Dialogue

  1 Phileb| explanation; e.g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class,
  2 Phileb|          immediately follows, that pleasure and pain naturally have
  3 Phileb|        mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a further
  4 Phileb|          or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we able to say
  5 Phileb|       disciple of the partisans of pleasure, but is drawn over to the
  6 Phileb|         again, that he may support pleasure, of which he remains to
  7 Phileb|           the anonymous enemies of pleasure, and the teachers of the
  8 Phileb|            the nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion,
  9 Phileb|    original elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge,
 10 Phileb|       rightly entitled ‘Concerning pleasure’ or ‘Concerning good,’ but
 11 Phileb|       treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after they
 12 Phileb|         question is asked, whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good,
 13 Phileb|             and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to
 14 Phileb|          we must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (
 15 Phileb|          that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge
 16 Phileb|            the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom
 17 Phileb|          is a pain of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you
 18 Phileb|              c) those in which the pleasure and pain are both mental.
 19 Phileb|        more akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix
 20 Phileb|       elements; (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (
 21 Phileb|         affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which
 22 Phileb|          of the relative places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been
 23 Phileb|       precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out
 24 Phileb|         nature of the cause, while pleasure is found in the infinite
 25 Phileb|          may now proceed to divide pleasure and knowledge after their
 26 Phileb|            III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative,
 27 Phileb|        ideal conceptions of mental pleasure, happiness, and the like.~
 28 Phileb|        happiness, and the like.~2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative,
 29 Phileb|   experience of the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be
 30 Phileb|          then the abstract idea of pleasure will be equally unchangeable
 31 Phileb|            than capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which
 32 Phileb|          to fade away, just as the pleasure of health after sickness,
 33 Phileb|      difference between subjective pleasure and subjective knowledge
 34 Phileb|          the relative character of pleasure is described as becoming
 35 Phileb|          Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who
 36 Phileb|        points, e.g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to nature,
 37 Phileb|         Plato; for he affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all;
 38 Phileb|          with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although
 39 Phileb|         will deny that a degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking;
 40 Phileb|  constantly affords some degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are
 41 Phileb|            terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain.
 42 Phileb|   Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher;
 43 Phileb|  philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. Yet such a combination
 44 Phileb|        While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely considered,
 45 Phileb|            good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really
 46 Phileb|          are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which accompanies
 47 Phileb|           to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable
 48 Phileb|          from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who,
 49 Phileb|            We can no more separate pleasure from knowledge in the Philebus
 50 Phileb|            The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined;
 51 Phileb|         worth considering, because pleasure, having only gained the
 52 Phileb|            the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is common to both
 53 Phileb|            to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of the
 54 Phileb|          of the nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between
 55 Phileb|       Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure; asserting with more consistency
 56 Phileb|          the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom to rank as the
 57 Phileb|     circumstances, to the cause of pleasure.~Socrates suggests that
 58 Phileb|            good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then neither
 59 Phileb|             Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as figure
 60 Phileb|         Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as figure is like figure
 61 Phileb|        some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may retort
 62 Phileb|            whether of knowledge or pleasure, will spoil the discussion,
 63 Phileb|         comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:’ Socrates replies,
 64 Phileb|            of hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest
 65 Phileb|     sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect and sufficient,
 66 Phileb|          devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the
 67 Phileb|          more akin to mind than to pleasure? Thus pleasure is rejected
 68 Phileb|        mind than to pleasure? Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is
 69 Phileb|          infinite. And in which is pleasure to find a place? As clearly
 70 Phileb|         the superlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute
 71 Phileb|           be that which imparts to pleasure the nature of the good.
 72 Phileb|       which we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite
 73 Phileb|        both.~What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the
 74 Phileb|         Pain is the violation, and pleasure the restoration of limit.
 75 Phileb|            may show us whether all pleasure is to be desired, or whether
 76 Phileb|   consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in pain,
 77 Phileb|         person is balanced between pleasure and pain; in his body there
 78 Phileb|          not a balance of pain and pleasure.) Another question is raised:
 79 Phileb|     opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not,
 80 Phileb|          and will not be, which is pleasure still,—that is to say, false
 81 Phileb|       still,—that is to say, false pleasure; and only when false, can
 82 Phileb|           and only when false, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious.
 83 Phileb|            out of the derangement— pleasure out of the restoration—of
 84 Phileb|  unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or pain. We assume, then,
 85 Phileb|       Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that
