Dialogue

  1  Gorg|            the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or the intellectual
  2  Gorg|         into a general view of the good and evil of man. After making
  3  Gorg|       desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is to be
  4  Gorg|           to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness
  5  Gorg|           as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely
  6  Gorg|       maintaining that pleasure is good, and that might is right,
  7  Gorg|            of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose
  8  Gorg|     convinced that he or any other good man who attempted to resist
  9  Gorg|       death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here
 10  Gorg|             boasts himself to be a good one.’ At the request of
 11  Gorg|            and saying that her own good is superior to that of the
 12  Gorg|         the state, is the greatest good.’ But what is the exact
 13  Gorg|       self- defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good
 14  Gorg|          good thing, but, like all good things, may be unlawfully
 15  Gorg|            of desire, which is the good. ‘As if you, Socrates, would
 16  Gorg|           natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts
 17  Gorg|           identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain
 18  Gorg|         the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge
 19  Gorg|            either with pleasure or good, or with one another. Socrates
 20  Gorg|    drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous,
 21  Gorg|     pleasure cannot be the same as good.~Callicles has already lost
 22  Gorg|        knowledge from pleasure and good, proceeds:—The good are
 23  Gorg|            and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence
 24  Gorg|             proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good,
 25  Gorg|            good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad by
 26  Gorg|         And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and foolish
 27  Gorg|           he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is
 28  Gorg|            bad man or coward is as good as the brave or may be even
 29  Gorg|      admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good
 30  Gorg|           good and others bad. The good are the beneficial, and
 31  Gorg|           done for the sake of the good.~Callicles assents to this,
 32  Gorg|       distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division
 33  Gorg|         order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has
 34  Gorg|        self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better
 35  Gorg|    pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed
 36  Gorg|        pursued for the sake of the good, and the good is that of
 37  Gorg|          sake of the good, and the good is that of which the presence
 38  Gorg|        which the presence makes us good; we and all things good
 39  Gorg|            good; we and all things good have acquired some virtue
 40  Gorg|         temperate and is therefore good, and the intemperate is
 41  Gorg|         that a bad man will kill a good one. ‘Yes, and that is the
 42  Gorg|            done his passengers any good in saving them from death,
 43  Gorg|          directed to making men as good as possible. And those who
 44  Gorg|        should make the citizens as good as possible. But who would
 45  Gorg|           he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale
 46  Gorg|            you who were the really good statesmen, you answer—as
 47  Gorg|           I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered,
 48  Gorg|          the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such
 49  Gorg|     actuated by a desire for their good. And therefore there is
 50  Gorg|            to help himself is in a good condition?’ Yes, Callicles,
 51  Gorg|        upon them they departed—the good to the islands of the blest,
 52  Gorg|           a great man from being a good one, as is shown by the
 53  Gorg|            souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped
 54  Gorg|           is bad, he should become good, and avoid all flattery,
 55  Gorg|        custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The
 56  Gorg|         antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion
 57  Gorg|          under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like.
 58  Gorg|            When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls
 59  Gorg|          human things the wise and good are weak and miserable;
 60  Gorg|      sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult
 61  Gorg|            faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported
 62  Gorg|          retribution, in which the good are to be rewarded and the
 63  Gorg|           evil only with a view to good,’ and that ‘they were the
 64  Gorg|        like), who are neither very good nor very bad, by not counting
 65  Gorg|  considered:—~a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in
 66  Gorg|      relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge
 67  Gorg|          opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to
 68  Gorg|     assertion of the permanence of good is only based on the assumption
 69  Gorg|         not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness
 70  Gorg|          virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with reference
 71  Gorg|           the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.~
 72  Gorg|            allowed to be the chief good, but pleasure and good are
 73  Gorg|       chief good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed
 74  Gorg|      between the beautiful and the good.~In general spirit and character,
 75  Gorg|            to them.’ The tangle of good and evil can no longer be
 76  Gorg|         means, they feel also that good has often come out of evil.
 77  Gorg|          greatest consequences for good or for evil cannot alter
 78  Gorg|           an evil at all, but to a good man the greatest good. For
 79  Gorg|            a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there
 80  Gorg|          we are slow to learn—that good intentions, and even benevolent
 81  Gorg|            something to be for our good which we afterwards find
 82  Gorg|         find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be
 83  Gorg|        developed, and ‘the idea of good’ is the animating principle
 84  Gorg|           the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or even to increase
 85  Gorg|          which all his life long a good man has been praying to
 86  Gorg|     visible world what the idea of good is to the intellectual,
 87  Gorg|            punishments which await good and bad men after death.
 88  Gorg|       homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural
 89  Gorg|       receive the rewards of their good. There are also incurable
 90  Gorg|  observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a
 91  Gorg|           of forgetfulness than is good for them is a poetical description
 92  Gorg|            thing remaining for the good than for the evil.’~All
 93  Gorg|     exhibit to you.~SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he
 94  Gorg|      GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call
 95  Gorg|        fewer words.~SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to
 96  Gorg|        Socrates, I do think myself good at that.~SOCRATES: I am
 97  Gorg|           discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the
 98  Gorg|        concerned with the greatest good of men and not his.’ And
 99  Gorg|          art produces the greatest good? ‘Certainly,’ he will answer, ‘
100  Gorg|            not health the greatest good? What greater good can men
101  Gorg|        greatest good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?’
102  Gorg|           if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show
103  Gorg|            can produce any greater good than wealth.’ Well, you
104  Gorg|          wealth to be the greatest good of man? ‘Of course,’ will
