Dialogue

 1 Intro|        hard is explained to mean ‘evil’ in the Cean dialect. To
 2 Intro|           good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras seems to doubt
 3 Intro|          are good, some pains are evil,’ which is also the opinion
 4 Intro|       this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition
 5 Intro|           only good; and the only evil is the preference of the
 6 Intro|       ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the
 7 Intro|     dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except
 8  Prot|        commit yourself be good or evil.~I certainly think that
 9  Prot|        body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being
10  Prot| understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge
11  Prot|           art of government, they evil intreated one another, and
12  Prot|    Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work
13  Prot|         and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are
14  Prot|          and reprove him—of these evil qualities one is impiety,
15  Prot|           all whom they regard as evil doers; and hence, we may
16  Prot|          the only opposite is the evil?~There is no other.~And
17  Prot|         of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and
18  Prot|      meaning by the term ‘awful,’ evil. And I think that Simonides
19  Prot|       they spoke of ‘hard’ meant ‘evil,’ or something which you
20  Prot|     Prodicus, by the term ‘hard’?~Evil, said Prodicus.~And therefore,
21  Prot|        were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.~Yes, he said,
22  Prot|          what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not easy—
23  Prot|         to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds
24  Prot|       poem):~‘But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and
25  Prot|          praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there
26  Prot|           there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise
27  Prot|  voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions;
28  Prot|        well aware that all who do evil and dishonourable things
29  Prot|           praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word ‘voluntarily’
30  Prot|        things are good with which evil is unmingled.’~In these
31  Prot|     things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say ‘
32  Prot|      moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me,
33  Prot|          VOLUNTARILY, who does no evil:’~and that the stop should
34  Prot|           to live unpleasantly an evil?~Yes, he said, if the pleasure
35  Prot|         call some pleasant things evil and some painful things
36  Prot|          good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only
37  Prot|        which are neither good nor evil.~And you would call pleasant,
38  Prot|        the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is
39  Prot|          they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in
40  Prot|          do you say that they are evil,—in that they are pleasant
41  Prot|       future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant
42  Prot|          if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because
43  Prot|          answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure
44  Prot|          yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except
45  Prot|        good, and avoid pain as an evil?’~He assented.~‘Then you
46  Prot|         you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good:
47  Prot|         even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater
48  Prot|     however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other
49  Prot|         any possible way in which evil can be explained as other
50  Prot|        unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure
51  Prot|     affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might
52  Prot|         and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things,
53  Prot|        two names— first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful.
54  Prot|         on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil.
55  Prot|         evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask,
56  Prot|     should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because
57  Prot|          worthy of conquering the evil’? And in answer to that
58  Prot|           good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good’?
59  Prot|      unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good’? Is not the
60  Prot|       that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser
61  Prot|    pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, not as before,
62  Prot|           that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does
63  Prot|          their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge;
64  Prot|         the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my
65  Prot|           man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks
66  Prot|        that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good
67  Prot|      thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human
68  Prot|          terror as expectation of evil.~Protagoras and Hippias
69  Prot|       things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue
70  Prot|        that which he thinks to be evil?~That also was universally