 86 Phileb|          leads them to affirm that pleasure is only the absence of pain.
 87 Phileb|             and that the nature of pleasure will be best understood
 88 Phileb|            tell whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these
 89 Phileb|      internal pain and an external pleasure in the body: sometimes the
 90 Phileb|           sometimes the feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which they
 91 Phileb|        feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which they give may be quite
 92 Phileb|           laugh at him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, which
 93 Phileb|     feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty
 94 Phileb|         there is another question:—Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious
 95 Phileb|           friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh
 96 Phileb|           laugh at the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other
 97 Phileb|            that other notion, that pleasure is produced by generation,
 98 Phileb|            to which the friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there
 99 Phileb|          from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge.
100 Phileb|           borrowing the analogy of pleasure, we may say that the philosophical
101 Phileb|        whom I propose as rivals to pleasure.~And now, having the materials,
102 Phileb|           issue.~Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed
103 Phileb|         more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together
104 Phileb|          the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom.~Which has the
105 Phileb|          truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the veriest impostor
106 Phileb|            is more immoderate than pleasure.~Which of beauty? Once more,
107 Phileb|             Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and the
108 Phileb|          are put out of sight.~Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the
109 Phileb|         have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both renounce
110 Phileb|      nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and
111 Phileb|          chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not first,
112 Phileb|            own times the nature of pleasure has occupied the attention
113 Phileb|     attention of philosophers. ‘Is pleasure an evil? a good? the only
114 Phileb|         language of their age, ‘Is pleasure a “becoming” only, and therefore
115 Phileb|          further question:— ‘Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself,
116 Phileb|    question:— ‘Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your
117 Phileb|         also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure the
118 Phileb|     between pleasure the test, and pleasure the motive of actions. For
119 Phileb|            meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the calculation of
120 Phileb|             but the calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that
121 Phileb|         neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief good, but that
122 Phileb|         the so-called sophist that pleasure and pain are the final standards
123 Phileb|        that the exchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be an
124 Phileb|         after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near or distant:
125 Phileb|          he regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still
126 Phileb|     unwilling to acknowledge that ‘pleasure is the chief good.’ Either
127 Phileb|        another mould; or the word ‘pleasure’ has been associated in
128 Phileb|            of the same nature. The pleasure of doing good to others
129 Phileb|            their taste. To elevate pleasure, ‘the most fleeting of all
130 Phileb|             to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all pleasures
131 Phileb|            as in quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality
132 Phileb|           inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek,
133 Phileb|             which we seek, our own pleasure, but that of others,—of
134 Phileb|       other.’~Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the
135 Phileb|       greatest, but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard
136 Phileb|     utility who sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his fellow-men.
137 Phileb|           our own, the votaries of pleasure have gained belief for their
138 Phileb|          There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing morals,
139 Phileb|          the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective
140 Phileb|           mankind?’ If we say ‘Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom,
141 Phileb|     ingredients of health, wealth, pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which
142 Phileb|          that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing themselves
143 Phileb|           do not contribute to the pleasure of the world. In that very
144 Phileb|           detect a false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal;
145 Phileb|           of eternal and immutable pleasure; nor by any refinement can
146 Phileb|            lose sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion
147 Phileb|        slipping away from us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing
148 Phileb|          us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive,
149 Phileb|            the words ‘utility’ or ‘pleasure’: their principle of right
150 Phileb|    happiness he meant anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted
151 Phileb|          Philebus, ‘What rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?’
152 Phileb|            whole; the relations of pleasure and knowledge to each other
153 Phileb|           thought. The question of pleasure and the relation of bodily
154 Phileb|          saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class
155 Phileb|            and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to
156 Phileb|         SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom,
157 Phileb|        turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life
158 Phileb|        than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage
159 Phileb|          then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;—do you agree?~
160 Phileb|         and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the conqueror;
161 Phileb|          but that her real name is Pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~
162 Phileb|       called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and
163 Phileb|           that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate
164 Phileb|         and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—
165 Phileb|          and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish
166 Phileb|  themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely
167 Phileb|        things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, like itself?~SOCRATES:
168 Phileb|     although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may
169 Phileb|         argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are
170 Phileb|           that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate
171 Phileb|          say (as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference
172 Phileb|        them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good,
173 Phileb|         comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?~PHILEBUS: Certainly.~
174 Phileb|     whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number
175 Phileb|            when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment
176 Phileb|          designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects
177 Phileb|            whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according
178 Phileb|          certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake
179 Phileb|          clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for
180 Phileb|            us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom,
181 Phileb|           no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the
182 Phileb|          life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for
183 Phileb|          to you if you had perfect pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Certainly not.~
184 Phileb|   PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.~
185 Phileb|      slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment
186 Phileb|        able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be
187 Phileb|             but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected
188 Phileb|          of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?~SOCRATES:
189 Phileb|        place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause
190 Phileb|            similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure
191 Phileb|     pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to
192 Phileb|       PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had
193 Phileb|            a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of
194 Phileb|        that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?~
195 Phileb|           second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?~PROTARCHUS: We
196 Phileb|             that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror—
197 Phileb|            me hear.~SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do
198 Phileb|      admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good
199 Phileb|           element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But
200 Phileb|       admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the
201 Phileb|             And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long
202 Phileb|          this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs
203 Phileb|             And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first
204 Phileb|            first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested
205 Phileb|        with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.~PROTARCHUS: What
206 Phileb|            nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to
207 Phileb|           is a replenishment and a pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Yes.~SOCRATES:
208 Phileb|    replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural
209 Phileb|            their original state is pleasure. And would not the general
210 Phileb|      things to their own nature is pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Granted; what
211 Phileb|           is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing,
212 Phileb|            pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall
213 Phileb|         whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether
214 Phileb|        been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and
215 Phileb|            on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the
216 Phileb|       possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?~
217 Phileb|             over and above that of pleasure and of pain?~PROTARCHUS:
218 Phileb|      difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this
219 Phileb|        were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small,
220 Phileb|          Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this
221 Phileb|          or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be
222 Phileb|        plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist
223 Phileb|            and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine
224 Phileb|            these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it.~PROTARCHUS:
225 Phileb|       SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping
226 Phileb|         have at the same time both pleasure and pain?~PROTARCHUS: I
227 Phileb|    question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such
228 Phileb|      SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Yes.~SOCRATES:
229 Phileb|      always have a real feeling of pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is
230 Phileb|           both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure
231 Phileb|       pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally
232 Phileb|          in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid
233 Phileb|          difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion
234 Phileb|            bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Quite true,
235 Phileb|           a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the
236 Phileb|          SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect
237 Phileb|             PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?~
238 Phileb|           we?~SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany
239 Phileb|          one could call the actual pleasure false.~SOCRATES: How eagerly,
240 Phileb|         you rush to the defence of pleasure!~PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates,
241 Phileb|            my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with
242 Phileb|     PROTARCHUS: Yes.~SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just
243 Phileb|           must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real
244 Phileb|           be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything
245 Phileb|         body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.~
246 Phileb|         What is it?~SOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more
247 Phileb|           and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against
248 Phileb|         and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure?~PROTARCHUS:
249 Phileb|         pain, and pleasure against pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Yes, such is
250 Phileb|  corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.~
251 Phileb|            of the natural state is pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Right.~SOCRATES:
252 Phileb|        that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.~SOCRATES: Very
253 Phileb|          will not be the same with pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: Certainly not.~
254 Phileb|        PROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative
255 Phileb|          they think that they have pleasure when they are free from
256 Phileb|       would not say that they have pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: I suppose not.~
257 Phileb|          not.~SOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain
258 Phileb|         deny the very existence of pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: Indeed!~SOCRATES:
259 Phileb|         nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that
260 Phileb|          to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use which you
261 Phileb|        thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view,
262 Phileb|            deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their
263 Phileb|       speaking of the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures
264 Phileb|           have to discover what is pleasure, and what they mean by pleasure
265 Phileb|    pleasure, and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence.~
266 Phileb|          their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of
267 Phileb|            is thus produced in us?—Pleasure or pain?~PROTARCHUS: A villainous
268 Phileb|         which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is afforded
269 Phileb|           produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts,
270 Phileb|           mingles with the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of
271 Phileb|            to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.~PROTARCHUS: Quite
272 Phileb|           Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the
273 Phileb|          the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in
274 Phileb|            to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite
275 Phileb|        desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity.
276 Phileb|         and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.~
277 Phileb|          mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: I do not quite
278 Phileb|         sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.~PROTARCHUS: How
279 Phileb|            not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous
280 Phileb|             And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?~PROTARCHUS:
281 Phileb|        PROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure.~SOCRATES: And was not envy
282 Phileb|            envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes
283 Phileb|          the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy,
284 Phileb|          there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations,
285 Phileb|  Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible
286 Phileb| illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient
287 Phileb|           prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure,
288 Phileb|      pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with
289 Phileb|            and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure
290 Phileb|      pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.~PROTARCHUS:
291 Phileb|             have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation,
292 Phileb|          Assuredly.~SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must
293 Phileb|          certainly.~SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will
294 Phileb|         who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and
295 Phileb|            laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.~PROTARCHUS:
296 Phileb|          the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they
297 Phileb|           were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest
298 Phileb|          who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved
299 Phileb|           only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or temperance
300 Phileb|         feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when
301 Phileb|            he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased
302 Phileb|          And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let
303 Phileb|            truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought
304 Phileb|         been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original
305 Phileb|         purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.~PROTARCHUS:
306 Phileb|           adduced of the rivals of pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Very true,
307 Phileb|          here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be
308 Phileb|       SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living
309 Phileb|          wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and
310 Phileb|           separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct
311 Phileb|           a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from
312 Phileb|            had no part whatever in pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: We did.~SOCRATES:
313 Phileb|            acquire,—I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense,
314 Phileb|        wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain
315 Phileb|           with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid
316 Phileb|         degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather
317 Phileb|            our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain
318 Phileb|           we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?~
319 Phileb|          What is it?~SOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be
320 Phileb|          return to the fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted
321 Phileb|           but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom to answer for
322 Phileb| omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.~PROTARCHUS:
323 Phileb|         decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to
324 Phileb|    separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce
325 Phileb|     passing in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer
326 Phileb|          to yourself—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to
327 Phileb|          between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor
328 Phileb|            manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom,
329 Phileb|        than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?~PROTARCHUS: Here is another
330 Phileb|  immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with
331 Phileb|       greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure
332 Phileb|           pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?~PROTARCHUS:
333 Phileb|         tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions,
334 Phileb|   certainly more akin to good than pleasure is.~PROTARCHUS: Surely.~
335 Phileb|             Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely
336 Phileb|        element of human life, than pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: True.~SOCRATES:
337 Phileb|         second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose
338 Phileb|            mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place
339 Phileb|       SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute
340 Phileb|       nature of the conqueror than pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: Certainly.~
341 Phileb|          which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth.~PROTARCHUS: