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Alphabetical [« »] knew 10 know 78 knowing 6 knowledge 103 known 6 knows 9 labour 1 | Frequency [« »] 113 do 109 good 103 has 103 knowledge 102 him 99 one 97 for | Plato Meno IntraText - Concordances knowledge |
Dialogue
1 Meno| difficulty is the origin of knowledge:—~He has heard from priests 2 Meno| may be developed into all knowledge. The existence of this latent 3 Meno| existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by the 4 Meno| the uneducated man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry 5 Meno| assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. ( 6 Meno| be under the direction of knowledge. Upon the assumption just 7 Meno| right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for 8 Meno| practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being 9 Meno| which is identical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If the 10 Meno| If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach what he 11 Meno| satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and therefore virtue can 12 Meno| there is no virtue and no knowledge. The teaching of the Sophists 13 Meno| doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly 14 Meno| vanishes away. ‘If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; 15 Meno| the teachers?’ There is no knowledge in the higher sense of systematic, 16 Meno| systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be 17 Meno| Even if there be no true knowledge, as is proved by ‘the wretched 18 Meno| divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable 19 Meno| are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons. Those who 20 Meno| basis of human life. To him knowledge, if only attainable in this 21 Meno| regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred 22 Meno| The philosopher only has knowledge, and yet the statesman and 23 Meno| the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association 24 Meno| the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular 25 Meno| prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not in the previous 26 Meno| priestesses:’ (1) that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes ( 27 Meno| that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle’ 28 Meno| with an ardent desire of knowledge, and is equally willing 29 Meno| conclusion, that if ‘virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.’ In the 30 Meno| deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly explained. 31 Meno| to find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. 32 Meno| indeed the profession of knowledge, but right opinion is our 33 Meno| sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior and future state 34 Meno| not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards 35 Meno| Republic the relation of knowledge to virtue is described in 36 Meno| without the possession of knowledge in the higher or philosophical 37 Meno| Theaetetus as an account of knowledge, but is rejected on the 38 Meno| The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in the 39 Meno| distinction between opinion and knowledge is more fully developed 40 Meno| caricature of a great theory of knowledge, which Plato in various 41 Meno| any solid foundation of knowledge be laid. It has degenerated 42 Meno| again emerged. No other knowledge has given an equal stimulus 43 Meno| enquiry from any part of knowledge we may be led on to infer 44 Meno| soul and a lower kind of knowledge. On the other hand, in the 45 Meno| attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now finally 46 Meno| without the sphere of human knowledge, or how the human and divine 47 Meno| the nature and origin of knowledge, will always continue to 48 Meno| Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would have maintained 49 Meno| would have maintained that knowledge alone is good, and what 50 Meno| and what contributes to knowledge useful. Both are equally 51 Meno| man is supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work 52 Meno| filled. It is a symbol of knowledge rather than the reality 53 Meno| the certainty of objective knowledge is transferred to the subject; 54 Meno| age, all the branches of knowledge, whether relating to God 55 Meno| nature, will become the knowledge of ‘the revelation of a 56 Meno| Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just 57 Meno| in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no 58 Meno| him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only 59 Meno| spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?~ 60 Meno| True.~SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he 61 Meno| he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; 62 Meno| or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired 63 Meno| and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught 64 Meno| SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?~MENO: The fact, Socrates, 65 Meno| if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must 66 Meno| need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to 67 Meno| have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was 68 Meno| that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in that case will it be 69 Meno| does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?~MENO: I 70 Meno| SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?~ 71 Meno| question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?~MENO: 72 Meno| good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; 73 Meno| may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then 74 Meno| thinking that virtue is knowledge?~MENO: True.~SOCRATES: And 75 Meno| such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are 76 Meno| supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that 77 Meno| of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?~SOCRATES: I will 78 Meno| assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I 79 Meno| doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and say 80 Meno| disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire— 81 Meno| themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing 82 Meno| other guidance than that of knowledge (episteme);—and indeed if 83 Meno| good guide unless he have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were 84 Meno| guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point 85 Meno| virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right 86 Meno| is not less useful than knowledge?~MENO: The difference, Socrates, 87 Meno| is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but 88 Meno| Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right 89 Meno| they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, 90 Meno| abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent 91 Meno| conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion 92 Meno| action quite as well as knowledge?~MENO: There again, Socrates, 93 Meno| is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; 94 Meno| inferior to him who has knowledge?~MENO: True.~SOCRATES: And 95 Meno| not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right 96 Meno| opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given 97 Meno| If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it 98 Meno| the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these are 99 Meno| man are true opinion and knowledge.~MENO: I think so too.~SOCRATES: 100 Meno| taught, neither is virtue knowledge.~MENO: Clearly not.~SOCRATES: 101 Meno| useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and 102 Meno| virtue was not grounded on knowledge.~MENO: That is probably 103 Meno| SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which