Par.

  1 Pre|          stated that the Trinity may be said to consist of three
  2 Pre|          nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of
  3 Pre|      investigation should declare to be true, should, in an unadorned
  4 Pre|              with a simple argument, be briefly enforced by the
  5 Pre|             they wanted this work to be adaptable to practical use,
  6 Pre|          might accomplish would soon be overwhelmed with contempt,
  7 Pre|              the supreme Trinity may be said to consist of three
  8 Pre|            And this method I knew to be in accordance with the wish
  9 Pre|             copy this work, he shall be careful to place this preface
 10 Pre|              I believe that one will be much helped in understanding
 11 1  |         things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that
 12 1  |          except as he judges them to be good. So that, as reason
 13 1  |      authority adduces, I wish it to be received in this way: although,
 14 1  |             for this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, but
 15 1  |          another through another? To be sure, it is most certain
 16 1  |           mutual comparison they may be said to possess it in greater,
 17 1  |           which is not understood to be one thing in one case and
 18 1  |           another in another, but to be the same in different cases,
 19 1  |        whatsoever things are said to be just, when compared one
 20 1  |             or more, or less, cannot be understood as just, except
 21 1  |      although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one by
 22 1  |              For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of
 23 1  |            strength do not appear to be the same thing.~But if a
 24 1  |      instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes
 25 1  |            which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must
 26 1  |              a great good? This must be, then, a good through itself,
 27 2  |        instance. And since there can be nothing supremely great
 28 2  |           supremely good, there must be a being that is greatest
 29 3  |              these are themselves to be referred to some one being,
 30 3  |       through itself. But, there can be no doubt that, in that case,
 31 3  |        through which all exist, must be one. Since, then, all things
 32 3  |           any existence -- that must be supremely good, and supremely
 33 4  |        observes the nature of things be perceives, whether he will
 34 4  |        Therefore, although it cannot be denied that some natures
 35 4  |             than which no higher can be found, our course of reasoning
 36 4  |             equal, since they cannot be equal through any diverse
 37 4  |           than themselves, can there be more such natures than one,
 38 4  |             which nothing else shall be more excellent, then in
 39 4  |            then in no wise can there be more than one nature of
 40 4  |             This, however, it cannot be, unless it is what it is
 41 4  |           through it; or, there will be more than one supreme being.
 42 4  |           manifest that there cannot be more than one supreme being.
 43 5  |              the artificer, may also be said to exist through matter,
 44 6  |           very diligent inquiry must be made, in what way all existing
 45 6  |             the supreme Nature could be created neither by itself,
 46 6  |             could itself or an other be the matter whence it should
 47 6  |              matter whence it should be created; nor did it assist
 48 6  |            did anything assist it to be what it was not before.~
 49 6  |           was not before.~What is to be inferred? For that which
 50 6  |       external aids, seems either to be nothing, or, if it has any
 51 6  |        propositions could in no wise be true in the case of supreme
 52 6  |              is as false as it would be absurd to say that whatever
 53 6  |             of good. But no good can be understood as existing before
 54 6  |         Finally, as to how it should be understood to exist through
 55 6  |         relations of essence, and to be and being, that is, existing
 56 6  |            the supreme Being, and to be in the highest degree, and
 57 7  |             elements, of course, can be conceived of without these
 58 7  |          confused, nature appears to be the material of all bodies,
 59 7  |         certainly it not only cannot be, but it cannot even be supposed
 60 7  |        cannot be, but it cannot even be supposed to be, from any
 61 7  |           cannot even be supposed to be, from any other material
 62 7  |      material, doubtless nothing can be more clear than that this
 63 8  |           CHAPTER VIII.~How it is to be understood that this Nature
 64 8  |             one, that the belief can be wrested from no one by argument,
 65 8  |           argument, and can scarcely be purloined by sophistry.~
 66 8  |           source in nothing, who can be convinced, and how, that
 67 8  |   inconceivable that anything should be created from what does not
 68 8  |           what was nothing will thus be something, that which was
 69 8  |              the highest degree will be nothing. For, from the discovery
 70 8  |         created, which I supposed to be nothing, is something, whatever
 71 8  |           nothing.~What, then, is to be our understanding of the
 72 8  |       possible objection, even if it be almost foolish. --In three
