Dialogue

 1 Lache|       will be to ask, ‘What is Virtue?’—or rather, to restrict
 2 Lache|        enquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with
 3 Lache|         and courage is not all virtue, but only one of the virtues.
 4 Lache|       justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a single virtue would
 5 Lache|   other virtue. Thus, a single virtue would be the same as all
 6 Lache|        adduced as a proof that virtue cannot be taught. The recognition
 7 Lache|      thus be equivalent to all virtue—a position which elsewhere
 8 Lache|     the connexion and unity of virtue and knowledge, we arrive
 9 Lache|        a teacher of the art of virtue; although I have always
10 Lache|      hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom,
11 Lache|        in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their
12 Lache|       first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise any
13 Lache|     that we know the nature of virtue?~LACHES: Yes.~SOCRATES:
14 Lache|   enquiring about the whole of virtue; for that may be more than
15 Lache|     Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we
16 Lache|        courage to be a part of virtue.~NICIAS: Very true.~SOCRATES:
17 Lache|      taken together are called virtue.~NICIAS: Certainly.~SOCRATES:
18 Lache|       are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would
19 Lache|     perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance,
20 Lache|     instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?~
21 Lache|       virtue only, will be all virtue?~NICIAS: It would seem so.~
22 Lache| courage is one of the parts of virtue?~NICIAS: Yes, that was what