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| Alphabetical [« »] thus 15 time 115 times 35 to 704 to-day 1 to-morrrow 1 together 1 | Frequency [« »] 958 and 893 that 883 of 704 to 606 in 527 be 445 not | Anselmus Cantuariensis Monologium IntraText - Concordances to |
Par.
1 Pre| the Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, 2 Pre| and earnestly entreated me to put in writing some thoughts 3 Pre| investigation should declare to be true, should, in an unadorned 4 Pre| that I should not disdain to meet such simple and almost 5 Pre| foolish objections as occur to me.~This task I have long 6 Pre| task I have long refused to undertake. And, reflecting 7 Pre| have tried on many grounds to excuse myself; for the more 8 Pre| more they wanted this work to be adaptable to practical 9 Pre| this work to be adaptable to practical use, the more 10 Pre| limits they set.~I was led to this undertaking in the 11 Pre| entreated me, as put an end to the entreaties that followed 12 Pre| somehow it fell out, contrary to my hope, that not only the 13 Pre| condemned this writing to long remembrance. And, after 14 Pre| consideration, I have not been able to find that I have made in 15 Pre| Wherefore, if it shall appear to any man that I have offered 16 Pre| the truth, I ask him not to denounce me at once as one 17 Pre| supreme Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, 18 Pre| solitary reflection, questions to which he had given no attention 19 Pre| And this method I knew to be in accordance with the 20 Pre| whose request I was striving to fulfil. But it is my prayer 21 Pre| that if any shall wish to copy this work, he shall 22 Pre| work, he shall be careful to place this preface at the 23 Pre| and the method according to which it is discussed. It 24 Pre| thought that is contrary to his own belief.~ ~ 25 1 | which is also sufficient to itself in its eternal blessedness, 26 1 | man. For, since all desire to enjoy only those things 27 1 | things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that 28 1 | time, turn his mind's eye to the examination of that 29 1 | except as he judges them to be good. So that, as reason 30 1 | he advances rationally to those truths of which, without 31 1 | authority adduces, I wish it to be received in this way: 32 1 | grounds that I shall see fit to adopt, the conclusion is 33 1 | not, for this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, 34 1 | It is easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there 35 1 | easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there are 36 1 | another through another? To be sure, it is most certain 37 1 | for all who are willing to see, that whatsoever things 38 1 | whatsoever things are said to possess any attribute in 39 1 | comparison they may be said to possess it in greater, or 40 1 | or equal degree, are said to possess it by virtue of 41 1 | which is not understood to be one thing in one case 42 1 | another in another, but to be the same in different 43 1 | whatsoever things are said to be just, when compared one 44 1 | although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one 45 1 | swift. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue 46 1 | and strength do not appear to be the same thing.~But if 47 1 | instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes 48 1 | through which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must 49 3 | either these are themselves to be referred to some one 50 3 | themselves to be referred to some one being, through 51 3 | by which they are able to exist each through itself. 52 3 | through which they are able to exist, each through itself. 53 3 | exist through the subjects to which they are referred.~ 54 4 | is superior in its nature to wood, and man more excellent 55 4 | some natures are superior to others, nevertheless reason 56 4 | absurdly foolish man can fail to regard such a conclusion 57 4 | nature which is so superior to some nature or natures, 58 4 | and which is so superior to others that it is inferior 59 4 | others that it is inferior to none. But that which is 60 5 | demonstrated, it is profitable to examine whether this Nature, 61 5 | artificer, may also be said to exist through matter, and 62 5 | exist through matter, and to derive existence from the 63 6 | meaning is not always attached to the phrase, "existence through" 64 6 | through" something, or, to the phrase, "existence derived 65 6 | itself? For, what is said to exist through anything apparently 66 6 | nor did anything assist it to be what it was not before.~ 67 6 | was not before.