 73 8  |             was created from nothing be explained.~There is one
 74 8  |     according to which we wish it to be understood, that what is
 75 8  |           from nothing" may properly be given; that is, it never
 76 8  |              supposition, but cannot be true; namely, that if anything
 77 8  |           from which something could be created. But, since this
 78 8  |            inferred; although it may be said, without inconsistency
 79 9  |        things which were created may be said to have been nothing
 80 9  |             can anything conceivably be created by any, unless there
 81 9  |             sort, and how, it should be. Hence, although it is clear
 82 9  |          anything whence they should be created, yet they were not
 83 10 |      themselves, whether destined to be, or already existing.~For,
 84 10 |        object, and where they cannot be, no other word is of any
 85 10 |             absurdity, they may also be said to be the truer, the
 86 10 |             they may also be said to be the truer, the more like
 87 10 |              This last, then, should be called the especially proper
 88 10 |              of words, nor can there be in the thought of any another
 89 10 |          object, whether destined to be, or already existing, not
 90 10 |            not without reason it may be thought that such an expression
 91 10 |            creation, that they might be created; and exists, now
 92 10 |          been created, that they may be known through it.~ ~
 93 11 |             work premeditated cannot be performed. For, though a
 94 12 |            word; what conclusion can be more evidently necessary,
 95 12 |           should not, in my opinion, be carelessly passed over.
 96 12 |              over. But before it can be discussed, I think some
 97 12 |             supreme Substance should be diligently and earnestly
 98 13 |             reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever things
 99 13 |             But, since it cannot but be that those things which
100 14 |              rather, since this must be true, it follows that, where
101 15 |       CHAPTER XV.~What can or cannot be stated concerning the substance
102 15 |              the statements that may be made regarding anything
103 15 |         Nature. For, though I should be surprised if, among the
104 15 |             from nothing, any should be found that could worthily
105 15 |            found that could worthily be applied to the Substance
106 15 |            that can, in like manner, be applied to it, does not
107 15 |             or greater, it would not be conceived as either supreme
108 15 |             it would not, therefore, be less good, or suffer detriment
109 15 |          than itself, whatever there be that is good or great. If,
110 15 |               the supreme Nature can be so conceived of as not supreme,
111 15 |         supreme, that still it shall be in no wise greater or less
112 15 |       supreme or highest is found to be true, in like manner, of
113 15 |          anything, let our attention be turned to the discussion
114 15 |           either it is such that, to be it is in general better
115 15 |           general better than not to be it, or such that, in some
116 15 |          that, in some cases, not to be it is better than to be
117 15 |              be it is better than to be it. But I here understand
118 15 |           understand the phrases, to be it and not to be it, in
119 15 |         phrases, to be it and not to be it, in the same way in which
120 15 |             in which I understand to be true and not to be true,
121 15 |     understand to be true and not to be true, to be bodily and not
122 15 |          true and not to be true, to be bodily and not to be bodily,
123 15 |              to be bodily and not to be bodily, and the like. Indeed,
124 15 |             and the like. Indeed, to be anything is, in general,
125 15 |          general, better than not to be it; as to be wise is better
126 15 |             than not to be it; as to be wise is better than not
127 15 |           wise is better than not to be so; that is, it is better
128 15 |             that is, it is better to be wise than not to be wise.
129 15 |        better to be wise than not to be wise. For, though one who
130 15 |              it is not better not to be wise than to be wise. For,
131 15 |        better not to be wise than to be wise. For, everything that
132 15 |    everything that is not wise would be better if it were wise.
133 15 |            wise. In the same way, to be true is altogether better
134 15 |        altogether better than not to be so, that is, better than
135 15 |          that is, better than not to be true; and just is better
136 15 |           But, in some cases, not to be a certain thing is better
137 15 |              thing is better than to be it, as not to be gold may
138 15 |             than to be it, as not to be gold may be better than
139 15 |            it, as not to be gold may be better than to be gold.
140 15 |           gold may be better than to be gold. For it is better for
141 15 |             is better for man not to be gold, than to be gold; although
142 15 |              not to be gold, than to be gold; although it might
143 15 |              gold; although it might be better for something to
144 15 |              better for something to be gold, than not to be gold --
145 15 |              to be gold, than not to be gold -- lead, for instance.
