Dialogue

  1 Phileb|            present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may
  2 Phileb|          correspond to the highest good, the sciences and arts and
  3 Phileb|      Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus
  4 Phileb|         opinion, the nature of the good, the order and relation
  5 Phileb|           pleasure’ or ‘Concerning good,’ but should rather be described
  6 Phileb|         been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked,
  7 Phileb|    pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than
  8 Phileb|         are related to this higher good. (2) Before we can reply
  9 Phileb|            of the character of the good than either of them when
 10 Phileb|            of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure;
 11 Phileb|           V) the conception of the good. We may then proceed to
 12 Phileb|          he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and Politicus
 13 Phileb|     removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of the age of
 14 Phileb|            have insisted that ‘the good is of the nature of the
 15 Phileb|      things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are
 16 Phileb|           find the idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the
 17 Phileb|         abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear almost
 18 Phileb|         and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he seems
 19 Phileb|          highest expression of the good may also be described as
 20 Phileb|           the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first
 21 Phileb|           a category distinct from good. For again we must repeat,
 22 Phileb|             that to the Greek ‘the good is of the nature of the
 23 Phileb|     depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute.
 24 Phileb|           as the sole principle of good. The comparison of pleasure
 25 Phileb|   vestibule or ante-chamber of the good; for there is a good exceeding
 26 Phileb|           the good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding
 27 Phileb|   difficulty in apprehending. This good is now to be exhibited to
 28 Phileb|        Phaedrus, or like the ideal good in the Republic, this is
 29 Phileb|        then proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective
 30 Phileb|           account of the nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction
 31 Phileb|         own concrete conception of good against the abstract practical
 32 Phileb|     against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or the abstract
 33 Phileb|          the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his
 34 Phileb|        wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried
 35 Phileb|        victory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure
 36 Phileb|           more akin to this higher good will have a right to the
 37 Phileb|            pleasures of all kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish—
 38 Phileb|   attribute a new predicate (i.e. ‘good’) to pleasures in general,
 39 Phileb|           to indicate by the term ‘good’? If he continues to assert
 40 Phileb|      abstract unities (e.g.‘man,’ ‘good’) and with the attempt to
 41 Phileb|           knowledge is the highest good, for the good should be
 42 Phileb|          the highest good, for the good should be perfect and sufficient.
 43 Phileb|          character of the absolute good. Yes, retorts Socrates,
 44 Phileb|         pleasure the nature of the good. But where shall we place
 45 Phileb|       opinions may be described as good or bad. And though we do
 46 Phileb|           sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of
 47 Phileb|         essence is of the class of good. But if essence is of the
 48 Phileb|         essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some
 49 Phileb|          notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion,
 50 Phileb|        absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or
 51 Phileb|        affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be
 52 Phileb|     knowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that
 53 Phileb|            that we should seek the good not in the unmixed life,
 54 Phileb|            at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three
 55 Phileb|        ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and eternal
 56 Phileb|          times nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure
 57 Phileb|             Is pleasure an evil? a good? the only good?’ are the
 58 Phileb|          an evil? a good? the only good?’ are the simple forms which
 59 Phileb|             and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor
 60 Phileb|           and some neither bad nor good?’ There are bodily and there
 61 Phileb|            who maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In
 62 Phileb|         that pleasure is the chief good, but that we should have
 63 Phileb|           standards and motives of good and evil, and that the salvation
 64 Phileb|        that ‘pleasure is the chief good.’ Either they have heard
 65 Phileb|      nature. The pleasure of doing good to others and of bodily
 66 Phileb|          affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some
 67 Phileb|            civilized country, in a good home. A well-educated child
 68 Phileb|           and the aspiration after good has often lent a strange
 69 Phileb|       virtue and for every other.’~Good or happiness or pleasure
 70 Phileb|         must live before he can do good to others, still the last
 71 Phileb|       large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected,
 72 Phileb|           acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is
 73 Phileb|            commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly
 74 Phileb|           should hardly say that a good man could be utterly miserable (
 75 Phileb|           we insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall
 76 Phileb|            is at variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further,
 77 Phileb|         sacrifices himself for the good of others, does not sacrifice
 78 Phileb|         notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best
 79 Phileb| philanthropist under that of doing good, the quietist under that
 80 Phileb|       these aspects is as true and good as another; but that they
 81 Phileb|           than the belief that the good of man is also the will
 82 Phileb|      whatever does not tend to the good of men is not of God. And
 83 Phileb|            strongest motives to do good to others.~On the other
 84 Phileb|           discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better
 85 Phileb| conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many
 86 Phileb|         evil may be diminished and good increased—by what course
 87 Phileb|        which differ widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love
 88 Phileb|          to this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law:
 89 Phileb|          not wholly evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness.
 90 Phileb|       content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true
 91 Phileb|           ideas are to the idea of good. It is the consciousness
 92 Phileb|           to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined;
 93 Phileb|           to widen and deepen. The good is summed up under categories
 94 Phileb|        made the first principle of good. Some of these questions
 95 Phileb|       feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas
 96 Phileb|         Pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: The awe which
 97 Phileb|          itself?~SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is
