Dialogue

 1 Parme|          dialectical frenzy, such as may be supposed to have prevailed
 2 Parme|              part of the dialogue we may certainly apply the words
 3 Parme|             Parmenides to Athens, we may observe—first, that such
 4 Parme|           consistent with dates, and may possibly have occurred;
 5 Parme|              of mind’? (Theaet.). It may be admitted that he has
 6 Parme|              Two preliminary remarks may be made. First, that whatever
 7 Parme|            that whatever latitude we may allow to Plato in bringing
 8 Parme|        subject of the Parmenides, we may remark that Plato is quite
 9 Parme|              have been suggested, we may begin by sketching the first
10 Parme|             similar absurdity, which may be supposed to follow from
11 Parme|            both. For the same things may very well partake of like
12 Parme|     maintaining that the same things may partake of the one and many,
13 Parme|            said Socrates, ‘the whole may be like the day, which is
14 Parme|        places: in this way the ideas may be one and also many.’ ‘
15 Parme|             as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many—that
16 Parme|           makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.’ Socrates
17 Parme|      Socrates replies that the ideas may be thoughts in the mind
18 Parme|              demonstration, which he may be unable or unwilling to
19 Parme|             mean?’ said Socrates. ‘I may illustrate my meaning in
20 Parme|          that in visible objects you may easily show any number of
21 Parme|           philosophers together.’ He may be supposed to have thought
22 Parme|      contained. At the same time, we may note also the transition
23 Parme|            Socrates. Here, again, he may perhaps be describing the
24 Parme|         favourite notions. But Plato may here be said to anticipate
25 Parme|     Parmenides shows that objections may be urged against either
26 Parme|             forms or opinions, which may be changed arbitrarily by
27 Parme|         argumentum ad infinitum.’ We may remark, in passing, that
28 Parme|          difficulties mankind, as we may say, a little parodying
29 Parme|   notwithstanding any theories which may be entertained respecting
30 Parme|            Cratylus and Heracleitus, may have seen that a contradiction
31 Parme|             hypotheses of others, it may appear presumptuous to add
32 Parme|           have been already offered. May we say, in Platonic language,
33 Parme|           without settling there.~We may begin by remarking that
34 Parme|        multiplicity of phenomena.~We may now endeavour to thread
35 Parme|        everything.~But is and is not may be taken in two senses:
36 Parme|               we are alone, though I may say with Ibycus, who in
37 Parme|          your questions.’—The result may be summed up as follows:—~
38 Parme|              involves the other, and may be further subdivided into
39 Parme|             the same relations. This may be illustrated by the case
40 Parme|             well as being? Thus much may be affirmed, that the same
41 Parme|         first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain
42 Parme|              true of the others, and may be deduced from the existence
43 Parme|            and that, some and other, may be all attributed or related
44 Parme|            which though non-existent may and must have plurality,
45 Parme|              fractions into which it may be divided. Further, each
46 Parme|              the first hypothesis we may remark: first, That one
47 Parme|              dialectic. Secondly, We may note, that the conclusion
48 Parme|          opposed to it. Fourthly, We may detect notions, which have
49 Parme|            is a mere fiction; and we may observe that similar antinomies
50 Parme|       obtains his remarkable results may be summed up as follows: (
51 Parme|        manner that number and figure may be made a calculus of thought.
52 Parme|           the sphere of mathematics, may be doubted. That Plato and
53 Parme|              opposite, although they may both inhere together in
54 Parme|               Ideas, persons, things may be one in one sense and
55 Parme|             and many in another, and may have various degrees of
56 Parme|              is required. Parmenides may still have thought that ‘
57 Parme|             as well as in the other, may be regarded as an introduction
58 Parme|              any or every conclusion may be deduced from them. The
59 Parme| cross-examination of Parmenides; and may at last perhaps arrive at
60 Parme|             method of the Parmenides may be compared with the process
61 Parme|           first be forged, that they may be used hereafter by modern
62 Parme|          word ‘cause’ or ‘substance’ may be employed.~The philosophy
63 Parme|            ask a favour of you.~What may that be? he said.~I want
64 Parme|             participate in both? And may not all things partake of
65 Parme|          things of which the mention may provoke a smile?—I mean
66 Parme|           because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit
67 Parme|            itself.~Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is
68 Parme|        itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all
69 Parme|           infinitely multiplied.~But may not the ideas, asked Socrates,
70 Parme|           For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience
71 Parme|           you mean? said Socrates.~I may illustrate my meaning in
72 Parme|             unity. He who hears what may be said against them will
73 Parme|              of thought, and to what may be called ideas.~Why, yes,
74 Parme|              are like and unlike and may experience anything.~Quite
75 Parme|          request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which
76 Parme|             parts, and then one part may be in, and another part
77 Parme|          consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the
78 Parme|            we take two things, which may be rightly called both.~
79 Parme|              How so.~In this way—you may speak of being?~Yes.~And
80 Parme|          great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?~True.~
81 Parme|              one.~How do you mean?~I may take as an illustration
82 Parme|             to a thing?~Yes.~And you may say the name once or oftener?~
83 Parme|             same.~Yes, that argument may be used.~And there is another
84 Parme|              and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.~Clearly.~
85 Parme|            But consider whether they may not become older and younger
86 Parme|            of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty
87 Parme|              but the one that is not may or rather must participate
88 Parme|              And change is motion—we may say that?~Yes, motion.~And
89 Parme|           the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if
90 Parme|            if one is not?~True.~Then may we not sum up the argument