Dialogue

 1 Intro|       teach their sons political virtue. Will Protagoras answer
 2 Intro|          if he did not profess a virtue which he had not. (2) And
 3 Intro|        the education of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as
 4 Intro|      foolish and worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not
 5 Intro|         there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers
 6 Intro|       him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree
 7 Intro|         case of courage—the only virtue which still holds out against
 8 Intro|    denying, the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends
 9 Intro|    latter ends by affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the
10 Intro|       been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this
11 Intro|        equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is
12 Intro| different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) Whether virtue
13 Intro|       virtue is, and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras
14 Intro|         also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates
15 Intro|    civilized men are teachers of virtue; and more than a half-truth (
16 Intro|         seeking for the unity of virtue and knowledge as for a precious
17 Intro|          is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of
18 Intro|         question the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to
19 Intro|     found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then
20 Intro|          knowledge are one, then virtue can be taught; the end of
21 Intro|        distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is
22 Intro|          for a less—the unity of virtue and the identity of virtue
23 Intro|       virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have
24 Intro|   teacher of moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to
25 Intro|          in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; (2) that
26 Intro|        virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of pleasures
27 Intro|        to a higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue
28 Intro|       virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox
29 Intro|          Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man,
30 Intro|        truth—they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further,
31 Intro|         relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if
32 Intro|  question is discussed, ‘whether virtue can be taught,’ and the
33 Intro|        of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure
34 Intro|       great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is an
35  Prot|       that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or
36  Prot|        am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then
37  Prot|         little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you
38  Prot|       deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by
39  Prot|         to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not
40  Prot|         of every other political virtue, let me give you a further
41  Prot|          or some other political virtue, even if they know that
42  Prot|    counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion
43  Prot|        they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or
44  Prot|       very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will
45  Prot|          study and learning, the virtue in which the other is deficient
46  Prot|        in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one
47  Prot|    thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught.
48  Prot|          of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught.
49  Prot|          and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught
50  Prot|   holiness and, in a word, manly virtue—if this is the quality of
51  Prot|       have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught
52  Prot|     there is all this care about virtue private and public, why,
53  Prot|         wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to
54  Prot|          of a state implies that virtue is not any man’s private
55  Prot|      interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this
56  Prot|       compelled them to practise virtue— with the savages, for example,
57  Prot|          all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his
58  Prot|    ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else; if
59  Prot|      able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must
60  Prot|         I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that
61  Prot|  satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught;—that I will
62  Prot|         if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell
63  Prot|         to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice
64  Prot|        speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.~And are they
65  Prot|         and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part,
66  Prot|         wisdom are also parts of virtue?~Most undoubtedly they are,
67  Prot|          concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from
68  Prot|         I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like
69  Prot|         saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one
70  Prot|        maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is
71  Prot|        both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only
72  Prot|          will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage
73  Prot|           For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil, But
74  Prot|          height, Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition,
75  Prot|         a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of
76  Prot|          resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being
77  Prot| understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?—
78  Prot|          a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the
79  Prot|      these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that
80  Prot|     these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the
81  Prot|          place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which
82  Prot|    related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to
83  Prot|         there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any
84  Prot|          from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his
85  Prot|          nature and relations of virtue; for if this were clear,
86  Prot|     affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also
87  Prot|   Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting
88  Prot|         which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught;
89  Prot|      certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge,
90  Prot| attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if
91  Prot|         cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as
92  Prot|          cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught.
93  Prot|          until we ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being