146 15 |        better than gold, as he would be of inferior nature, were
147 15 |          base than gold, as it would be more precious, were it gold.~
148 15 |          that the supreme Nature may be so conceived of as not supreme,
149 15 |              taken independently, to be it is better than not to
150 15 |             it is better than not to be it; as it is impious to
151 15 |              any way better, it must be true that this substance
152 15 |             this rational mind would be if it were any of those
153 15 |            should this supreme Being be said to be any of those
154 15 |             supreme Being be said to be any of those things to which
155 15 |              as our reasoning shows, be said to be any of those
156 15 |          reasoning shows, be said to be any of those things to which
157 15 |               Hence, this Being must be living, wise, powerful,
158 16 |              Being it is the same to be just that it is to be justice;
159 16 |             to be just that it is to be justice; and so with regard
160 16 |        regard to attributes that can be expressed in the same way:
161 16 |             every such term seems to be used with reference to quantity
162 16 |         through justness, and cannot be just, except through itself,
163 16 |             through itself, what can be more clear than that this
164 16 |              And, when it is said to be just through justness, it
165 16 |              And, when it is said to be just through itself, nothing
166 16 |        itself, what truer answer can be given, than Justness?~We
167 16 |              For, since a man cannot be justness, but can possess
168 16 |             hand, it cannot properly be said of the supreme Nature
169 16 |               if, when it is said to be justness, it is not said
170 16 |     difference whether it is said to be justness or to be just.
171 16 |            said to be justness or to be just. Hence, when one is
172 17 |             that all things that can be said of its essence are
173 17 |          same in it: and nothing can be said of its substance except
174 17 |             of what it is. ~Is it to be inferred, then, that if
175 17 |             goods, it will therefore be compounded of more goods
176 17 |              of every composite must be applicable to it. But this
177 17 |           For, when a man is said to be a material body, and rational,
178 17 |            accordance with one fact, be is a material body; and
179 17 |              is; hence, it would not be simple, but composite.~ ~
180 18 |         reasoning has asserted it to be powerful and all-powerful.
181 18 |           been irrefutably proved to be above.~Then, let him who
182 18 |              time when this began to be true, or when it was not
183 18 |            something was destined to be; or when this shall cease
184 18 |             when this shall cease to be true, and shall not be true,
185 18 |            to be true, and shall not be true, namely, that something
186 18 |            exist, and after it shall be ended it will be true that
187 18 |            it shall be ended it will be true that truth will not
188 18 |              exist after truth shall be ended, which is a most contradictory
189 18 |          beginning or end, it cannot be limited by any beginning
190 19 |             has concluded nothing to be. For, if the propositions
191 19 |            something or nothing must be destined to follow it.~But,
192 19 |         existed, and that there will be after it a time when nothing
193 19 |         rather ought this nothing to be resisted, lest so many structures
194 19 |       structures of cogent reasoning be stormed by nothing; and
195 19 |         found by the light of truth, be lost for nothing. Let it
196 19 |           for nothing. Let it rather be declared, then, that nothing
197 19 |             what was nothing, should be reduced through nothing
198 19 |       actually to fly -- which would be false; or in this way, that
199 19 |        taught me to fly, which would be true.~The former interpretation,
200 19 |              whole correlation, must be true.~Hence, the statement
201 19 |       existed before that Being must be received in the latter sense.
