Dialogue

 1 Parme|      being many, that is to say, having many parts or members, am
 2 Parme|          is of subjective truth, having many kinds, general and
 3 Parme|      then see what follows: God, having this exact knowledge, can
 4 Parme|        to Socrates the credit of having gone beyond them in seeking
 5 Parme|       existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea,
 6 Parme|      same are different. And one having any affection which is other
 7 Parme|       measures. But the one, not having sameness, cannot have sameness
 8 Parme|        be unlike. Again, one, as having the same relations, has
 9 Parme|       and therefore like; or, as having different relations, is
10 Parme|       less than itself or other, having also measures or parts or
11 Parme|           each particle although having a limit in relation to itself
12 Parme|         personality or substance having many attributes or qualities.
13 Parme|          Ideas, which he himself having created is unable to connect
14 Parme|          in their old connexion, having first tested their meaning
15 Parme|         meaning and quality, and having corrected the error which
16 Parme|       many years ago, Pythodorus having often recited it to him.~
17 Parme|        read over again, and this having been done, he said: What
18 Parme|   Certainly.~But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have
19 Parme|          things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated
20 Parme|       being a whole, and also as having parts?~To be sure.~And in
21 Parme|         Certainly.~Then the one, having neither beginning nor end,
22 Parme|    circular form?~Assuredly.~But having no parts, it will be neither
23 Parme|        same?~Impossible.~And not having the same measures, the one
24 Parme|      true.~The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts
25 Parme|       and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited
26 Parme|     number?~Clearly.~And because having limits, also having extremes?~
27 Parme|      because having limits, also having extremes?~Certainly.~And
28 Parme|       Certainly.~And if a whole, having beginning and middle and
29 Parme|       the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have
30 Parme|   relation of the one to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness
31 Parme|       must be one perfect whole, having parts.~Certainly.~And the
32 Parme|      greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the
33 Parme| appearance of equality.~Yes.~And having neither beginning, middle,
34 Parme|          they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and