 98 Phileb|            all pleasant things are good; now although no one can
 99 Phileb|     pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them all good,
100 Phileb|        good; but you call them all good, and at the same time are
101 Phileb|          quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which
102 Phileb|           designate all of them as good.~PROTARCHUS: What do you
103 Phileb|         asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion
104 Phileb|            that some pleasures are good and others bad?~SOCRATES:
105 Phileb|          what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are
106 Phileb|           the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case
107 Phileb|         the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring
108 Phileb|       pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third
109 Phileb|         one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which
110 Phileb|          with questions.~SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin
111 Phileb|            the like were the chief good, you answered—No, not those,
112 Phileb|          the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which
113 Phileb|          lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified
114 Phileb|         are they?~SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect?~PROTARCHUS:
115 Phileb|       things.~SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient?~PROTARCHUS:
116 Phileb|       beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch
117 Phileb|        eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not
118 Phileb|        which is not accompanied by good.~PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable.~
119 Phileb|        either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to
120 Phileb|         cannot really be the chief good.~PROTARCHUS: Impossible.~
121 Phileb|            neither of them has the good, for the one which had would
122 Phileb|     regarded as identical with the good?~PHILEBUS: Neither is your ‘
123 Phileb|         Neither is your ‘mind’ the good, Socrates, for that will
124 Phileb|       neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined
125 Phileb|    imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further
126 Phileb|            mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar
127 Phileb|   PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend?~SOCRATES: I say
128 Phileb|    pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite
129 Phileb|            pleasure some degree of good. But now—admitting, if you
130 Phileb|        tire of you.~SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus,
131 Phileb|          ability.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Let us then understand
132 Phileb|        have described?~PROTARCHUS: Good.~SOCRATES: Let us next assume
133 Phileb|            being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and
134 Phileb|         admitting of the nature of good.~PROTARCHUS: You say most
135 Phileb|          SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms.~
136 Phileb|        shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?~
137 Phileb|           a man.’~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Or again, he
138 Phileb|     SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the
139 Phileb|        mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.~PROTARCHUS: True.~
140 Phileb|            may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods,
141 Phileb|         their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they
142 Phileb|           false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?~PROTARCHUS:
143 Phileb|      SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far
144 Phileb|        assertion.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Then now, like
145 Phileb|        were not changed either for good or bad?~SOCRATES: Yes.~PROTARCHUS:
146 Phileb|           nor pain.~SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not
147 Phileb|    SOCRATES: To them we will say: ‘Good; but are we, or living things
148 Phileb|          neither.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Now, can that
149 Phileb|         pain, which is of itself a good, and is called pleasant?~
150 Phileb|            delight.~SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then
151 Phileb|          demands.~PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains
152 Phileb|        whiteness.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: How can there
153 Phileb|      SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave
154 Phileb|          be placed in the class of good, and that which is done
155 Phileb|            in some other class, my good friend.~PROTARCHUS: Most
156 Phileb|           other class than that of good?~PROTARCHUS: Quite right.~
157 Phileb|         notion of pleasure being a good.~PROTARCHUS: Assuredly.~
158 Phileb|           believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities,
159 Phileb|      arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or
160 Phileb|            anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and
161 Phileb|            only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure;
162 Phileb|        understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really
163 Phileb|          the soul, is not really a good?—and is there not yet a
164 Phileb|         same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry
165 Phileb|             Socrates, and hope for good luck.~SOCRATES: We have
166 Phileb|         sciences.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus,
167 Phileb|          even thrice that which is good.~PROTARCHUS: Certainly.~
168 Phileb|      moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two
169 Phileb|            and that the two names ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ are correctly
170 Phileb|          more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this
171 Phileb|         was it?~SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things.~
172 Phileb|            the being who possesses good always everywhere and in
173 Phileb|  universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either
174 Phileb|        ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately,
175 Phileb|            which leads towards the good?~PROTARCHUS: What road?~
176 Phileb|            that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life
177 Phileb|           former.~PROTARCHUS: Very good and right.~SOCRATES: If,
178 Phileb|        manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of
179 Phileb|           pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible;
180 Phileb|          in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe,
181 Phileb|           what is the true form of good—there would be great want
182 Phileb|           of the habitation of the good?~PROTARCHUS: I think that
183 Phileb|           And now the power of the good has retired into the region
184 Phileb|           are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with
185 Phileb|           and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion
186 Phileb|           more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among
187 Phileb|          knowledge.~SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains
188 Phileb|         are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is.~PROTARCHUS:
189 Phileb|          always and absolutely the good.~PROTARCHUS: I understand;
190 Phileb|            mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven
191 Phileb|         that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts