Dialogue

  1 Parme|           either or both of which things are like or unlike or partly
  2 Parme|         partly both. For the same things may very well partake of
  3 Parme|         maintaining that the same things may partake of the one and
  4 Parme|       hair, mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?’ ‘
  5 Parme|           No, Parmenides; visible things like these are, as I believe,
  6 Parme|          despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is your meaning
  7 Parme|          me, is your meaning that things become like by partaking
  8 Parme|        are thoughts, must not all things think? Or can thought be
  9 Parme|         in nature, and that other things partake of them by becoming
 10 Parme|        have no knowledge of human things, as we have divided the
 11 Parme|       include consequences to the things supposed and to other things,
 12 Parme|      things supposed and to other things, in themselves and in relation
 13 Parme|         contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of
 14 Parme|           physics?—of the meanest things in the world as well as
 15 Parme|        will despise neither great things nor small, and he will think
 16 Parme|      hypothesis, and to all other things. There is no trace in the
 17 Parme|        conceiving the connection. Things are little by partaking
 18 Parme|    rejoinder—‘You know nothing of things in themselves.’ ‘Then how
 19 Parme|           you know that there are things in themselves?’ In some
 20 Parme| indifference between the mind and things. As if they had said, in
 21 Parme|   undiscerning tribe who say that things both are and are not,’ to
 22 Parme|          one has being, it is all things.~To which are appended two
 23 Parme|          one has being, all other things are. 1.bb. If one is one,
 24 Parme|          If one is one, all other things are not.~The same distinction
 25 Parme|         one is not one, it is all things. 2.b. If one has not being,
 26 Parme|          If one is not one, other things are all. 2.bb. If one has
 27 Parme|          one has not being, other things are not.~...~‘I cannot refuse,’
 28 Parme|           in any case we have two things which separately are called
 29 Parme|           affirmed, that the same things which are older or younger
 30 Parme|        one and the others are all things, and there is no third existence
 31 Parme|         if one exists, one is all things, and likewise nothing, in
 32 Parme|    something different from other things. Moreover, this and that,
 33 Parme|       conception. Ideas, persons, things may be one in one sense
 34 Parme|        asserted the existence of ‘things in themselves,’ while denying
 35 Parme|    missing link between words and things. The famous dispute between
 36 Parme|         we must compare them with things; in using them we acknowledge
 37 Parme|          you are saying different things when really you are saying
 38 Parme|           you and I and all other things to which we apply the term
 39 Parme|        the term many, participate—things which participate in likeness
 40 Parme|          in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites,
 41 Parme|         Zeno, in showing that the things which only partake of likeness
 42 Parme|          a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the
 43 Parme|       ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and
 44 Parme|        and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?~I
 45 Parme|        undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may
 46 Parme|      provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything
 47 Parme|            said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they
 48 Parme|          despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too
 49 Parme|          ideas of which all other things partake, and from which
 50 Parme|          of similarity; and great things become great, because they
 51 Parme|           that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful,
 52 Parme| themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them
 53 Parme|        and that of the many great things, each one is great in virtue
 54 Parme|           way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas,
 55 Parme|         of greatness and of great things which are not the idea,
 56 Parme|         of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are
 57 Parme|        fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances
 58 Parme|        the participation of other things in the ideas, is really
 59 Parme|          Impossible.~And when two things are alike, must they not
 60 Parme|          theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas
 61 Parme|         parting it off from other things.~What difficulty? he said.~
 62 Parme|          partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere
 63 Parme|         have a knowledge of human things?~Why not?~Because, Socrates,
 64 Parme|        valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation
 65 Parme|           human things; nor human things in relation to them; the
 66 Parme|          neither do they know the things of men.~Yet, surely, said
 67 Parme|           who discovers all these things for himself, and having
 68 Parme|           does away with ideas of things and will not admit that
 69 Parme|           in reference to visible things, or to consider the question
 70 Parme|          this method that visible things are like and unlike and
 71 Parme|          hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves
 72 Parme|          itself, and to any other things which you choose,—to each
 73 Parme|           to all; and so of other things, you must look at them in
 74 Parme|   roundabout progress through all things is the only way in which
 75 Parme|           if greater or less than things which are commensurable
 76 Parme|           greater?~Yes.~And so of things which are not commensurate
 77 Parme|         again is inevitable.~Then things which are in time, and partake
 78 Parme|          the one be two different things, it is not because the one
 79 Parme|       every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called
 80 Parme|           Undoubtedly.~And of two things how can either by any possibility
 81 Parme|       over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however
 82 Parme|           broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have
 83 Parme|       Certainly.~And will not all things that are not one, be other
 84 Parme|         one?~No.~But we said that things which are neither parts
 85 Parme|           True.~And also in other things?~Yes.~In so far as it is
 86 Parme|          so far as it is in other things it would touch other things,
 87 Parme|       things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is
 88 Parme|           between them.~True.~Two things, then, at the least are
 89 Parme|   Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always
 90 Parme|  greatness.~Very true.~Then other things not greater or less than
 91 Parme|          more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of
 92 Parme|          of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater
 93 Parme|         is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them
 94 Parme|         both itself and all other things.~It will.~Does the one also
 95 Parme|        are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become
 96 Parme|          Yes.~Then the one of all things that have number is the
 97 Parme|         into being; but all other things have also number, being
 98 Parme|         the others later; and the things which came into being later,
 99 Parme|   preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the
100 Parme|          the one older than other things?~True.~What would you say
101 Parme|           itself and of all other things, comes into being first
102 Parme|         which appertains to other things appertains to the one.~Certainly,
103 Parme|         so.~Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the
104 Parme|        anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.~
105 Parme|            True.~And will not the things which participate in the
106 Parme|       than it?~Of course.~And the things which are other than the
107 Parme|          will be many; for if the things which are other than the
108 Parme|        True.~But, seeing that the things which participate in the
109 Parme|          one, must not those very things which participate in the
110 Parme|  opposites are the most unlike of things.~Certainly.~Considered,
111 Parme|          the others’ includes all things.~Yes, all things.~Then we
112 Parme|     includes all things.~Yes, all things.~Then we cannot suppose
113 Parme|         nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?~
114 Parme|      opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown
115 Parme|         if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both
116 Parme|   relation to itself and to other things.~Certainly.~2.a. Well, and
117 Parme|          not’ is other than other things?~To be sure.~And so when
118 Parme|           is other than all other things; it makes no difference
119 Parme|          distinguished from other things.~Certainly.~Then I will
120 Parme|          must participate in many things, if it and nothing else
121 Parme|            Certainly.~And are not things of a different kind also
122 Parme|            Of course.~And are not things other in kind unlike?~They
123 Parme|        And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it
124 Parme|         to it?~Certainly not.~And things that are not equal are unequal?~
125 Parme|          cannot be reckoned among things that are?~It cannot.~Then
126 Parme|       attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?~Certainly
127 Parme|          not.~And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike,
128 Parme|         way?~Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to
129 Parme|           and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated,