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appropriately 6
approve 1
apud 1
are 260
argument 8
arguments 3
arises 3
Frequency    [«  »]
280 being
274 from
262 by
260 are
233 all
220 itself
216 if
Anselmus Cantuariensis
Monologium

IntraText - Concordances

are

    Par.
1 1 | even if his mental powers are very ordinary, by the force 2 1 | cause by which these things are good, which he does not 3 1 | to himself: Since there are goods so innumerable, whose 4 1 | which all goods whatever are good? Or are they good one 5 1 | goods whatever are good? Or are they good one through one 6 1 | certain and clear, for all who are willing to see, that whatsoever 7 1 | that whatsoever things are said to possess any attribute 8 1 | or less, or equal degree, are said to possess it by virtue 9 1 | For, whatsoever things are said to be just, when compared 10 1 | unequally good, necessarily they are all good by virtue of something 11 1 | useful or honorable, if they are truly good, are good through 12 1 | if they are truly good, are good through that same being 13 1 | therefore, that all other goods are good through another being 14 1 | that which they themselves are, and this being alone is 15 2 | supremely good, since all goods are good through a single being, 16 3 | beings. ~THEREFORE, not only are all good things such through 17 3 | there is one being, or there are more than one, through which 18 3 | through which all things that are exist. But if there are 19 3 | are exist. But if there are more than one, either these 20 3 | more than one, either these are themselves to be referred 21 3 | existendi per se), by which they are able to exist each through 22 3 | and through which they are able to exist, each through 23 3 | than through these, which are more than one, which, without 24 3 | terms master and servant are used with mutual reference, 25 3 | the men thus designated are mentioned as having mutual 26 3 | the subjects to which they are referred.~Therefore, since 27 3 | the supposition that there are more beings than one, through 28 3 | Since, then, all things that are exist through this one being, 29 3 | itself. Whatever things there are else then, exist through 30 3 | through which all things are, and which alone exists 31 4 | will or no, that not all are embraced in a single degree 32 4 | that certain among them are distinguished by inequality 33 4 | denied that some natures are superior to others, nevertheless 34 4 | either is single, or there are more natures than one of 35 4 | one of this sort, and they are of equal degree.~But, if 36 4 | equal degree.~But, if they are more than one and equal, 37 4 | cause, through which they are equally so great, either 38 4 | either is itself what they are, that is, the very essence 39 4 | is another than what they are.~But if it is nothing else 40 4 | through which these natures are so great is another than 41 4 | another than that which they are, then, certainly, they are 42 4 | are, then, certainly, they are less than that through which 43 4 | that through which they are so great. For, whatever 44 4 | is great. Therefore, they are not so great that there 45 4 | neither through what they are nor through anything other 46 4 | and all existing beings are what they are through it.~ 47 4 | existing beings are what they are through it.~For since, as 48 5 | just as all existing beings are what they are, through the 49 5 | existing beings are what they are, through the supreme Nature, 50 6 | itself, and all other beings are what they are, through it, 51 6 | other beings are what they are, through it, how does it 52 6 | both these suppositions are false. The supreme Substance, 53 6 | and from itself. For, as are the mutual relations of 54 6 | lux, lucere, lucens), such are the relations of essence, 55 7 | shown, that whatever things are should exist secondarily, 56 7 | But all these suppositions are false.~Again, everything 57 8 | things from nothing. ~BUT we are confronted with a doubt 58 8 | which before were nothing, are now something. For, indeed, 59 9 | they were not what they now are, nor was there anything 60 10| signs, that is, signs which are perceptible to the bodily 61 10| which, when outwardly used, are sensible; or not by employing 62 10| two kinds of expression are in the language of one's 63 10| concern objects well known, are natural, and are the same 64 10| known, are natural, and are the same among all nations. 65 10| invention to these, where these are, no other word is necessary 66 10| truer, the more like they are to the objects to which 67 11| its creatures what they are; while the artisan is wholly 68 11| expressions of the works they are to create differ in the 69 13| whose creative act they are endowed with the existence 70 15| both, namely, man and lead are not gold, man is something 71 15| it is evident that there are many relative expressions 72 15| relative expressions which are by no means included in 73 15| classification. Whether, however, any are so included, I refrain from 74 15| better than all things, which are not what it is.~It is not 75 15| not what they themselves are. For, the rational mind, 76 15| any of those things that are in the scope of the bodily 77 15| something, which they themselves are not, is superior; and it 78 15| not what they themselves are, is inferior.~Hence, this 79 16| must observe, then, how we are to understand the statement, 80 16| of all attributes which are similarly predicated of 81 17| can be said of its essence are one and the same in it: 82 17| true, rather, that there are not more goods than one, 83 17| through these things; and they are not what they are through 84 17| and they are not what they are through it, and therefore 85 17| one, all these facts that are true of every composite 86 17| goods, necessarily all these are not more than one, but are 87 17| are not more than one, but are one. Any one of them is, 88 17| human, these three things are not said in one way, or 89 19| this Being. ~BUT here we are again confronted by the 90 20| place and time themselves are existing things -- the supreme 91 21| individual places and times.~We are confronted, then, by the 92 21| distinguished from place that there are individual places, so that 93 21| another place, that there are indiviual wholes. For, of 94 21| individual places, there are individual wholes, if anything 95 21| individual place, there are as many supreme Natures 96 21| places themselves, which are not nothing, but something. 97 21| individual times, if these times are not themselves simultaneous? 98 21| these earlier propositions are true, how can these latter 99 22| these prepositions, that are so necessary according to 100 22| places or times, that there are not more wholes than one; 101 22| case of those beings which are not of this class, no such 102 22| 1) that these objects are present in those places 103 22| and times in which they are said to be, and (2) that 104 22| to be, and (2) that they are contained by these places 105 22| past or future, since these are restricted to things finite 106 23| of place to objects which are not places; as, when I say 107 23| though there and where are adverbs of place, yet, by 108 25| as Anselm uses the term, are facts external to the essence 109 25| called accidents, some are understood not to be present 110 25| instance -- while others are known not to effect any 111 25| of those accidents which are in no wise inconsistent 112 25| occurrence or non-occurrence, are by virtue of this very effect 113 25| which lack a like effect, are found to be improperly called 114 26| from these beings, which are not what it is. And, since 115 27| individual men the fact that they are men; does any one conceive 116 28| simply, and created beings are not comparable with him. ~ 117 28| to be comparable with it are not so.~For, by diligent 118 28| while all other beings are almost non-existent, and 119 28| by mutation, what they are not now; or, are what they 120 28| what they are not now; or, are what they were not, or will 121 28| it is asserted that they are almost nonexistent, that 122 28| since all beings, which are other than this Spirit himself, 123 28| is concerned, unless they are sustained through another 124 28| exists, and all creatures are nonexistent; yet, they are 125 28| are nonexistent; yet, they are not wholly non-existent, 126 29| consubstantial with him, since there are not two spirits, but one. ~ 127 29| consubstantial with him, that they are not two spirits, but one.~ ~ 128 30| supreme Nature that they are not two spirits, but one; 129 31| being, while created beings are a kind of likeness of reality. -- 130 31| reality. --What natures are greater and more excellent 131 31| that is, conceive of them, are likenesses and images of 132 31| Word by which all things are expressed, and through which 133 31| comparison with that Essence, are in some sort non-existent, 134 31| alive to excel those that are not alive, the sentient 135 32| there would be no word.~Are we to conclude, then, that 136 33| if the substance is one, are there two words? But, perhaps, 137 34| supreme Reason, in which are all things that have been 138 34| created, and after they are decayed or changed in any 139 34| changed in any way, they are ever in him not what they 140 34| ever in him not what they are in themselves, but what 141 34| For, in themselves they are mutable beings, created 142 34| unto which those beings are in any way, the more really 143 35| Therefore, just as all things are in his Word life and truth, 144 35| Word life and truth, so are they in his knowledge.~ ~ 145 37| more than one, since there are not more supreme creative 146 37| Word also; and yet there are not two, but one creator 147 38| cannot be explained why they are two, although they must 148 38| simultaneously, whatever they are so exists that it is separately 149 38| Creator; yet both at once are not two truths or two creators.~ 150 38| regards either what they are substantially, or what relation 151 38| wise be explained why they are two.~For although they may 152 38| reference to which they are used, it cannot be expressed 153 38| two like men. For, neither are there two equal spirits 154 38| to the other, since there are neither two words nor two 155 38| something; and so peculiar are these attributes to the 156 38| attributes to the one that they are by no means predicable of 157 38| cannot be explained why they are two, the supreme Spirit 158 38| properties of each they are required to be two. For 159 39| For, innumerable objects are unhesitatingly said to be 160 39| those things of which they are said to be born, as offspring 161 39| many objects of this sort are without absurdity said to 162 42| be the Son, because both are Spirit (Spiritus, masculine); 163 42| the daughter, since both are truth and wisdom (veritas 164 43| and he who is begotten, are the same, and that parent 165 43| that parent and offspring are the same --so impossible 166 43| altogether evident that they are two; yet that which the 167 43| which the one and the other are is in such a way one and 168 43| obscure mystery why they are two. For, in such a way 169 43| which both Father and Son are, that I do not understand 170 43| not understand why they are two of whom I have spoken.~ 171 43| supreme Spirit, yet, so are the Spirit-Father and the 172 43| that the Father and the Son are not two spirits, but one 173 43| not attributed, since they are not properties of two things, 174 43| separately.~For, as there are not two fathers or two sons, 175 43| separate beings, so there are not two spirits, but one 176 43| Spirit. For so opposite are their relations, that the 177 43| the other; so harmonious are they in nature, that the 178 43| essence of the other. For they are so diverse by virtue of 179 43| Son the Father; and they are so identical, by virtue 180 44| from the Father that they are not two essences, subsists, 181 46| some of these truths which are thus expounded may also 182 46| expounded and conceived of, are apparently capable of another 183 50| of it; while many things are retained in memory and conceived 184 50| memory and conceived of that are not loved.~It is evident, 185 53| what the Father and the Son are, which is the supreme Being. 186 53| Son and the love of both are one supreme Being? Therefore, 187 54| considered whether there are two loves, one proceeding 188 54| in which Father and Son are more than one, but from 189 54| from that in which they are one. For, not from their 190 54| from their relations, which are more than one, but from 191 54| and Father and Son at once are not two, but one Spirit; 192 55| its mother. But that there are two beings which, taken 193 55| that is, Father and Son, are not father and mother of 194 57| uncreated and creator, as are Father and Son; and yet 195 57| is the supreme Being, as are Father and Son, and yet 196 57| Son, and the love of both are not more than one, but one 197 57| and the Son separately, are each uncreated and creator, 198 57| and yet all three at once are not more than one, but one 199 57| itself essentially spirit, as are Father and Son, they are 200 57| are Father and Son, they are not regarded as the spirits 201 61| CHAPTER LXI.~Yet there are not three, but one Father 202 61| memory and intelligence are sufficient to him; since 203 62| three more sons than one are born. ~BUT perhaps the following 204 62| two. But, if this is true, are there not in the supreme 205 62| Being as many words as there are expressive beings, and as 206 62| and as many words as there are beings who are expressed?~ 207 62| as there are beings who are expressed?~For, if more 208 62| thought, apparently there are as many words corresponding 209 62| to that object as there are thinkers; since the word 210 62| objects than one, there are as many words in the mind 211 62| of the thinker as there are objects thought of.~But 212 62| and Son and their Spirit are always so present to one 213 63| therefore, there apparently are in that Being, not only 214 63| certain that they truly exist, are not three expressive beings, 215 63| separately is expressive, nor are there more beings than one 216 63| conception, as it were, are the same, just as the expression 217 63| knowledge and intelligence are attributes of his being, 218 63| and yet the three at once are not more knowing and conceiving 219 63| expressive, and yet there are not three expressive beings 220 63| recognised, that when these three are expressed, either by themselves 221 63| themselves or by another, there are not more beings than one 222 63| it follows that there are not more words than one, 223 63| because imitation and likeness are impossible where only one 224 63| Being. And, although there are three, so that the Father 225 63| the others; yet what they are is in such a way one that 226 63| as plural, when the three are taken at once. And though 227 63| express one another, yet there are not among them more words 228 64| given to these truths which are declared to be such by cogent 229 65| concerning it in words which are also applicable to other 230 65| means that in which they are applied to other natures.~ 231 65| express with precision as they are; but by another expression 232 65| expression we indicate what we are unwilling or unable to express 233 65| created from nothing and are preserved from nothingness; 234 70| all of which suppositions are inconsistent with his nature; 235 72| be immortal. But if there are some rational souls which 236 72| some rational souls which are to be judged as neither 237 72| be held regarding these? Are they mortal or immortal? 238 72| undoubtedly all human souls are of the same nature. Hence, 239 72| is established that some are immortal, every human soul 240 73| good. ~BUT, which souls are unhesitatingly to be judged 241 73| either loving or scorning are assigned to either eternal 242 75| believes those things which are proper to this aim. For 243 75| strive for it and toward it are the same, except that whoever 244 76| and Son with their Spirit are one and the same supreme 245 78| the Spirit of both, who are three; yet I cannot, in 246 78| one word, show why they are three; as if I should call 247 78| substance.~For three persons are not to be supposed, because 248 78| because all persons which are more than one so subsist 249 78| many substances as there are persons, a fact that is 250 78| men than one, when there are as many persons as there 251 78| as many persons as there are individual substances. Hence, 252 78| supreme Being, just as there are not more substances than 253 78| substances than one, so there are not more persons than one.~ 254 78| express to any why they are three, he will say that 255 78| three, he will say that they are Father and Son and the Spirit 256 78| substances.~For these two terms are more appropriately chosen 257 78| plurality. For individual beings are especially exposed to, that 258 78| especially exposed to, that is, are subject to, accidents, and 259 79| created by him, or that beings are governed by another less 260 79| through whom, and in whom, are all things.~Therefore, since


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