Dialogue

 1 Craty| questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in
 2 Craty|  vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the
 3 Craty|     partial or imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than
 4 Craty|          things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that there
 5 Craty|         and that there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state
 6 Craty|          only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion
 7 Craty|   Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names
 8 Craty|        is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear
 9 Craty|        of things; and the higher knowledge is of things, and is not
10 Craty|        fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.)~Neither
11 Craty|       the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress
12 Craty|           but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon that impression.
13 Craty|         with actual and definite knowledge. The words ‘evolution,’ ‘
14 Craty|        which adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower
15 Craty|          is the horizon of human knowledge.~The greatest light is thrown
16 Craty|       view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible. The comparisons
17 Craty|         there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can never
18 Craty|          or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless
19 Craty|          he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means
20 Craty|        the different branches of knowledge and of their relation to
21 Craty|        greater progress.~(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined
22 Craty|       when we have only a slight knowledge of it, such as French or
23 Craty|      indicate the sources of our knowledge of it and the spirit in
24 Craty|          not add anything to our knowledge. We may try to grasp the
25 Craty|         3) It is relative to the knowledge of the writer and reader
26 Craty|    theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain
27 Craty|      Like some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a
28 Craty|         we may remember that all knowledge is valuable for its own
29 Craty|        saying, that ‘hard is the knowledge of the good.’ And the knowledge
30 Craty|  knowledge of the good.’ And the knowledge of names is a great part
31 Craty|         names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor,
32 Craty|       difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better
33 Craty|          otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all noble things.~
34 Craty|        and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), and all those
35 Craty|       now considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates
36 Craty|       the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of
37 Craty|       all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little trouble and
38 Craty|      them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by
39 Craty|       Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous
40 Craty|       the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?~
41 Craty|          the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before
42 Craty|          admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived
43 Craty|          Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is
44 Craty|          is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be
45 Craty|        too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always
46 Craty|        But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when
47 Craty|          occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is
48 Craty|          there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this
49 Craty|        as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and