Dialogue

  1 Phileb|         good many bad jests, as we may venture to term them. We
  2 Phileb|           venture to term them. We may observe an attempt at artificial
  3 Phileb|           appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond
  4 Phileb|        brought back again, that he may support pleasure, of which
  5 Phileb|          and synthetical processes may be compared with his discussion
  6 Phileb|           also a difference, which may be noted, between the two
  7 Phileb|        knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm generally, that the
  8 Phileb|         Philebus and Socrates,’ we may now consider the metaphysical
  9 Phileb|         conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (
 10 Phileb|      Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of them to their
 11 Phileb|            him the idea of science may be said to anticipate science;
 12 Phileb|          and that a like principle may be applied to analogy to
 13 Phileb|          depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all
 14 Phileb|      either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively
 15 Phileb|           nature.~Two other points may be noticed respecting the
 16 Phileb|         characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish
 17 Phileb|     highest expression of the good may also be described as the
 18 Phileb|            or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure
 19 Phileb|         pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either abstracted
 20 Phileb|       first is an idea only, which may be conceived as absolute
 21 Phileb|         and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean
 22 Phileb|        insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this
 23 Phileb|           although the calculation may be false, or the after-effects
 24 Phileb|            pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though
 25 Phileb|         recollection is, or rather may be, simultaneous with acute
 26 Phileb|    theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract
 27 Phileb|           applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the modern
 28 Phileb|           to the divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret
 29 Phileb|         out of the running.~VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain
 30 Phileb|           style, many resemblances may be noticed between the Philebus
 31 Phileb|         than that of the Republic, may be further argued on the
 32 Phileb|      painter. A superficial notion may arise that Plato probably
 33 Phileb|         for longer ones. This view may be natural; but on further
 34 Phileb|         palm of victory. For there may be a good higher than either
 35 Phileb|            that although pleasures may be opposed in so far as
 36 Phileb|          pleasure is one, Socrates may retort by saying that knowledge
 37 Phileb|        knowledge into classes, you may leave the further consideration
 38 Phileb|            music, for example, you may begin with the most general
 39 Phileb|          of any other subject, you may be said to know that subject.
 40 Phileb|       himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or
 41 Phileb|            rejected. And yet there may be a life of mind, not human
 42 Phileb|           cause of the union. More may be added if they are wanted,
 43 Phileb|           obtained our classes, we may determine in which our conqueror
 44 Phileb|          and awful question, which may be prefaced by another.
 45 Phileb|             and yet, perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves.
 46 Phileb|            the examination of them may show us whether all pleasure
 47 Phileb|          and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral state,
 48 Phileb|         but in the mind. And there may be an intermediate state,
 49 Phileb|        Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions,
 50 Phileb|          to both of them qualities may be attributed; for pleasures
 51 Phileb|      pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or
 52 Phileb|         based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken.
 53 Phileb|           correct or mistaken. You may see a figure at a distance,
 54 Phileb|            the shepherds.’ And you may affirm this in a proposition
 55 Phileb|        which are inscribed by them may be either true or false;
 56 Phileb|            true or false; and they may represent either past, present,
 57 Phileb|           false ones. And as there may be opinion about things
 58 Phileb|            opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things
 59 Phileb| pleasureable, painful, neutral; we may embellish a little by calling
 60 Phileb|            not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who
 61 Phileb|           pleasure which they give may be quite overpowering, and
 62 Phileb|    ignorance is self-conceit—a man may fancy himself richer, fairer,
 63 Phileb|          who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak? ‘He may.’
 64 Phileb|         may be strong or weak? ‘He may.’ And if he is strong we
 65 Phileb|          in tragedy, the spectator may view the performance with
 66 Phileb|           themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental
 67 Phileb|        moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an
 68 Phileb|            creative arts, then, we may make two classes—the less
 69 Phileb|   arithmetic and mensuration again may be subdivided with reference
 70 Phileb|            analogy of pleasure, we may say that the philosophical
 71 Phileb|           having the materials, we may proceed to mix them—first
 72 Phileb|          argument is complete, and may be compared to an incorporeal
 73 Phileb|            Thus, pleasure and mind may both renounce the claim
 74 Phileb|          actions (how I know them) may not always be the highest
 75 Phileb|         aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be ascribed
 76 Phileb|           temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures of intemperance,
 77 Phileb|          it.~Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which
 78 Phileb|           field of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few
 79 Phileb|           all human actions are or may be included. The desire
 80 Phileb|     opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which
 81 Phileb|            which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation
 82 Phileb|          origin of our moral ideas may be shortly summed up as
 83 Phileb|            of public opinion. They may be corrected and enlarged
 84 Phileb|       enlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they
 85 Phileb|            be reasoned about, they may be brought home to us by
 86 Phileb|   circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified by imagination,
 87 Phileb|         ordinary rules of morality may create out of them for himself
 88 Phileb|          of religion and right.~We may further remark that our
 89 Phileb|     communicated to each of us. We may represent them to ourselves
 90 Phileb|       theories is the true one? we may answer: All of them—moral
 91 Phileb|       mature ideas of morality, we may now proceed to state the
 92 Phileb|     interest to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly
 93 Phileb|        virtues, including justice, may be explained. Admitting
 94 Phileb|     working out their happiness we may be said to be ‘working together
 95 Phileb|    stronger than any old religion, may be based upon such a conception.~
 96 Phileb|     generally the least share, and may be a great sufferer.~And
 97 Phileb|     practical,—so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,—
 98 Phileb|           his first enthusiasm, he may not recognize the proportions
 99 Phileb|          the rest of the world; or may degenerate in the next generation.
100 Phileb|          have assigned to them.~We may preface the criticism with
101 Phileb|  applications in practice, so also may be developed in theory into
102 Phileb|        whether in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties:
103 Phileb|       general principles of morals may be presented to us are many
104 Phileb|         the more general principle may correct prejudices and misconceptions,
105 Phileb|          rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all
106 Phileb|           by all rational beings,’ may exercise on the mind of
107 Phileb|       measure of a man’s happiness may be out of all proportion
108 Phileb|      coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is
109 Phileb|            the happiness of others may be a counsel of perfection,
110 Phileb|            of telling a lie, which may often make the greatest
111 Phileb|            happiness to one person may be the cause of unhappiness
112 Phileb|            performed by one person may increase the happiness of
113 Phileb|           the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect
114 Phileb|         happiness of mankind which may not under other circumstances
115 Phileb|          that the hold of morality may also be weakened, and the
116 Phileb|        sacrifice himself that they may be saved from the persecution
117 Phileb|            that they in their turn may be able to undergo similar
118 Phileb|           and that of others there may be happiness in the distance,
119 Phileb|       theories of philosophers. It may be compared with other notions,
120 Phileb|         chief good of Plato, which may be best expressed to us
121 Phileb|            obedience to law, which may be summed up under the word ‘
122 Phileb|           only conceding that they may choose the form under which
123 Phileb|            of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory,
124 Phileb|             my country, the world? may check the rising feeling
125 Phileb|           and superstitions of men may be brought:—whatever does
126 Phileb|         the stake in order that he may promote the happiness of
127 Phileb|             and the like. And many may be inclined to think that
128 Phileb|       growth of reflection. And he may also truly add that for
129 Phileb|        leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good increased—
130 Phileb|         policy the public interest may be promoted, and to understand
131 Phileb|        principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison
132 Phileb|             Act so that thy action may be the law of every intelligent
133 Phileb|   consideration of its content: it may be for great good or for
134 Phileb|         with motives of this world may easily be in excess, may
135 Phileb|           may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be interested,
136 Phileb|          excess, may be fanatical, may be interested, may be the
137 Phileb|      fanatical, may be interested, may be the mask of ambition,
138 Phileb|           be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand
139 Phileb|            of moral philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in
140 Phileb|            still incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have
141 Phileb|           names of the gods, which may be not unaptly compared
142 Phileb|          other ages; for this also may be comprehended under the
143 Phileb|      singular acknowledgment which may be regarded as the anticipation
144 Phileb|      although some of the old ones may do again.’ Let us pause
145 Phileb|           errors in psychology. We may contrast the contempt which
146 Phileb|       anticipated in his writings, may we not truly describe him
147 Phileb|       wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage
148 Phileb|         now do so.~PROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will
149 Phileb|         and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to
150 Phileb|       pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing,
151 Phileb|             that in self-defence I may, if I like, follow your
152 Phileb|          position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding
153 Phileb|          to a fallacy?~PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except
154 Phileb|      process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is
155 Phileb|         that my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that
156 Phileb|          the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by
157 Phileb|        danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you
158 Phileb|         there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion,
159 Phileb|            is.~SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but
160 Phileb|    everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for
161 Phileb|        then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and
162 Phileb|            the endless individuals may allow them to drop into
163 Phileb|            are saying.~SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by
164 Phileb|         and a note of equal pitch:—may we affirm so much?~PROTARCHUS:
165 Phileb|           you are perfect; and you may be said to understand any
166 Phileb|            shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous
167 Phileb|         properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and
168 Phileb|   according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if
169 Phileb|             Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of
170 Phileb|          place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain
171 Phileb|         would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to
172 Phileb|           however, of the old ones may do again. And must I then
173 Phileb|         sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.~
174 Phileb| particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a note of
175 Phileb|          extremely,’ and the like, may not be referred to the class
176 Phileb|       number and measure—all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned
177 Phileb|            the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?~PROTARCHUS:
178 Phileb|             SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient,
179 Phileb|            distinct from them,—and may therefore be called a fourth
180 Phileb|            down by the finite, and may therefore be truly said
181 Phileb|            PROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly
182 Phileb|             SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which
183 Phileb|          which for the same reason may be considered to be a body,
184 Phileb|           What question?~SOCRATES: May our body be said to have
185 Phileb|            seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom
186 Phileb|           source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the
187 Phileb|       PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor
188 Phileb|         and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of
189 Phileb|          pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter
190 Phileb|             SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious
191 Phileb|          Yes.~SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described
192 Phileb|            as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that
193 Phileb|      Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have
194 Phileb|  PROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not
195 Phileb|        qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be
196 Phileb|        nature?~SOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance
197 Phileb|         very clearly, and the seer may want to determine what it
198 Phileb|           is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself
199 Phileb|        True.~SOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer,
200 Phileb|             SOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will
201 Phileb|          thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep them
202 Phileb|         bodily ones; from which we may infer that anticipatory
203 Phileb|         also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a
204 Phileb|           and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself
205 Phileb|    PROTARCHUS: True.~SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good,
206 Phileb|         anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things
207 Phileb|          undeniable.~SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about
208 Phileb|      existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.~
209 Phileb|             SOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such
210 Phileb|            in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains
211 Phileb|       there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary
212 Phileb|            Very true.~SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are
213 Phileb|      Philebus.~PROTARCHUS: And who may they be?~SOCRATES: Certain
214 Phileb|          This is the use which you may make of them. And when you
215 Phileb|            apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense
216 Phileb|           or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts;
217 Phileb|            which ignorance of self may be shown?~PROTARCHUS: What
218 Phileb|          about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than
219 Phileb|           Certainly.~SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called
220 Phileb|        lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like
221 Phileb|          when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous,
222 Phileb|          who can defend themselves may be more truly described
223 Phileb|            but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth
224 Phileb|            when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying
225 Phileb|         Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite
226 Phileb|      PROTARCHUS: Yes.~SOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions
227 Phileb|           I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep
228 Phileb|           midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without
229 Phileb|     understand.~SOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of
230 Phileb|         Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection,
231 Phileb|          pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure,
232 Phileb|       element in either of them, I may present the pure element
233 Phileb|          of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment.~
234 Phileb|            and the other less; and may not the one part be regarded
235 Phileb|          of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to
236 Phileb|           As you please.~SOCRATES: May I not have led you into
237 Phileb|          SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest
238 Phileb|        pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who
239 Phileb|      saying, that the second place may be duly assigned.~PROTARCHUS:
240 Phileb|            one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain
241 Phileb|         perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves in every
242 Phileb|     argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal
243 Phileb|            Socrates.~SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that
244 Phileb|           idea only, with three we may catch our prey; Beauty,
245 Phileb|            these taken together we may regard as the single cause
246 Phileb|          is another question which may be easily answered; for