Dialogue

 1 Intro|        would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and
 2 Intro|  knowledge under the influence of pleasure. But this opposition of
 3 Intro|       greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils because
 4 Intro|       they end in pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good;
 5 Intro|          preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then
 6 Intro|           no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater
 7 Intro|          of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the courageous
 8 Intro|        the explanation of good as pleasure—Plato is inconsistent with
 9 Intro|         Socrates is arguing that ‘pleasure is the only good,’ Protagoras
10 Intro|          even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here,
11 Intro|        mere exchange of a greater pleasure for a less—the unity of
12 Intro|           doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the
13 Intro|       virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief or only good,
14  Prot|         not deny the company this pleasure.~Now I had got up, and was
15  Prot|         wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating
16  Prot|        evil?~Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.~
17  Prot|       things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?~Certainly,
18  Prot| participate in pleasure or create pleasure?~Certainly, he said.~Then
19  Prot|         question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.~According
20  Prot|        and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the
21  Prot|         opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you:
22  Prot|         overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps
23  Prot|          are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections
24  Prot|           call ‘being overcome by pleasure,’ and which they affirm
25  Prot|         called ‘being overcome by pleasure,’ pray, what is it, and
26  Prot|          termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen,
27  Prot|        that they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this.
28  Prot|        they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because
29  Prot|         give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?’—Would
30  Prot|        not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given
31  Prot|           except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert
32  Prot|         to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them
33  Prot|           do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain
34  Prot|          that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure
35  Prot|      pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it
36  Prot|     causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure
37  Prot|   pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some
38  Prot|          some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer
39  Prot|           expression ‘overcome by pleasure’; and the whole argument
40  Prot|       pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract.
41  Prot|         then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If
42  Prot|        evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences:—
43  Prot|        seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, when you say
44  Prot|         overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous
45  Prot|          not be able to reply ‘By pleasure,’ for the name of pleasure
46  Prot|        pleasure,’ for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that
47  Prot|           we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. ‘
48  Prot|           substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil,
49  Prot|         because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome.
50  Prot|         there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess
51  Prot|           Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future
52  Prot|        differs widely from future pleasure and pain’—To that I should
53  Prot|         differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no
54  Prot|           have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and
55  Prot|            and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage
56  Prot|      meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this?—tell us what
57  Prot|      meaning of being overcome by pleasure; —ignorance, and that the