Dialogue

 1 Intro|           in short, the science or knowledge of human life.’~This, as
 2 Intro|        been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras
 3 Intro|             those who have no such knowledge and are still confident
 4 Intro|          says Socrates, courage is knowledge—an inference which Protagoras
 5 Intro|     mankind. What does he think of knowledge? Does he agree with the
 6 Intro|            the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion?
 7 Intro|      passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras agrees
 8 Intro|             Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing
 9 Intro|        best, act contrary to their knowledge under the influence of pleasure.
10 Intro|           mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved
11 Intro|           a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more
12 Intro|          terrible. Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance.
13 Intro|           affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable
14 Intro|            show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost equivalent
15 Intro|            to say “that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human
16 Intro|            the unity of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure;
17 Intro|         the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved.
18 Intro|        involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue can
19 Intro|         and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with
20 Intro|            but is accompanied with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle
21 Intro|         the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be
22 Intro|          exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy, to
23 Intro|              3) that virtue is the knowledge of pleasures and pains present
24 Intro|           conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught
25 Intro|           principle is found to be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks,
26 Intro|        Further, the nature of this knowledge, which is assumed to be
27 Intro|           which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and pains,
28 Intro|        question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded,
29 Intro|     Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is an aspect of the
30  Prot|          the soul?~Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul;
31  Prot|           carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the
32  Prot|           evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any
33  Prot|            greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and
34  Prot|            cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another
35  Prot|       impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not
36  Prot|           men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers,
37  Prot|            who have no training or knowledge of them—aye, and confiscation
38  Prot|         other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally
39  Prot|          all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble
40  Prot|       other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like
41  Prot|          when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the
42  Prot|        good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the
43  Prot|           ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never
44  Prot|          of this is that they have knowledge?~Yes, that is the reason.~
45  Prot|         your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than
46  Prot|   confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident
47  Prot|         are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous,
48  Prot|           show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than
49  Prot|          they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than
50  Prot|            than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to
51  Prot|             the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or
52  Prot|          reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether
53  Prot|          world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength,
54  Prot|      notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge
55  Prot|        knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered
56  Prot|        perhaps by fear,—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might
57  Prot|         view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding
58  Prot|      anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have
59  Prot|       bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human
60  Prot|           when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain,
61  Prot|           odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose
62  Prot|            of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring,
63  Prot|             Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question
64  Prot|           excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question
65  Prot|          was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in
66  Prot|           than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must
67  Prot|            even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow
68  Prot|           and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further,
69  Prot|            not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that
70  Prot|             but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring.
71  Prot|          act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This,
72  Prot| reluctantly nodded assent.~And the knowledge of that which is and is
73  Prot|          prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and
74  Prot|          if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted
75  Prot|          but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show,
76  Prot|            be anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it