Dialogue

  1  Meno|           Meno, who asks, ‘whether virtue can be taught.’ Socrates
  2  Meno|          does not as yet know what virtue is, and has never known
  3  Meno|       nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of
  4  Meno|         and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of
  5  Meno|        second attempt Meno defines virtue to be ‘the power of command.’
  6  Meno|         taken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, as well
  7  Meno|           to admit that justice is virtue: ‘Would you say virtue or
  8  Meno|          is virtue: ‘Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are
  9  Meno|          Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues,
 10  Meno|         the words of a poet, ‘that virtue is to delight in things
 11  Meno|  definition will then stand thus: ‘Virtue is the power of getting
 12  Meno|           But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is
 13  Meno|           of virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with
 14  Meno|     getting of good with a part of virtue. The definition repeats
 15  Meno|            has plenty to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates,
 16  Meno|            of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he professes
 17  Meno|   professes a desire to know ‘what virtue is’ first. But he is willing
 18  Meno|             He will assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue
 19  Meno|          virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was
 20  Meno|         difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that goods,
 21  Meno|        assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where
 22  Meno|            extremely discouraging. Virtue is no sooner discovered
 23  Meno|     follows that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not
 24  Meno|           of the question ‘whether virtue is teachable,’ which was
 25  Meno|       nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance
 26  Meno|     inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is identical with
 27  Meno|           answer the question, Can virtue be taught? No one would
 28  Meno|        rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular
 29  Meno|            of the teachableness of virtue could be resolved.~The answer
 30  Meno|           than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and therefore
 31  Meno|           knowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue
 32  Meno|          virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore
 33  Meno|            ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The teaching
 34  Meno| reminiscence.~To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has
 35  Meno|            the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the virtue
 36  Meno|            virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas.~Also here,
 37  Meno|       discuss the teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after
 38  Meno|        disciple. His definition of virtue as ‘the power and desire
 39  Meno|  hypothetical conclusion, that if ‘virtue is knowledge, it can be
 40  Meno|           relation of knowledge to virtue is described in a manner
 41  Meno|      reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been
 42  Meno|   substance. As Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza
 43  Meno|         tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching
 44  Meno|           ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired,
 45  Meno|         literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether
 46  Meno|            literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know
 47  Meno|          that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back
 48  Meno|          tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly
 49  Meno|    question. Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know
 50  Meno|            harm himself. A woman’s virtue, if you wish to know about
 51  Meno|           or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless,
 52  Meno|           definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions
 53  Meno|             When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm
 54  Meno|      answer the question, ‘What is virtue?’ would do well to have
 55  Meno|            Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman,
 56  Meno|            does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same
 57  Meno|             SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same,
 58  Meno|            And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in
 59  Meno|            you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a
 60  Meno|          to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order
 61  Meno|         the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?~MENO:
 62  Meno|           that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and
 63  Meno|           you and Gorgias say that virtue is.~MENO: Will you have
 64  Meno|          not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing
 65  Meno|            does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue
 66  Meno|   definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a
 67  Meno|      virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and
 68  Meno|          friend; according to you, virtue is ‘the power of governing;’
 69  Meno|        agree there; for justice is virtue.~SOCRATES: Would you say ‘
 70  Meno|           SOCRATES: Would you say ‘virtue,’ Meno, or ‘a virtue’?~MENO:
 71  Meno|          say ‘virtue,’ Meno, or ‘a virtue’?~MENO: What do you mean?~
 72  Meno|        just what I am saying about virtue—that there are other virtues
 73  Meno|             in searching after one virtue we have found many, though
 74  Meno|          unable to find the common virtue which runs through them
 75  Meno|            at one common notion of virtue as of other things.~SOCRATES:
 76  Meno|           view to the answer about virtue.~MENO: I would rather that
 77  Meno|        then you will tell me about virtue?~MENO: I will.~SOCRATES:
 78  Meno|            a similar definition of virtue?~MENO: But, Socrates, it
 79  Meno|          is Gorgias’ definition of virtue.~MENO: When you have told
 80  Meno|          promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and
 81  Meno|         break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and
 82  Meno|         MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he,
 83  Meno|         poet says, and I say too—~‘Virtue is the desire of things
 84  Meno|           not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power
 85  Meno|      according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power
 86  Meno|           may be right:—You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining
 87  Meno|          friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting
 88  Meno|    dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?~MENO: Not virtue, Socrates,
 89  Meno|           deemed virtue?~MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.~SOCRATES:
 90  Meno|    holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany
 91  Meno|    acquisition of good will not be virtue.~MENO: Why, how can there
 92  Meno|        MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?~SOCRATES:
 93  Meno|            of them, may be equally virtue?~MENO: True.~SOCRATES: Then
 94  Meno|           of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition
 95  Meno|           by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid
 96  Meno|        were each of them a part of virtue?~MENO: Yes.~SOCRATES: And
 97  Meno|     because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and
 98  Meno|          already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining
 99  Meno|        acknowledge to be a part of virtue.~MENO: Yes.~SOCRATES: Then
100  Meno|          your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with
101  Meno|         what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like
102  Meno|         said by you to be parts of virtue.~MENO: What of that?~SOCRATES:
103  Meno|           to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are
104  Meno|         declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part
105  Meno|       which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told
106  Meno|          already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered
107  Meno|         the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only
108  Meno|         action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is
109  Meno|           with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning
110  Meno|        action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the
111  Meno|          any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?~MENO:
112  Meno|         know virtue know a part of virtue?~MENO: No; I do not say
113  Meno|           to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some
114  Meno|        some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that
115  Meno|          the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?~MENO: I
116  Meno|      Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?~MENO: O Socrates, I used
117  Meno|          variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many
118  Meno|      moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you
119  Meno|            And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in
120  Meno|           that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for
121  Meno|        with you into the nature of virtue.~MENO: Yes, Socrates; but
122  Meno|        together into the nature of virtue?~MENO: By all means, Socrates.
123  Meno|      Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a
124  Meno|          not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction
125  Meno|        allow the question ‘Whether virtue is given by instruction,
126  Meno|            nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue
127  Meno|          virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under
128  Meno|            hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental
129  Meno|           first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—
130  Meno|   disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather,
131  Meno|           agree.~SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will
132  Meno|            if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?~MENO: Certainly.~
133  Meno|           end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it
134  Meno|          next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another
135  Meno|       SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis
136  Meno|           distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if
137  Meno|          be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?~MENO: True.~
138  Meno|          MENO: True.~SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?~MENO: Yes.~
139  Meno|          MENO: Yes.~SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?~MENO: That
140  Meno|            true.~SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul,
141  Meno|            folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must
142  Meno|           if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom
143  Meno|          be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable?~
144  Meno|      arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly
145  Meno|            On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can
146  Meno|         there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.~SOCRATES: Yes,
147  Meno|          believe that knowledge is virtue?~SOCRATES: I will try and
148  Meno|      retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught;
149  Meno|         reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider
150  Meno|       consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but
151  Meno|       whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught,
152  Meno|           there are no teachers of virtue?~SOCRATES: I have certainly
153  Meno|          there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please,
154  Meno|            that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state
155  Meno|       order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument
156  Meno|         good teachers of their own virtue;—not whether there are,
157  Meno|          of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question
158  Meno|           to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves;
159  Meno|         they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being
160  Meno|           good teacher, of his own virtue?~ANYTUS: Yes certainly,—
161  Meno|           imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that
162  Meno|           say so.~SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught,
163  Meno|    SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among
164  Meno|           must have wished it. But virtue, as I suspect, could not
165  Meno|          have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught?
166  Meno|         and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have been taught,
167  Meno|       suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can
168  Meno|             and do they agree that virtue is taught?~MENO: No indeed,
169  Meno|            saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then
170  Meno|           to you to be teachers of virtue?~MENO: I often wonder, Socrates,
171  Meno|           heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others
172  Meno|    politicians have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but
173  Meno|        here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?~MENO: Clearly.~
174  Meno|           there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?~MENO:
175  Meno|            is true.~SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught?~MENO:
176  Meno|    speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge
177  Meno|          came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?~
178  Meno|            MENO: Yes.~SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge),
179  Meno|          there were no teachers of virtue?~MENO: Yes.~SOCRATES: Then
180  Meno|           so too.~SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is
181  Meno|          is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.~MENO: Clearly
182  Meno|           themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.~
183  Meno|            right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired,
184  Meno|            shades’; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a
185  Meno|             the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by
186  Meno|           until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into
187  Meno|          into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away,