceive of a time when this began to
259 18 |            existed. But, if neither of these suppositions is conceivable,
260 19 |          the concordant attestation of truth and necessity, has
261 19 |      confirmed by the fortification of logically necessary truth,
262 19 |          nothing shall still exist. Of what avail is so weighty
263 19 |          avail is so weighty a mass of arguments, if this nothing
264 19 |             lest so many structures of cogent reasoning be stormed
265 19 |       sought and found by the light of truth, be lost for nothing.
266 19 |            meanings. For, one sense of this statement is that,
267 19 |           But another understanding of the same statement is that,
268 19 |           and which, from the force of their whole correlation,
269 19 |             anything. The same sort of double signification is
270 19 |           then, this interpretation of the term nothing, that has
271 19 |         after it. Yet, the solidity of the truths already established
272 19 |           impaired by the emptiness of nothing.~ ~
273 20 |             a certain secret murmur of contradiction which compels
274 20 |          But, if it is said that it of itself exists finitely,
275 21 |           time, or else only a part of it so exists, the other
276 21 |            composition and division of parts; which has been found
277 21 |           times. But, since the law of place and the law of time,
278 21 |            law of place and the law of time, the investigation
279 21 |             time, the investigation of which it has hitherto been
280 21 |          are indiviual wholes. For, of what exists as a whole,
281 21 |             in that place. And that of which there is no part that
282 21 |             given place, is no part of what exists at the same
283 21 |            in any place, is no part of what exists at the same
284 21 |            outside that place. But, of that of which no part exists
285 21 |            that place. But, of that of which no part exists outside
286 21 |           another place, if no part of it can at that time exist
287 21 |           exists. But the absurdity of this supposition is proved
288 21 |             proved by the existence of places themselves, which
289 21 |        parts according to the parts of time.~But its eternity is
290 21 |          according to the divisions of time. For, if its age is
291 21 |           prolonged through periods of time, it has with this time
292 21 |           its age than its duration of existence, than its eternity?
293 22 |            future.~For, to this law of space and time, nothing
294 22 |             do not transcend extent of space or duration of time.
295 22 |         extent of space or duration of time. Hence, though of beings
296 22 |     duration of time. Hence, though of beings of this class it
297 22 |             Hence, though of beings of this class it is with all
298 22 |        places or times; in the case of those beings which are not
299 22 |          those beings which are not of this class, no such conclusion
300 22 |            place is predicable only of objects whose magnitude
301 22 |             time is predicable only of objects whose duration time
302 22 |      compelled to submit to the law of place or time. No law of
303 22 |            of place or time. No law of place or time, then, in
304 22 |            time limits by some kind of restraint. But what rational
305 22 |     consideration can by any course of reasoning fail to reach
306 22 |            from, the nature and law of all things which itself
307 22 |             limited by no restraint of space or time; since, more
308 22 |         circumscribes the magnitude of truth, or, that time measures
309 22 |           no greatness or smallness of spatial or temporal extent
310 22 |          that this is the condition of place or time; that only
311 22 |             neither escapes the law of parts -- such as place follows,
312 22 |           confined by the restraint of place or time, is not compelled
313 22 |            not compelled by any law of places or times to multiplicity
314 22 |            or times to multiplicity of parts, nor is it prevented
315 22 |         encompassed by no restraint of place or time, is bound
316 22 |           or time, is bound by none of their laws.~Hence, since
317 22 |           place or time, and no law of place or time prevents it
318 22 |           or shall be, has any part of its eternity therefore vanished
319 22 |     compelled or forbidden by a law of space or time to exist,
320 22 |             time, although the form of expression regarding it,
321 22 |       natures, is the same, because of the usage of language, yet
322 22 |          same, because of the usage of language, yet the sense
323 22 |         sense is different, because of the unlikeness of the objects
324 22 |           because of the unlikeness of the objects of discussion.
325 22 |           unlikeness of the objects of discussion. For in the latter
326 22 |         themselves.~But in the case of the supreme Being, the first
327 22 |             contained. If the usage of language permitted, it would,
328 22 |             be said, after a manner of its own, to be in every
329 22 |        taken to itself distinctions of place or time, neither here
330 22 |          nor does it exist in terms of this fleeting present, in
331 22 |             will it exist, in terms of past or future, since these
332 22 |           And yet, these properties of time and place can, in some
333 22 |            to how the highest Being of all exists, everywhere and
334 22 |             to the consistent truth of different senses of the
335 22 |           truth of different senses of the terms employed.~ ~
336 23 |           is supported by the truth of the fact, and is not forbidden
337 23 |            the proper signification of the word of place?~For we
338 23 |           signification of the word of place?~For we often quite
339 23 |          quite properly apply terms of place to objects which are
340 23 |         there and where are adverbs of place, yet, by no local
341 23 |         Hence, as regards the truth of the matter, the supreme
342 24 |          than a changing succession of times, which is ever in
343 24 |          consistent with the nature of that Substance alone, than
344 24 |           free from the limitations of beginning and end; and this
345 24 |          consistent with the nature of no created being, from the
346 25 |             external to the essence of a being, which may yet be
347 25 |          say, be, but, be conceived of, as variable by virtue of
348 25 |           of, as variable by virtue of accidents? And, on the ocher
349 25 |           hand, does it not partake of accident, since even this
350 25 |              if from the undergoing of these accidents the substance
351 25 |           undergoes no change?~For, of all the facts, called accidents,
352 25 |            variation in the subject of the accident -- all colors,
353 25 |           is made clear, then, that of all those facts, called
354 25 |            a part bring some degree of mutability in their train,
355 25 |             at all the immutability of that in whose case they
356 25 |      occasional expression in terms of those accidents which are
357 25 |        whence it would be conceived of, as itself variable.~Whence
358 25 |              that it is susceptible of no accident; since, just
359 25 |       non-occurrence, are by virtue of this very effect of theirs
360 25 |          virtue of this very effect of theirs regarded as being
361 25 |            the proper signification of the term accident, this
362 25 |           is undoubtedly true, that of the supremely immutable
363 25 |        whence it shall be conceived of as mutable.~ ~
364 26 |           concerning the simplicity of this Nature is established,
365 26 |            substance is susceptible of admixture of difference,
366 26 |            susceptible of admixture of difference, or, at any rate,
367 26 |            at any rate, susceptible of mutation by accidents, the
368 26 |     accidents, the immutable purity of this Being is inaccessible
369 26 |   maintained that it is a substance of any kind, except as it is
370 26 |            is. And, since it alone, of all natures, derives from
371 26 |            itself, without the help of another nature, whatever
372 26 |             different signification of that name is to be understood
373 27 |           in any ordinary treatment of substance, this Substance
374 27 |     conceive that, in the treatment of other substances, that supreme
375 27 |           with any other, by virtue of a common essence?~Yet, seeing
376 27 |        exists in the highest degree of all things; and since the
377 27 |       things; and since the essence of anything is usually called
378 27 |       spirit and body is known, and of these, spirit is more worthy
379 27 |            be more spirits than one of this kind, it must, by all
380 27 |            it is neither compounded of parts, nor can be conceived
381 27 |         parts, nor can be conceived of as mutable, through any
382 27 |            is divisible by any form of division.~ ~
383 28 |          singularly wonderful a way of its own is in some sort
384 28 |            at all. For, seeing that of this Spirit, because of
385 28 |             of this Spirit, because of its immutable eternity,
386 28 |           no wise be said, in terms of any alteration, that it
387 28 |          say, that its existence is of this character, it is rightly
388 28 |         since this former existence of theirs is no longer a fact;
389 28 |             And since the existence of this ineffable Spirit alone
390 28 |     non-existence, or to be capable of sustaining any deficiency
391 28 |     existence alone to be conceived of as simple, and perfect,
392 28 |            According to this course of reasoning, then, the creative
393 29 |            regarding the properties of the supreme Nature, which
394 29 |           in following the guidance of reason to the present point,
395 29 |             the inflexible strength of reason, I am especially
396 29 |             more careful discussion of this expression by the fact
397 29 |      impossible that the expression of this Spirit is included
398 29 |          then, that this expression of the supreme Spirit, since
399 29 |             itself can be conceived of as nothing else than the
400 29 |        intelligence (intelligentia) of this Spirit, by which he
401 29 |       Spirit, by which he conceives of (intelligit) all things.
402 29 |              according to this kind of expression, but conceiving
403 29 |          expression, but conceiving of it? For he does not, like
404 30 |         expression does not consist of more words than one, but
405 30 |            this expression consists of more words than one, or
406 30 |             more words than one, or of one? For, if it is so consubstantial
407 30 |          therefore does not consist of more words than one, but
408 31 |          itself is not the likeness of created beings, but the
409 31 |             beings, but the reality of their being, while created
410 31 |           created beings are a kind of likeness of reality. --What
411 31 |       beings are a kind of likeness of reality. --What natures
412 31 |            ambiguity. For all words of that sort by which we express
413 31 |             mind, that is, conceive of them, are likenesses and
414 31 |           are likenesses and images of the objects to which they
415 31 |         closely imitates the object of which it is the likeness.~
416 31 |             it not be, the likeness of the things that have been
417 31 |            itself the true likeness of mutable things, it is not
418 31 |          true, and is merely a sort of likeness of mutable things,
419 31 |           merely a sort of likeness of mutable things, then the
420 31 |       mutable things, then the Word of supreme Truth is not altogether
421 31 |        example?~But perhaps nothing of this ambiguity will remain
422 31 |         remain if -- as the reality of a man is said to be the
423 31 |           but the likeness or image of a man in his picture --
424 31 |           picture -- so the reality of being is conceived of as
425 31 |       reality of being is conceived of as in the Word, whose essence
426 31 |     according to, that Word, a kind of imitation of that supreme
427 31 |           Word, a kind of imitation of that supreme Essence is
428 31 |           For, in this way the Word of supreme Truth, which is
429 31 |             a certain unique manner of its own, not only exists,
430 31 |         rational, it is clear that, of all existing beings, that
431 31 |         more than what is incapable of reasoning.~But it is clear,
432 31 |            rational, to be deprived of its reason, then of its
433 31 |        deprived of its reason, then of its sentience, then of its
434 31 |         then of its sentience, then of its life, and finally of
435 31 |            of its life, and finally of the bare existence that
436 31 |         smaller and smaller degrees of existence, and at last to
437 31 |            to less and less degrees of existence, if assumed in
438 31 |          but an imperfect imitation of that true Essence. Hence,
439 32 |     corresponding to those objects, of which it is not the likeness?
440 32 |           expressed is the likeness of that object, if this is
441 32 |         understanding or conceiving of it (intelligere), he would
442 32 |          not understand or conceive of anything; if he understood
443 32 |             understood or conceived of nothing, then the supreme
444 32 |        would understand or conceive of nothing; which is most absurd.~
445 32 |      inferred? For, if it conceived of nothing, how would it be
446 32 |            no wise anything but it, of what would it conceive?
447 32 |     conceive? Would it not conceive of itself? But how can it be
448 32 |          any time does not conceive of itself; since a rational
449 32 |        supreme Wisdom, and conceive of that Wisdom and of itself?
450 32 |         conceive of that Wisdom and of itself? For, if the human
451 32 |           have no memory or concept of that Wisdom or of itself,
452 32 |           concept of that Wisdom or of itself, it would not distinguish
453 32 |           is thus eternally mindful of himself, and conceives of
454 32 |           of himself, and conceives of himself after the likeness
455 32 |          himself after the likeness of a rational mind; nay, not
456 32 |              not after the likeness of anything; but in the first
457 32 |      likeness. But, if he conceives of himself eternally, he expresses
458 32 |            therefore, it be thought of in connection with no other
459 32 |           existing beings, the Word of that Spirit must be coeternal
460 33 |       himself, as is evidently true of the Word by which he expresses
461 33 |         still require the existence of that word by which he expresses
462 33 |        himself, it is manifest that of the Word by which he expresses
463 33 |           he expresses himself, and of the Word by which he expresses
464 33 |              But, perhaps, identity of substance does not compel
465 33 |       contains the perfect likeness of that Wisdom.~For, on no
466 33 |             rational mind conceives of itself in meditation the
467 33 |             in meditation the image of itself arises in its thought,
468 33 |      thought, or rather the thought of the mind is itself its image,
469 33 |       either through representation of the body or through reason,
470 33 |         reason, desires to conceive of truly, it at least attempts
471 33 |            more truly does it think of the object itself; and,
472 33 |         more clearly when it thinks of something else which it
473 33 |           especially when it thinks of a material body. For, when
474 33 |             body. For, when I think of a man I know, in his absence,
475 33 |             his absence, the vision of my thought forms such an
476 33 |           man I express by thinking of him.~The rational mind,
477 33 |             then, when it conceives of itself in thought, has with
478 33 |          with itself its image born of itself that is, its thought
479 33 |           Wisdom, when it conceives of itself by expressing itself,
480 33 |           itself, begets a likeness of itself consubstantial with
481 33 |             And this Word, although of a subject so uniquely important
482 33 | inappropriately be called the image of that Wisdom, its representation,
483 33 |         that is, it is the likeness of something. But if he expresses
484 34 |             which is made after one of the arts, not only when
485 34 |     destroyed, is always in respect of the art itself nothing else
486 34 |        being, and the first reality of existence, the more like
487 35 |           he expresses or conceives of them. Therefore, just as
488 36 |     themselves they exist by virtue of their own being; while in
489 36 |            truly anywhere by virtue of their own being, than by
490 36 |           own being, than by virtue of their likeness. Therefore,
491 36 |             is, in the intelligence of the Creator, than it does
492 36 |           the human mind comprehend of what kind is that expression
493 37 |         must be the supreme essence of that of which it is the
494 37 |             supreme essence of that of which it is the Word. But
495 37 |      creator and the only beginning of all things which have been
496 37 |           creator and the beginning of the world, so is his Word
497 38 |             is certain that in each of these separately and in
498 38 |   indivisible unity. But in respect of the fact that he does not
499 38 |             plurally, as one speaks of two equal lines, or two
500 38 |    designates the peculiar relation of the one to the other, since