~What is to be inferred? For that which 68 6 | external aids, seems either to be nothing, or, if it has 69 6 | if it has any existence, to exist through nothing, and 70 6 | yet, I would not neglect to give a connected demonstration 71 6 | has suddenly brought me to an important and interesting 72 6 | interesting point, I am unwilling to pass over carelessly even 73 6 | foolish objection that occurs to me, in my argument; in order 74 6 | ambiguity in my discussion up to this point, I may have the 75 6 | better assured strength to advance toward what follows; 76 6 | perchance, I shall wish to convince any one of the 77 6 | false as it would be absurd to say that whatever is is 78 6 | itself.~But if it is supposed to have derived existence from 79 6 | nothing. It is unnecessary to show that both these suppositions 80 6 | whatever it is.~Finally, as to how it should be understood 81 6 | it should be understood to exist through itself, and 82 6 | exist through itself, and to derive existence from itself: 83 6 | in any way assist itself to become what it was not before, 84 6 | unless, haply, it seems best to conceive of this subject 85 6 | relations of the light and to light and lucent (lux, lucere, 86 6 | relations of essence, and to be and being, that is, existing 87 6 | So the supreme Being, and to be in the highest degree, 88 6 | the same relations, one to another, as the light and 89 6 | another, as the light and to light and lucent.~ ~ 90 7 | exist through another, as to how they exist through the 91 7 | all. For, there is no need to inquire whether all exist 92 7 | it.~First, then, it seems to me, we ought to inquire 93 7 | it seems to me, we ought to inquire whether that whole 94 7 | confused, nature appears to be the material of all bodies, 95 7 | cannot even be supposed to be, from any other material 96 7 | supreme good is subject to change and corruption. But 97 7 | But this it is impious to suppose. Hence, since everything 98 7 | supreme good is subjected to change or corruption. But, 99 7 | supreme good is subjected to change and corruption through 100 8 | CHAPTER VIII.~How it is to be understood that this 101 8 | affords some assistance to the being of what it effects. 102 8 | existence? If, however, no aid to the existence of anything 103 8 | so posited in opposition to the whole argument propounded 104 8 | reasoning had brought me to this conclusion, that all 105 8 | created, which I supposed to be nothing, is something, 106 8 | something, whatever I supposed to have been ascertained regarding 107 8 | nothing.~What, then, is to be our understanding of 108 8 | have already determined not to neglect in this meditation 109 8 | There is one way, according to which we wish it to be understood, 110 8 | according to which we wish it to be understood, that what 111 8 | understood, that what is said to have been created from nothing 112 8 | created at all; just as, to one who asks regarding a 113 8 | speak at all. According to this interpretation, to 114 8 | to this interpretation, to one who enquires regarding 115 8 | does not exist at all, as to whence it was created, the 116 8 | that if anything is said to have been created from nothing, 117 8 | interpretation, according to which a thing is said to 118 8 | to which a thing is said to have been created from nothing, 119 9 | the Creator. ~BUT I seem to see a truth that compels 120 9 | a truth that compels me to distinguish carefully in 121 9 | were created may be said to have been nothing before 122 9 | nothing before their creation, to this extent, that they were 123 9 | through which, and according to which, they were created.~ ~ 124 10 | mind for what he intends to make. ~BUT this model of 125 10 | when an artisan is about to make something after the 126 10 | craft, he first expresses it to himself through a concept? 127 10 | themselves, whether destined to be, or already existing.~ 128 10 | signs which are perceptible to the bodily senses; or by 129 10 | understanding thought, according to the diversity of these objects 130 10 | words owe their invention to these, where these are, 131 10 | absurdity, they may also be said to be the truer, the more like 132 10 | the more like they are to the objects to which they 133 10 | they are to the objects to which they correspond, and 134 10 | their own names, in order to signify them, like certain 135 10 | word appears so similar to the object to which it is 136 10 | so similar to the object to which it is applied, or 137 10 | primary word, corresponding to the thing. Hence, if no 138 10 | object, whether destined to be, or already existing, 139 11 | it established according to, and through, this same 140 11 | artisan is wholly unable to conceive in his imagination 141 11 | no means has he the power to do this, except by uniting 142 11 | expressions of the works they are to create differ in the creative 143 13 | creatures live and continue to exist, so long as they do 144 13 | like course of reasoning to that by which it has been 145 15 | am now strongly impelled to inquire as earnestly as 146 15 | substantially applicable to this so wonderful Nature. 