105  Gorg|         his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he
106  Gorg|            to go on and ask, ‘What good? Let Gorgias answer.’ Now
107  Gorg|           you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you
108  Gorg|           Answer us.~GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly
109  Gorg|          in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this
110  Gorg|        they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against
111  Gorg|            the same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician
112  Gorg|           by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions,
113  Gorg|       unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine
114  Gorg|           know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable,
115  Gorg|        know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or
116  Gorg|         and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any
117  Gorg|      further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?~
118  Gorg|        condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance?
119  Gorg|            not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean
120  Gorg|        persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a
121  Gorg|           first sight not to be in good health.~GORGIAS: True.~SOCRATES:
122  Gorg|         the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather
123  Gorg|          older?~POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded
124  Gorg|        mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.~POLUS:
125  Gorg|            you say that power is a good to him who has the power.~
126  Gorg|          he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this
127  Gorg|         you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time
128  Gorg|    monstrous and absurd.~SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I
129  Gorg|      absurd.~SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your
130  Gorg|          are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate
131  Gorg|           things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake
132  Gorg|         sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil,
133  Gorg|      things which you call neither good nor evil?~POLUS: Exactly
134  Gorg|           done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake
135  Gorg|           sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?~
136  Gorg|    indifferent for the sake of the good.~SOCRATES: When we walk
137  Gorg|           walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that
138  Gorg|        equally for the sake of the good?~POLUS: Yes.~SOCRATES: And
139  Gorg|             it will conduce to our good?~POLUS: Certainly.~SOCRATES:
140  Gorg|           them for the sake of the good?~POLUS: Yes.~SOCRATES: And
141  Gorg|         that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive
142  Gorg|            is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we
143  Gorg|         you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither
144  Gorg|          but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil,
145  Gorg|           Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such
146  Gorg|            a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not
147  Gorg|         power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather
148  Gorg|            of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing,
149  Gorg|          have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed
150  Gorg|          would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is
151  Gorg|           property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?~
152  Gorg|           good and sometimes not a good?~POLUS: Certainly.~SOCRATES:
153  Gorg|           do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—
154  Gorg|            me, I say that they are good when they are just, and
155  Gorg|             and not weary of doing good to a friend.~POLUS: Yes,
156  Gorg|           women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain,
157  Gorg|          man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation?
158  Gorg|           a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their
159  Gorg|        which we are at issue:—very good. And do you mean to say
160  Gorg|  honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the
161  Gorg|           honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either
162  Gorg|           punished suffers what is good?~POLUS: That is true.~SOCRATES:
163  Gorg|          the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let
164  Gorg|            life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries
165  Gorg|           one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate.
166  Gorg|            a poor creature and not good for much, you would die
167  Gorg|            with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice,
168  Gorg|            a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he
169  Gorg|   undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not
170  Gorg|         made by them are by nature good?~CALLICLES: Yes.~SOCRATES:
171  Gorg|        would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should
172  Gorg|        more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell
173  Gorg|           freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand
174  Gorg|          of no distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I
175  Gorg|          you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether
176  Gorg|            pleasure which is not a good?~CALLICLES: Well, then,
177  Gorg|    whatever source derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then
178  Gorg|             says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge
179  Gorg|           one another, or with the good.~CALLICLES: And what does
180  Gorg|        will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed
181  Gorg|          does he have and not have good and happiness, and their
182  Gorg|             clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please
183  Gorg|          instances.~SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that
184  Gorg|             that no man could have good and evil fortune at the
185  Gorg|        pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same
186  Gorg|         fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?~
187  Gorg|         But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment,
188  Gorg|          the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant,
189  Gorg|            same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different.
190  Gorg|            pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I
191  Gorg|       identified them: Are not the good good because they have good
192  Gorg|  identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present
193  Gorg|        good good because they have good present with them, as the
194  Gorg|         call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying
195  Gorg|    courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?~CALLICLES:
196  Gorg|         the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the
197  Gorg|            Yes.~SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased
198  Gorg|             SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in
199  Gorg|          Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal
200  Gorg|          bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having
201  Gorg|           remember saying that the good were good because good was
202  Gorg|          saying that the good were good because good was present
203  Gorg|         the good were good because good was present with them, and
204  Gorg|         Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with
205  Gorg|         Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain
206  Gorg|           SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees
207  Gorg|          our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what
208  Gorg|          repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as
