Dialogue

 1 Parme|      said Parmenides, ‘in that case the whole, which is one,
 2 Parme|      in the mind only; in this case, the consequence would no
 3 Parme|     Heracleitean. In the first case, they assume that Plato
 4 Parme|       or other. This being the case, neither can the one be
 5 Parme|       or one and other, in any case we have two things which
 6 Parme|        another. This being the case, the one is at once both
 7 Parme|       part of one, for in that case it would be one; nor can
 8 Parme|      may be illustrated by the case of names: when you repeat
 9 Parme|       inherent in one: in this case the inherence is either
10 Parme|      nor the many, for in that case the one would be contained
11 Parme|        the many.~In the former case, nothing could be predicated
12 Parme|        instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows
13 Parme|        Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one,
14 Parme|       for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis
15 Parme|     Certainly.~Then, in either case, the one would be made up
16 Parme|      To be sure.~And in either case, the one would be many,
17 Parme| partake of time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the same
18 Parme|       the other, in every such case we take two things, which
19 Parme|     and the other,—in any such case do I not speak of both?~
20 Parme|       True.~And if this is the case, it will be both in itself
21 Parme|   rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?~It would.~
22 Parme|    take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name
23 Parme|     And it will be in the same case in relation to the other