Dialogue

  1 Intro|        degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether
  2 Intro|           Protagoras would rather say that justice is different
  3 Intro|      favourite weapon; that is to say, he makes a long speech
  4 Intro|          to this; he would rather say that ‘some pleasures are
  5 Intro|        all other men, is bound to say “that wisdom and knowledge
  6 Intro|     Aristotelian distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge,
  7 Intro|           nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought
  8  Prot|          some wise one?~SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest
  9  Prot|           have answered?~I should say, he replied, that I gave
 10  Prot|           object some one were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates,
 11  Prot|         tell.~Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware
 12  Prot|            In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in
 13  Prot|         keeping.~When he heard me say this, he replied: No other
 14  Prot|         have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of
 15  Prot|      opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home,
 16  Prot|  Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and
 17  Prot|        therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven
 18  Prot|       with you. I have no more to say.~Protagoras answered: Young
 19  Prot|         all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your age,
 20  Prot|         to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say,
 21  Prot|          say, as he has heard you say, that every day he would
 22  Prot|         the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked
 23  Prot|          on his account. When you say that on the first day on
 24  Prot|          When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask
 25  Prot|     communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an
 26  Prot|       everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler,
 27  Prot|          be something in what you say, because I know that you
 28  Prot|           distributed; that is to say, to a favoured few only,
 29  Prot|          interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not
 30  Prot|          deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess
 31  Prot|          families—those things, I say, they are supposed not to
 32  Prot|      being said to him: he cannot say or do anything without their
 33  Prot|          and the laws;—suppose, I say, that there were the same
 34  Prot|           to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers?
 35  Prot|    artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and
 36  Prot|       larger or smaller?~I should say that they differed, Socrates,
 37  Prot|        suppose that he went on to say: ‘Well now, is there also
 38  Prot|          be a thing—should we not say so?~He assented.~‘And is
 39  Prot|       such a question, and should say, ‘Peace, man; nothing can
 40  Prot|         not holy.’ What would you say? Would you not answer in
 41  Prot|    supposing that he proceeded to say further, ‘Then holiness
 42  Prot|     holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf
 43  Prot|           to be proven: I mean to say that the conclusion will
 44  Prot|   Protagoras? What else would you say?~He assented, but with great
 45  Prot|           will only answer me and say whether you are of their
 46  Prot|        and gently said:—~When you say, Protagoras, that things
 47  Prot|          you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to
 48  Prot|            and every man ought to say what he thinks.~When Alcibiades
 49  Prot|     Critias, I believe—went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias,
 50  Prot|           by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade
 51  Prot|          choosing him? And if you say, ‘Let us have a better then,’—
 52  Prot|         better, and whom you only say is better, to put another
 53  Prot|           not the poet proceed to say, ‘I do not agree with the
 54  Prot|         all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion,
 55  Prot|        himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that
 56  Prot| inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others
 57  Prot|    Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says,~‘On the
 58  Prot|         made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the
 59  Prot|         as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one
 60  Prot|          he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil,
 61  Prot|         he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift,
 62  Prot|       Nothing too much.’~Why do I say all this? I am explaining
 63  Prot|           of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good
 64  Prot|         was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who
 65  Prot|         words he does not mean to say that all things are good
 66  Prot|        evil in them, as you might say ‘All things are white which
 67  Prot|       ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts and finds
 68  Prot|   Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon
 69  Prot| Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will
 70  Prot|   different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what
 71  Prot|            Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things,
 72  Prot|      diving into a well?~I should say, the divers.~And the reason
 73  Prot|         asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are
 74  Prot|     strong are able, and I should say ‘Yes’; and then whether
 75  Prot|        body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage,
 76  Prot|           I am rather disposed to say that things are good in
 77  Prot|          pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind
 78  Prot|        all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge
 79  Prot|          do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are
 80  Prot|     opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to
 81  Prot|    indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome
 82  Prot|        again: ‘In what way do you say that they are evil,—in that
 83  Prot|           assented.~Then I should say to them, in my name and
 84  Prot|       opposite point of view, and say: ‘Friends, when you speak
 85  Prot|         consequences:—If what you say is true, then the argument
 86  Prot|      pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses
 87  Prot|    Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing
 88  Prot|       answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. ‘By
 89  Prot|        worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure,
 90  Prot|        what do you mean,’ he will say, ‘but that you choose the
 91  Prot|       pain for good and evil, and say, not as before, that a man
 92  Prot|          and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other.
 93  Prot|       with me.~Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be
 94  Prot|          Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the
 95  Prot|         whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, delightful,
 96  Prot|           my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions
 97  Prot|     danger?~Yes, Socrates, so men say.~Very true, I said. But
 98  Prot|          know against what do you say that the courageous are
 99  Prot|          two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to
100  Prot|    cowardice or courage?~I should say cowardice, he replied.~And
101  Prot|           I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me