147 15 | could worthily be applied to the Substance which is the 148 15 | yet, we must try and see to what end reason will lead 149 15 | lead this investigation.~As to relative expressions, at 150 15 | describes what is essential to that in regard to which 151 15 | essential to that in regard to which it is relatively employed. 152 15 | like manner, be applied to it, does not describe its 153 15 | ever existed, in relation to which it is called supreme 154 15 | good, or suffer detriment to its essential greatness 155 15 | supreme or highest is found to be true, in like manner, 156 15 | our attention be turned to the discussion of other 157 15 | either it is such that, to be it is in general better 158 15 | general better than not to be it, or such that, in 159 15 | that, in some cases, not to be it is better than to 160 15 | to be it is better than to be it. But I here understand 161 15 | understand the phrases, to be it and not to be it, 162 15 | phrases, to be it and not to be it, in the same way in 163 15 | way in which I understand to be true and not to be true, 164 15 | understand to be true and not to be true, to be bodily and 165 15 | true and not to be true, to be bodily and not to be 166 15 | true, to be bodily and not to be bodily, and the like. 167 15 | bodily, and the like. Indeed, to be anything is, in general, 168 15 | general, better than not to be it; as to be wise is 169 15 | better than not to be it; as to be wise is better than not 170 15 | wise is better than not to be so; that is, it is better 171 15 | so; that is, it is better to be wise than not to be wise. 172 15 | better to be wise than not to be wise. For, though one 173 15 | itself, it is not better not to be wise than to be wise. 174 15 | better not to be wise than to be wise. For, everything 175 15 | were wise. In the same way, to be true is altogether better 176 15 | altogether better than not to be so, that is, better than 177 15 | that is, better than not to be true; and just is better 178 15 | better than not just; and to live than not to live.~But, 179 15 | just; and to live than not to live.~But, in some cases, 180 15 | But, in some cases, not to be a certain thing is better 181 15 | certain thing is better than to be it, as not to be gold 182 15 | better than to be it, as not to be gold may be better than 183 15 | gold may be better than to be gold. For it is better 184 15 | it is better for man not to be gold, than to be gold; 185 15 | man not to be gold, than to be gold; although it might 186 15 | be better for something to be gold, than not to be 187 15 | something to be gold, than not to be gold -- lead, for instance. 188 15 | is taken independently, to be it is better than not 189 15 | be it is better than not to be it; as it is impious 190 15 | be it; as it is impious to suppose that the substance 191 15 | For, the rational mind, as to which no bodily sense can 192 15 | this supreme Being be said to be any of those things to 193 15 | to be any of those things to which something, which they 194 15 | reasoning shows, be said to be any of those things to 195 15 | to be any of those things to which everything, which 196 15 | make any further inquiry as to what that supreme Nature 197 16 | this Being it is the same to be just that it is to be 198 16 | same to be just that it is to be justice; and so with 199 16 | justice; and so with regard to attributes that can be expressed 200 16 | For every such term seems to be used with reference to 201 16 | to be used with reference to quantity or magnitude; because 202 16 | itself. But this is contrary to the truth already established, 203 16 | justness? And, when it is said to be just through justness, 204 16 | itself. And, when it is said to be just through itself, 205 16 | observe, then, how we are to understand the statement, 206 16 | Hence, if, when it is said to be justness, it is not said 207 16 | seeing that it is the same to say of the supreme Being, 208 16 | difference whether it is said to be justness or to be just. 209 16 | is said to be justness or to be just. Hence, when one 210 16 | Justness. Moreover, what we see to have been proved in the 211 16 | the intellect is compelled to acknowledge as true of all 212 17 | terms of what it is. ~Is it to be inferred, then, that 213 17 | compounded, and, indeed, owes to them the fact of its existence, 214 17 | composite must be applicable to it. But this impious falsehood 215 17 | as whatever is attributed to the essence of the supreme 216 17 | For, when a man is said to be a material body, and 217 17 | this same thing, according to another way, or another 218 18 | or until what time is it to exist? Or rather, let us 219 18 | neither from what time, nor to what time, it exists; but 220 18 | it is certain, according to truths already made plain, 221 18 | exists. But, whatever begins to exist from or through something, 222 18 | through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the supreme 223 18 | have an end. For, if it is to have end, it is not supremely 224 18 | end.~Furthermore, if it is to have an end, it will perish 225 18 | will. If, however, it is to perish against its will, 226 18 | reasoning has asserted it to be powerful and all-powerful. 227 18 | will the supreme Nature is to have an end, in no way will 228 18 | been irrefutably proved to be above.~Then, let him 229 18 | of a time when this began to be true, or when it was 230 18 | that something was destined to be; or when this shall cease 231 18 | or when this shall cease to be true, and shall not be 232 18 | truth, it is impossible even to conceive that truth has 233 18 | Whether, then, truth is said to have, or understood not 234 18 | have, or understood not to have, beginning or end, 235 19 | necessity, has concluded nothing to be. For, if the propositions 236 19 | nothing must be destined to follow it.~But, he who says 237 19 | existed before it appears to make this statement, "that 238 19 | it that it will not come to nothing? -- if that Being 239 19 | entity, supposed actually to precede the supreme Being 240 19 | it, and yields its place to nothing, which follows it, 241 19 | rather ought this nothing to be resisted, lest so many 242 19 | given before or after it to nothing, that Being which 243 19 | reduced through nothing to nothing.~For this one assertion, 244 19 | Nothing has taught me to fly," I could explain this 245 19 | has taught me actually to fly -- which would be false; 246 19 | not anything has taught me to fly, which would be true.~ 247 20 | neither began, nor will cease to be, it follows that it always 248 20 | contradiction which compels me to inquire more carefully where 249 20 | all. But there is no need to state that this is false. 250 21 | always? For, either it is to be understood that it exists 251 21 | parts; which has been found to be in a high degree alien 252 21 | be in a high degree alien to the supreme Nature. Hence, 253 21 | has hitherto been possible to prosecute in a single discussion, 254 21 | one from another and seem to avoid debate, as if by evasion 255 21 | individual wholes, if anything is to exist as a whole in different 256 21 | which it would be irrational to believe. Therefore, it does 257 21 | distributed in parts according to the parts of time.~But its 258 21 | divided into parts, according to the divisions of time. For, 259 21 | parts distributed according to times? Or rather, if these 260 21 | past or future attributable to the creative Being, either 261 21 | way can it be conceived to exist everywhere and always, 262 22 | are so necessary according to our exposition, and so necessary 263 22 | and so necessary according to our proof, be reconciled? 264 22 | present, and future.~For, to this law of space and time, 265 22 | and time, nothing seems to be subject, except the beings 266 22 | necessarily reached.~For it seems to be rightly said, that place 267 22 | measures by ending it. Hence, to any being, to whose spatial 268 22 | it. Hence, to any being, to whose spatial extent or 269 22 | time, it is not irrational to say, that no place is its 270 22 | doubtless by no means compelled to submit to the law of place 271 22 | means compelled to submit to the law of place or time. 272 22 | course of reasoning fail to reach the conclusion, that 273 22 | beings, which must be alien to, and free from, the nature 274 22 | impudently foolish, too, to say either, that space circumscribes 275 22 | place follows, according to magnitude, or such as time 276 22 | or such as time submits to, according to duration -- 277 22 | time submits to, according to duration -- nor can in any 278 22 | any law of places or times to multiplicity of parts, nor 279 22 | as a whole, be lacking to no place or time, and no 280 22 | for an instant; nor is it to come with the future, which 281 22 | by a law of space or time to exist, or not to exist, 282 22 | or time to exist, or not to exist, at any place or time -- 283 22 | the supreme Being is said to exist in space or time, 284 22 | times in which they are said to be, and (2) that they are 285 22 | it would, therefore, seem to be more fittingly said, 286 22 | this Being properly said to exist, since it is contained 287 22 | after a manner of its own, to be in every place or time, 288 22 | time, and has not taken to itself distinctions of place 289 22 | since these are restricted to things finite and mutable, 290 22 | in some sort, be ascribed to it, since it is just as 291 22 | sufficient evidence, then, to dispel the contradiction 292 22 | contradiction that threatened us; as to how the highest Being of 293 22 | place or time, according to the consistent truth of 294 23 | How it is better conceived to exist everywhere than in 295 23 | why should it not be said to be everywhere, in this sense, 296 23 | may be understood rather to be in all existing things, 297 23 | properly apply terms of place to objects which are not places; 298 23 | more appropriately said to be everywhere, in this sense, 299 24 | it is better understood to exist always than at every 300 24 | therefore, the term which seems to mean all time more properly 301 24 | understood, when applied to this Substance, to signify 302 24 | applied to this Substance, to signify eternity, which 303 24 | Hence, if this Being is said to exist always; since, for 304 24 | for it, it is the same to exist and to live, no better 305 24 | is the same to exist and to live, no better sense can 306 24 | better sense can be attached to this statement, than that 307 24 | true eternity belongs only to that substance which alone, 308 24 | true eternity is conceived to be free from the limitations 309 24 | end; and this is proved to be consistent with the nature 310 25 | term, are facts external to the essence of a being, 311 25 | which may yet be conceived to produce changes in a mutable 312 25 | Being, which has been shown to exist as in every way substantially 313 25 | it is unlike them seems to be an accident in its case ( 314 25 | inconsistency between susceptibility to certain facts, called accidents, 315 25 | some are understood not to be present or absent without 316 25 | while others are known not to effect any change in a thing 317 25 | not yet born, nor equal to him, nor like him. But I 318 25 | him. But I shall be able to sustain and to lose all 319 25 | shall be able to sustain and to lose all these relations 320 25 | a like effect, are found to be improperly called accidents. 321 25 | But, however it may be as to the proper signification 322 26 | How this Being is said to be substance: it transcends 323 26 | this Being is inaccessible to admixture or mutation, in 324 26 | signification of that name is to be understood in its case.~ ~ 325 27 | as essentially common to more than one substance, 326 27 | as being a man is common to individual men; or as individual, 327 27 | it, there is no objection to our calling it substance.~ 328 28 | comparable with him. ~IT seems to follow, then, from the preceding 329 28 | other beings which seem to be comparable with it are 330 28 | future. Nor does it fail to be now what it was, or will 331 28 | it is rightly said itself to exist simply, and absolutely, 332 28 | come from non-existence to existence, not through themselves, 333 28 | they return from existence to non-existence, so far as 334 28 | consistent with their nature to exist simply, or perfectly, 335 28 | absolutely, and not rather to be almost non-existent.~ 336 28 | can in no way be conceived to have taken inception from 337 28 | inception from non-existence, or to be capable of sustaining 338 28 | not his existence alone to be conceived of as simple, 339 28 | certainly be justly said to be in some sort unique. 340 28 | hand, whatever is known to exist through a higher cause, 341 28 | absolutely, but scarcely to exist, or to be almost non-existent -- 342 28 | but scarcely to exist, or to be almost non-existent -- 343 28 | assuredly may be rightly said to be in some sort non-existent.~ 344 28 | non-existent.~According to this course of reasoning, 345 29 | Nature, which have occurred to me in following the guidance 346 29 | following the guidance of reason to the present point, I think 347 29 | point, I think it reasonable to examine this Spirit's expression ( 348 29 | am especially compelled to a more careful discussion 349 29 | the fact that it is proved to be identical with the supreme 350 29 | intelligit) all things. For, to him, what is expressing 351 29 | expressing anything, according to this kind of expression, 352 29 | not, like man, ever fail to express what he conceives.~ 353 31 | others. ~BUT here, it seems to me, there arises a question 354 31 | question that is not easy to answer, and yet must not 355 31 | and images of the objects to which they correspond; and 356 31 | likeness.~What, then, is to be our position regarding 357 31 | But if it has no likeness to mutable things, how were 358 31 | reality of a man is said to be the living man, but the 359 31 | something through, and according to, that Word, a kind of imitation 360 31 | excellent, the more like it is to what exists supremely, and 361 31 | natures in any way alive to excel those that are not 362 31 | not alive, the sentient to excel the non-sentient, 363 31 | natural essence, is nearer to the most excellent Being, 364 31 | sentient, and rational, to be deprived of its reason, 365 31 | remains, who would fail to understand that the substance 366 31 | little, is gradually brought to smaller and smaller degrees 367 31 | of existence, and at last to non-existence? But the attributes 368 31 | itself, reduce an essence to less and less degrees of 369 31 | assumed in order, lead it to greater and greater degrees.~ 370 31 | nor less true, according to its likeness to the things 371 31 | according to its likeness to the things created, but 372 31 | dignity, the more it is seen to approach that Word.~ ~ 373 32 | be the Word corresponding to those objects, of which 374 32 | not the word corresponding to the objects that have been 375 32 | is a word corresponding to some object. Therefore, 376 32 | would be no word.~Are we to conclude, then, that if 377 32 | through that Being? For, to what has not been, and is 378 32 | corresponding.~But, according to this reasoning, if there 379 32 | he would express nothing to himself; if he expressed 380 32 | if he expressed nothing to himself, since, for him, 381 32 | is most absurd.~What is to be inferred? For, if it 382 33 | substance does not compel us to admit a single Word. For 383 33 | through reason, desires to conceive of truly, it at 384 33 | truly, it at least attempts to express its likeness, so 385 33 | is the word corresponding to the man I express by thinking 386 33 | way, a word corresponding to the created world, since 387 33 | by a word corresponding to the created world. To what, 388 33 | corresponding to the created world. To what, then, does the word 389 33 | it by a word, belonging to itself? For what he expresses, 390 33 | and a word must belong to something, that is, it is 391 33 | by a word corresponding to himself or to something 392 33 | corresponding to himself or to something else.~So, if he 393 33 | nothing by a word belonging to the created world, whatever 394 33 | by the Word corresponding to himself. By one and the 395 34 | beings, created according to immutable reason; while 396 35 | since knowing is the same to the supreme Spirit as conceiving 397 37 | XXXVII.~Whatever his relation to his creatures, this relation 398 37 | the supreme Spirit bears to what he creates, this relation 399 38 | unusual in other beings, seems to belong to the supreme Spirit 400 38 | beings, seems to belong to the supreme Spirit and his 401 38 | what relation they bear to the created world, they 402 38 | like manner be attributed to them, yet if it were to 403 38 | to them, yet if it were to be asked what it is in these 404 38 | expressions with reference to which they are used, it 405 38 | essence or their relation to the created world; and there 406 38 | peculiar relation of the one to the other, since there are 407 38 | image, bears a relation to the other, because it is 408 38 | peculiar are these attributes to the one that they are by 409 38 | of each they are required to be two. For it is the property 410 38 | the property of the one to derive existence from the 411 39 | terms than when it is said to be the property of the one, 412 39 | the property of the one, to be born of the other; and 413 39 | from supreme Being. And, to dispose of this comparison 414 39 | is completely analogous to the offspring of a parent; 415 39 | are unhesitatingly said to be born of those things 416 39 | possess no such likeness to those things of which they 417 39 | things of which they are said to be born, as offspring to 418 39 | to be born, as offspring to a parent. -- We say, for 419 39 | are without absurdity said to be born, so much the more 420 39 | the supreme Spirit be said to derive existence from him 421 39 | the resemblance it bears to him, like a child's to its 422 39 | bears to him, like a child's to its parent, through deriving 423 40 | it is most properly said to be born, and is so like 424 40 | more he alone is sufficient to effect this birth, and the 425 40 | child, none so begets as to be solely and without accessory, 426 40 | without accessory, sufficient to the generation of offspring; 427 40 | shows complete likeness to its parent.~If, then, the 428 40 | offspring can be ascribed to no beings so consistently 429 40 | beings so consistently as to the supreme Spirit and his 430 40 | Hence, it is his property to be most truly parent, and 431 40 | most truly parent, and its to be most truly his offspring.~ ~ 432 41 | BUT it will be impossible to establish this proposition, 433 41 | certain. Hence, it belongs to the supreme Spirit most 434 41 | supreme Spirit most truly to beget, and to his Word to 435 41 | most truly to beget, and to his Word to be most truly 436 41 | to beget, and to his Word to be most truly begotten.~ ~ 437 42 | the property of the one to be most truly progenitor 438 42 | Father, and of the other to be the begotten and Son. ~ 439 42 | glad, and perhaps able, now to reach the conclusion, that 440 42 | whether it is more fitting to call them Father and Son, 441 42 | with the nature of the one to be the Father, and of his 442 42 | Father, and of his offspring to be the Son, because both 443 42 | with the nature of the one to be the mother, and the other 444 42 | difference of sex, it belongs to the superior sex to be father 445 42 | belongs to the superior sex to be father or son, and to 446 42 | to be father or son, and to the inferior to be mother 447 42 | son, and to the inferior to be mother or daughter? And 448 42 | rate, it is more consistent to call the supreme Spirit 449 42 | mother should be attached to that parent with which, 450 42 | property of the one most truly to beget, and of the other 451 42 | beget, and of the other to be begotten, so it is the 452 42 | the property of the one to be most truly progenitor, 453 42 | progenitor, and of the other to be most truly begotten. 454 43 | is inevitable, is proved to exist in the supreme unity, 455 43 | think it most interesting to reflect, again and again, 456 43 | one Spirit. For, just as to separate properties of separate 457 43 | things, so, what is common to both preserves an indivisible 458 43 | it belongs, as a whole, to them taken separately.~For, 459 43 | separate properties belong to separate beings, so there 460 43 | although it belongs both to the Father, taken separately, 461 43 | Father, taken separately, and to the Son, taken separately, 462 43 | the Son, taken separately, to be the perfect Spirit. For 463 44 | by generation, he grants to his Son the possession of 464 44 | nor will the Son be equal to the Father. But it has already 465 44 | without impropriety be said to teach me by this very wisdom 466 44 | the other. But in order to indicate how they share 467 45 | it is much more proper to call the Son the essence 468 45 | is not wholly appropriate to say that he has the being 469 45 | most appropriately be said to have the essence of his 470 45 | appropriately conceived to have the essence of the 471 45 | the Father than the Father to have the essence of the 472 45 | from the Father; so that, to assert that the Son is the 473 45 | the Father is the same as to assert that the Son is not 474 45 | consistently attributed to the essence of the supreme 475 48 | of memory. ~BUT what is to be our notion of memory? 476 48 | notion of memory? Is the Son to be regarded as the intelligence 477 48 | be more consistent than to regard the Father as memory, 478 48 | the word corresponding to it is born of memory. Hence, 479 48 | always born of memory. For, to think of an object of which 480 48 | have remembrance, this is to express it mentally; while 481 48 | while the word corresponding to the object is the thought 482 49 | in them more pleasurable to contemplate than the feeling 483 49 | For how absurd it would be to deny that the supreme Spirit 484 50 | IT is, at any rate, clear to the rational man that he 485 52 | Spirit, common as it is to Father and Son! But, if 486 53 | BUT, what can be equal to the supreme Spirit, except 487 53 | whatsoever can be attributed to the substance the supreme 488 55 | identical with them; is it to be regarded as their Son 489 55 | examined, declares itself to be the offspring of him 490 55 | displaying a manifold likeness to its parent; so love plainly 491 55 | long as it is conceived to proceed from Father and 492 55 | it does not at once show to one who contemplates it 493 55 | it so evident a likeness to him from whom it derives 494 55 | relations of Father and Son to it to be described by different 495 55 | of Father and Son to it to be described by different 496 55 | differing in no respect, to some one being --of this 497 56 | usage of common speech, to be unbegotten, nor can it 498 56 | can it so properly be said to be begotten, as the Word 499 56 | begotten, as the Word is said to be begotten. For we often 500 56 | Spirit, cannot be declared to be wholly unbegotten, but