209  Gorg|           brave man we allow to be good?~CALLICLES: Yes.~SOCRATES:
210  Gorg|    SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?~CALLICLES: Yes.~SOCRATES:
211  Gorg|           Certainly.~SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and
212  Gorg|             that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or,
213  Gorg|          is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—
214  Gorg|        from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the
215  Gorg|            that some pleasures are good and others bad?~SOCRATES:
216  Gorg|            that some pleasures are good and others evil?~CALLICLES:
217  Gorg|       SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?~
218  Gorg|            are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those
219  Gorg|       other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?~
220  Gorg|          in the same way there are good pains and there are evil
221  Gorg|          not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?~CALLICLES:
222  Gorg|           done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree with
223  Gorg|        with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions,
224  Gorg|           done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the
225  Gorg|           of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?—will
226  Gorg|          the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good
227  Gorg|        good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?~
228  Gorg|          choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must
229  Gorg|         other processes which know good and evil. And I considered
230  Gorg|        which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of
231  Gorg|           there is such a thing as good, and that there is such
232  Gorg|        pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and
233  Gorg| acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell
234  Gorg|     considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other
235  Gorg|      afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles,
236  Gorg|       without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish
237  Gorg|       perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he
238  Gorg|         Quite true.~SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of
239  Gorg|    pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their
240  Gorg|            that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades
241  Gorg|          Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at
242  Gorg|            described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he
243  Gorg|          and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is
244  Gorg|          say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder
245  Gorg|      argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad
246  Gorg|           of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed
247  Gorg|          of my soul.~CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but
248  Gorg|           pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles
249  Gorg|        pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake
250  Gorg|           sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant?
251  Gorg|        pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at
252  Gorg|           are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which
253  Gorg|           presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are
254  Gorg|             To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever
255  Gorg|           And we are good, and all good things whatever are good
256  Gorg|           good things whatever are good when some virtue is present
257  Gorg|           that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering
258  Gorg|          And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give,
259  Gorg|          any?~CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow.~SOCRATES: Then I
260  Gorg|          the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is
261  Gorg|          be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man
262  Gorg|    perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well
263  Gorg|          the bad man will kill the good and true.~CALLICLES: And
264  Gorg|    CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too.~SOCRATES: Well,
265  Gorg|         see that the noble and the good may possibly be something
266  Gorg|            you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power
267  Gorg|          always appear to me to be good words; and yet, like the
268  Gorg|         with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge
269  Gorg|           not try and make them as good as possible? For we have
270  Gorg|        imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those
271  Gorg|          those who are to have the good, whether money, or office,
272  Gorg|            of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?~CALLICLES:
273  Gorg|           we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and
274  Gorg|           Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one
275  Gorg|           by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever
276  Gorg|  conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which
277  Gorg|            But if this is what the good man ought to effect for
278  Gorg|         still think that they were good citizens.~CALLICLES: I do.~
279  Gorg|         SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them
280  Gorg|          the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?~CALLICLES:
281  Gorg|          the word; for if he was a good citizen, the inference is
282  Gorg|         time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they
283  Gorg|            when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the
284  Gorg|          SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought
285  Gorg|           view, Pericles was not a good statesman?~CALLICLES: That
286  Gorg|            if they had been really good men, as you say, these things
287  Gorg|          happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those
288  Gorg|         ever shown himself to be a good statesman— you admitted
289  Gorg|          prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that
290  Gorg|         they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats
291  Gorg|   repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and
292  Gorg|        asked, Who are or have been good trainers?—and you had replied,
293  Gorg|   purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their
294  Gorg|           who have become just and good, and whose injustice has
295  Gorg|          the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether
296  Gorg|           that you have made a man good, and then blaming him for
297  Gorg|            why talk of men who are good for nothing?~SOCRATES: I
298  Gorg|      between one and the other? My good friend, the sophist and
299  Gorg|       themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess
300  Gorg|           really able to make them good—am I not right? (Compare
301  Gorg|           to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to
302  Gorg|           the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly
303  Gorg|          bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will
304  Gorg|        that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent.
305  Gorg|           thus defenceless is in a good position?~SOCRATES: Yes,
306  Gorg|           any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get
307  Gorg|         themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring
308  Gorg|         very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration
309  Gorg|           who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there
310  Gorg|          by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the
311  Gorg|        virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we have
312  Gorg|       about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better