202 19 |          latter sense. Nor should it be so explained, that it shall
203 19 |             explained, that it shall be understood that there was
204 19 |         exist; but, so that it shall be understood that, before
205 20 |             began, nor will cease to be, it follows that it always
206 20 |           has been, and is, and will be; yet, I perceive a certain
207 20 |             at no time.~But what can be more obviously contradictory,
208 21 |         always? For, either it is to be understood that it exists
209 21 |              which has been found to be in a high degree alien to
210 21 |         diverse directions, let each be investigated independently
211 21 |         supreme Natures as there can be individual places; which
212 21 |    individual places; which it would be irrational to believe. Therefore,
213 21 |          that it was and is and will be. Its age, then, which is
214 21 |            supreme Being, then, will be divided into parts, according
215 21 |               shall that proposition be valid, which was proved
216 21 |         immutable? -- how shall this be so, if that Nature is one
217 21 |           true, how can these latter be possible? By no means, then,
218 21 |             was means past, and will be future. Therefore that Being
219 21 |            Being never was, nor will be. Hence, it does not exist
220 21 |        always.~For, in no way can it be conceived to exist everywhere
221 22 |              according to our proof, be reconciled? Perhaps the
222 22 |           and time, nothing seems to be subject, except the beings
223 22 |             reached.~For it seems to be rightly said, that place
224 22 |             or duration no bound can be set, either by space or
225 22 |         among all beings, which must be alien to, and free from,
226 22 |       duration -- nor can in any way be contained, as a whole, simultaneously
227 22 |           supreme Being, as a whole, be lacking to no place or time,
228 22 |              it was, or is, or shall be, has any part of its eternity
229 22 |            in which they are said to be, and (2) that they are contained
230 22 |            would, therefore, seem to be more fittingly said, that
231 22 |         other at all. And yet it may be said, after a manner of
232 22 |              a manner of its own, to be in every place or time,
233 22 |             place can, in some sort, be ascribed to it, since it
234 23 |    permeating all, why should it not be said to be everywhere, in
235 23 |             should it not be said to be everywhere, in this sense,
236 23 |              this sense, that it may be understood rather to be
237 23 |              be understood rather to be in all existing things,
238 23 |           more appropriately said to be everywhere, in this sense,
239 23 |          exist otherwise, it must so be in all existing things,
240 24 |            live, no better sense can be attached to this statement,
241 24 |             eternity is conceived to be free from the limitations
242 24 |           end; and this is proved to be consistent with the nature
243 25 |            of a being, which may yet be conceived to produce changes
244 25 |              it can, I will not say, be, but, be conceived of, as
245 25 |             I will not say, be, but, be conceived of, as variable
246 25 |              is unlike them seems to be an accident in its case (
247 25 |           some are understood not to be present or absent without
248 25 |            nor like him. But I shall be able to sustain and to lose
249 25 |             essence, whence it would be conceived of, as itself
250 25 |           this conclusion, also, may be reached, that it is susceptible
251 25 |            like effect, are found to be improperly called accidents.
252 25 |    accidentally. But, however it may be as to the proper signification
253 25 |              Nature no statement can be made, whence it shall be
254 25 |             be made, whence it shall be conceived of as mutable.~ ~
255 26 |            How this Being is said to be substance: it transcends
256 26 |            form.~How, then, shall it be maintained that it is a
257 26 |     signification of that name is to be understood in its case.~ ~
258 27 |     substance, this Substance cannot be included, from sharing in
259 27 |     doubtless if any worthy name can be given it, there is no objection
260 27 |              body, it must certainly be maintained that this Being
261 27 |              parts, and there cannot be more spirits than one of
262 27 |               it must, by all means, be an indivisible spirit. For
263 27 |         compounded of parts, nor can be conceived of as mutable,
264 28 |           other beings which seem to be comparable with it are not
265 28 |           diligent attention it will be seen that that Spirit alone
266 28 |          eternity, it can in no wise be said, in terms of any alteration,
267 28 |      alteration, that it was or will be, but simply that it is;
268 28 |             at any time, or will not be in the future. Nor does
269 28 |          future. Nor does it fail to be now what it was, or will
270 28 |             now what it was, or will be, at any time; but, whatever
271 28 |              some time been, or will be, by mutation, what they
272 28 |           they were not, or will not be, at some time; and, since
273 28 |        absolutely, and not rather to be almost non-existent.~And
274 28 |           Spirit alone can in no way be conceived to have taken
275 28 |            from non-existence, or to be capable of sustaining any
276 28 |           not his existence alone to be conceived of as simple,
277 28 |              this may very certainly be justly said to be in some
278 28 |          certainly be justly said to be in some sort unique. And,
279 28 |             scarcely to exist, or to be almost non-existent -- this
280 28 |   non-existent -- this assuredly may be rightly said to be in some
281 28 |     assuredly may be rightly said to be in some sort non-existent.~
282 29 |            fact that it is proved to be identical with the supreme
283 29 |            how shall that expression be anything else than what
284 29 |            that expression could not be created through itself.
285 29 |              itself. For nothing can be created through itself,
286 29 |              Spirit, since it cannot be a creature, is no other
287 29 |           this expression itself can be conceived of as nothing
288 29 |             this his expression must be so consubstantial with him,
289 31 |             answer, and yet must not be left in any ambiguity. For
290 31 |          likeness.~What, then, is to be our position regarding the
291 31 |            all were created? Will it be, or will it not be, the
292 31 |           Will it be, or will it not be, the likeness of the things
293 31 |          reality of a man is said to be the living man, but the
294 31 |      necessary inference will rather be, that every created being
295 31 |           think that this can easily be ascertained as follows.
296 31 |           sentient, and rational, to be deprived of its reason,
297 32 |             can what is simple Truth be the Word corresponding to
298 32 |             through it, how shall we be sure that it is the Word?
299 32 |             no creature, there would be no word.~Are we to conclude,
300 32 |              which is the Word still be the eternal Being, but not
301 32 |             and is not, and will not be, then can be no word corresponding.~
302 32 |            and will not be, then can be no word corresponding.~But,
303 32 |          supreme Spirit, there would be no word at all in him. If
304 32 |              most absurd.~What is to be inferred? For, if it conceived
305 32 |             of nothing, how would it be the supreme Wisdom? Or,
306 32 |            of itself? But how can it be even imagined that the supreme
307 32 |               Whether, therefore, it be thought of in connection
308 32 |             Word of that Spirit must be coeternal with him.~ ~
309 33 |          then, by one word, and what be creates by another; or does
310 33 |              expresses himself, must be identical with himself,
311 33 |      expresses itself may most fitly be called its Word on the former
312 33 |             For, on no ground can it be denied that when a rational
313 33 |       uniquely important nothing can be said with sufficient propriety,
314 33 |            still not inappropriately be called the image of that
315 34 |       creative and the created being be expressed by one Word, especially
316 34 |           with him? Perhaps, because be himself is supreme Wisdom
317 34 |              Thus, it may reasonably be declared that, when the
318 36 |       created by him. ~HENCE, it may be most clearly comprehended
319 36 |            the created world, cannot be comprehended by human knowledge.
320 37 |     consubstantial with him, it must be the supreme essence of that
321 38 |           CHAPTER XXXVIII.~It cannot be explained why they are two,
322 38 |              two, although they must be so. ~OUR careful attention
323 38 |               whose is the Word, can be his own Word, nor can the
324 38 |           own Word, nor can the Word be he, whose Word it is, although
325 38 |         necessity requires that they be two, it can in no wise be
326 38 |            be two, it can in no wise be explained why they are two.~
327 38 |            although they may perhaps be called two equals, or some
328 38 |          relation may in like manner be attributed to them, yet
329 38 |              them, yet if it were to be asked what it is in these
330 38 |             they are used, it cannot be expressed plurally, as one
331 38 |               evident that it cannot be explained why they are two,
332 38 |            each they are required to be two. For it is the property
333 39 |            this truth, it seems, can be expressed in no more familiar
334 39 |              than when it is said to be the property of the one,
335 39 |              property of the one, to be born of the other; and of
336 39 |              fitting supposition can be entertained regarding its
337 39 |           are unhesitatingly said to be born of those things from
338 39 |            of which they are said to be born, as offspring to a
339 39 |            without absurdity said to be born, so much the more fittingly
340 39 |           Word of the supreme Spirit be said to derive existence
341 40 |             is most properly said to be born, and is so like him
342 40 |            it is born, why should it be esteemed like, as a child
343 40 |             why should it not rather be declared, that the Spirit
344 40 |          child, none so begets as to be solely and without accessory,
345 40 |             parent and offspring can be ascribed to no beings so
346 40 |         Hence, it is his property to be most truly parent, and its
347 40 |             truly parent, and its to be most truly his offspring.~ ~
348 41 |         truly begotten. ~BUT it will be impossible to establish
349 41 |            beget, and to his Word to be most truly begotten.~ ~
350 42 |           the property of the one to be most truly progenitor and
351 42 |          Father, and of the other to be the begotten and Son. ~I
352 42 |             Son. ~I should certainly be glad, and perhaps able,
353 42 |             this question should not be neglected: whether it is
354 42 |             the nature of the one to be the Father, and of his offspring
355 42 |              and of his offspring to be the Son, because both are
356 42 |             the nature of the one to be the mother, and the other
357 42 |       belongs to the superior sex to be father or son, and to the
358 42 |               and to the inferior to be mother or daughter? And
359 42 |          that the name mother should be attached to that parent
360 42 |           beget, and of the other to be begotten, so it is the property
361 42 |           the property of the one to be most truly progenitor, and
362 42 |      progenitor, and of the other to be most truly begotten. And
363 43 |            that necessarily one must be the progenitor and the other
364 43 |             he who is begotten shall be the same, and also that
365 43 |           parent and offspring shall be the same, that the progenitor
366 43 |           that the progenitor cannot be any other than what the
367 43 |            Son, taken separately, to be the perfect Spirit. For
368 44 |            is wise, though he cannot be wise through himself, can
369 44 |              as if the one could not be existent except through
370 44 |          other, just as a man cannot be wise except through wisdom.~
371 44 |             the Father; but he would be a less perfect essence or
372 44 |              Father and Son will not be the same, nor will the Son
373 44 |           the same, nor will the Son be equal to the Father. But
374 44 |            might without impropriety be said to teach me by this
375 44 |        wisdom once existed, it would be no other essence than its
376 44 |           than its own, nor would it be wise except through itself.~
377 44 | inconceivable that the Father should be the essence of the Son,
378 44 |             one, it may consistently be said, and conceived, that
379 45 |           Son may more appropriately be called the essence of the
380 45 |            he may most appropriately be said to have the essence
381 45 |            so the Son may more fitly be called the essence of the
382 46 |              thus expounded may also be conceived of in another
383 46 |              these truths, which may be thus expounded and conceived
384 46 |           properly, too, may the Son be called the truth of the
385 46 |            imperfect imitation shall be conceived of, but the complete
386 48 |              memory. ~BUT what is to be our notion of memory? Is
387 48 |             of memory? Is the Son to be regarded as the intelligence
388 48 |              Indeed, since it cannot be denied that the supreme
389 48 |        remembers itself, nothing can be more consistent than to
390 48 |            of itself, its word would be always born of memory. For,
391 48 |           from memory.~Hence, it may be clearly apprehended in the
392 48 |             of his memory, there can be no more logical conclusion
393 49 |              For how absurd it would be to deny that the supreme
394 53 |           one spirit. ~BUT, what can be equal to the supreme Spirit,
395 53 |              But, since there cannot be more than one supreme Being,
396 53 |            Being, what inference can be more necessary than that
397 53 |             Good, and whatsoever can be attributed to the substance
398 54 |              as one love. ~IT should be carefully considered whether
399 54 |         question can, without doubt, be apprehended from the fact
400 55 |        identical with them; is it to be regarded as their Son or
401 55 |         examined, declares itself to be the offspring of him from
402 55 |              Father and Son to it to be described by different words;
403 55 |          their identical love should be their son or offspring.~ ~
404 56 |           that this love can neither be said, in accordance with
405 56 |           usage of common speech, to be unbegotten, nor can it so
406 56 |               nor can it so properly be said to be begotten, as
407 56 |            it so properly be said to be begotten, as the Word is
408 56 |               as the Word is said to be begotten. For we often say
409 56 |          from supreme Spirit, cannot be declared to be wholly unbegotten,
410 56 |        Spirit, cannot be declared to be wholly unbegotten, but it
411 56 |            but it cannot so properly be said to be begotten as can
412 56 |        cannot so properly be said to be begotten as can the Word;
413 56 |               may, or rather should, be called begetter and unbegotten,
414 56 |            and the Word alone should be called begotten, which alone
415 57 |           creative being. And it may be called the Spirit of Father
416 57 |            if such an expression may be used, breathe their love:
417 57 |       existence from it, can perhaps be no better expressed than
418 57 |            love may fittingly enough be called its breath (Spiritus).
419 57 |          Father and the Son: it will be useful to this effect also,
420 57 |           through this name it shall be signified that this love
421 58 |           with the Father; so it may be conceived that the Spirit
422 59 |       another, that none of them can be proved to surpass another
423 60 |            me as I reflect, ought to be most carefully commended
424 60 |              memory. The Father must be so conceived of as memory,
425 60 |             love, that it shall also be understood that the Father
426 60 |         conceives and loves, it must be that none of these three
427 62 |             assertion. It should not be doubted that the Father
428 62 |      Apparently as many words as can be proved to be born of the
429 62 |            words as can be proved to be born of the supreme Substance,
430 62 |         former reasoning, must there be begotten of this substance,
431 63 |            Hence, this fact may also be clearly recognised, that
432 63 |            nevertheless there cannot be in the supreme Being another
433 63 |           than that already shown to be born of him whose is the
434 63 |             the Word, so that it may be called his true image and
435 63 |           Word itself can in no wise be called the Word of all three,
436 63 |              that it cannot properly be called either the image
437 63 |             Spirit from it. It is to be concluded that this sole
438 63 |           one that just as it cannot be attributed to them taken
439 63 |           plural, so, neither can it be attributed to them as plural,
440 64 |     incomprehensible object ought to be satisfied if this reasoning
441 64 |              ought assured belief to be the less readily given to
442 64 |         truths which are declared to be such by cogent proofs, and
443 64 |              even though they cannot be so examined by the human
444 64 |            the human intellect as to be capable of explanation in
445 64 |             or scarcely anything can be known by man? Hence, if
446 65 |              LXV.~How real truth may be reached in the discussion
447 65 |            Son, and emanating Spirit be valid? For, if it has been
448 65 |             is ineffable, how can it be such as our discussion has
449 65 |              has shown? Or, could it be explained to a certain extent,
450 65 |               but since it could not be comprehended at all, for
451 65 |             for that reason it would be ineffable?~But how shall
452 65 |          whatever I have inferred to be attributable to it is not
453 65 |            to that Being? What is to be inferred?~Or, has there
454 65 |              regarding it, which can be reached by the instruction
455 66 |               then, that nothing can be ascertained concerning this
456 66 |          created beings is proved to be, the more excellent must
457 66 |              must that created being be by nature. Hence, this being,
458 67 |              the mind may most fitly be said to be its own mirror
459 67 |            may most fitly be said to be its own mirror wherein it
460 67 |             do not see why it should be denied that it is the true
461 67 |            rate, it proves itself to be the more truly the image
462 67 |            truly it is recognised to be its image.~But, it is utterly
463 68 |    discernment, it judges a thing to be more or less good, or not
464 69 |              take away, or permit to be taken away, from the loving
465 69 |          since it should by no means be doubted that he himself
466 70 |               that that creature may be eternally blessed. ~THEREFORE
467 70 |        blessed. ~THEREFORE it cannot be made to appear true that
468 70 |              existence that it might be able to be a loving being.
469 70 |             that it might be able to be a loving being. For, if
470 70 |          that despises what ought to be supremely loved, nor does
471 70 |            else it does not avail to be loved by him; all of which
472 70 |        rational being, that it might be a loving soul, what shall
473 70 |     creatures, assuredly nothing can be the reward of love except
474 70 |        itself, also requires that it be desired by the loving soul.
475 70 |           Being.~Or, if it wishes to be loved and desired, so as
476 70 |          than its love, it wishes to be loved and desired, not for
477 70 |        another; and does not wish to be loved itself, but wishes
478 70 |        itself, but wishes another to be loved; which it is impious
479 70 |            that blessedness, it will be impossible to turn the soul
480 70 |            that blessedness, will it be able not to love it; nor
481 70 |            loves it; nor shall there be anything powerful enough
482 70 |             supreme Blessedness will be eternally blessed.~ ~
483 71 |             despises this being will be eternally miserable. ~FROM
484 71 |         miserable. ~FROM this it may be inferred, as a certain consequence,
485 71 |             eternal misery. It might be said that it would be justly
486 71 |          might be said that it would be justly punished for such
487 71 |             guilt it is condemned to be what it was before all its
488 71 |            existed, it could neither be guilty nor feel a penalty.
489 71 |            feel nothing, or so as to be nothing at all, its condition
490 71 |              all, its condition will be the same when in the greatest
491 71 |               Therefore, nothing can be more logical, and nothing
492 71 |        logical, and nothing ought to be believed more confidently
493 72 |              it was created, it must be immortal. But if there are
494 72 |          rational souls which are to be judged as neither loving
495 72 |             souls of infants seem to be, what opinion shall be held
496 72 |            to be, what opinion shall be held regarding these? Are
497 72 |      immortal, every human soul must be immortal. But since every
498 73 |          good, and every effort must be directed toward that good. ~
499 73 |          souls are unhesitatingly to be judged as so loving that
500 74 |              The supreme Being is to be hoped for. ~BUT the human