Dialogue

  1 Intro|              we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish
  2 Intro|          says,~‘Hard is it to become good,’~and then reproaches Pittacus
  3 Intro|              said, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ How is this to be reconciled?
  4 Intro|          Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good
  5 Intro|             good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult
  6 Intro|            saying, ‘Hard is it to be good:’ and Simonides, who was
  7 Intro|            Pittacus; not ‘hard to be good,’ but ‘hard to become good.’
  8 Intro|           good,’ but ‘hard to become good.’ Socrates proceeds to argue
  9 Intro|            flute-girls, to come into good society. Men’s own thoughts
 10 Intro|             is in the highest degree good:—~The courageous are the
 11 Intro|             pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil?
 12 Intro|             that ‘some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,’ which
 13 Intro|               But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition
 14 Intro|      pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the
 15 Intro|              the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance.
 16 Intro|             form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure.
 17 Intro|           e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure—Plato is inconsistent
 18 Intro|             He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits
 19 Intro|           parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be,
 20 Intro|             is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false,
 21 Intro|   explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons; (
 22 Intro|           that ‘pleasure is the only good,’ Protagoras deems it more
 23 Intro|              some pleasures only are good;’ and admits that ‘he, above
 24 Intro|              the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere exchange of a
 25 Intro|        pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced.~
 26  Prot|           and do you bring any news?~Good news, he said; nothing but
 27  Prot|           news, he said; nothing but good.~Delightful, I said; but
 28  Prot|               I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too
 29  Prot|         which you commit yourself be good or evil.~I certainly think
 30  Prot|            to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you
 31  Prot|          than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends
 32  Prot|             understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely
 33  Prot|             friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken,
 34  Prot|        announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the
 35  Prot|         certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not
 36  Prot|             friends to hear us?~Very good, he said.~Suppose, said
 37  Prot|              you promise to make men good citizens?~That, Socrates,
 38  Prot|        instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet
 39  Prot|          never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger.
 40  Prot|            be taught. Will you be so good?~That I will, Socrates,
 41  Prot|              a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful
 42  Prot|          case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to
 43  Prot|        reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is
 44  Prot|              man is wanting in those good qualities which are attained
 45  Prot|             by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason
 46  Prot|               What is the reason why good men teach their sons the
 47  Prot|            what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught
 48  Prot|            And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened
 49  Prot|          which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the
 50  Prot|              why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill?
 51  Prot|           Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more
 52  Prot|           would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones?
 53  Prot|      flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn
 54  Prot|              of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players would
 55  Prot|           all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of
 56  Prot|          which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their
 57  Prot|             you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons,
 58  Prot|       fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers,
 59  Prot|            human care could make men good; but I know better now.
 60  Prot|       Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already
 61  Prot|         other.~And is there anything good?~There is.~To which the
 62  Prot|          admitted.~And temperance is good sense?~Yes.~And good sense
 63  Prot|              is good sense?~Yes.~And good sense is good counsel in
 64  Prot|               Yes.~And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?~
 65  Prot|            of goods?~Yes.~And is the good that which is expedient
 66  Prot|     inexpedient, and yet I call them good.~I thought that Protagoras
 67  Prot|          that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient
 68  Prot|           and do you call the latter good?~Certainly not the last,
 69  Prot|          example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the
 70  Prot|           that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of
 71  Prot|          hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands
 72  Prot|              think that the ode is a good composition, and true?~Yes,
 73  Prot|              true?~Yes, I said, both good and true.~But if there is
 74  Prot|               can the composition be good or true?~No, not in that
 75  Prot|             man: Hardly can a man be good’? Now you will observe that
 76  Prot|        Hardly can a man become truly good’; and then a little further
 77  Prot|           says, ‘Hardly can a man be good,’ which is the very same
 78  Prot|        Hardly can a man become truly good’?~Quite right, said Prodicus.~
 79  Prot|              hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be
 80  Prot|              but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus
 81  Prot|              hardly can a man become good, For the gods have made
 82  Prot|             of calling that which is good ‘awful’; and then he explains
 83  Prot|             for saying, ‘Hard is the good,’ just as if that were equivalent
 84  Prot|    equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.~Yes, he said, that was
 85  Prot|        surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards
 86  Prot|              he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation,
 87  Prot|              wise, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ And Simonides, who was
 88  Prot|              say only that to become good is hard, he inserted (Greek) ‘
 89  Prot|            on the one hand to become good is hard’); there would be
 90  Prot|             saying ‘Hard is it to be good,’ and he, in refutation
 91  Prot|               Pittacus, is to become good, not joining ‘truly’ with ‘
 92  Prot|            not joining ‘truly’ with ‘good,’ but with ‘hard.’ Not,
 93  Prot|            hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some
 94  Prot|         though there were some truly good men, and there were others
 95  Prot|           there were others who were good but not truly good (this
 96  Prot|              were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple
 97  Prot|          Pittacus, ‘hard is it to be good,’ and Simonides answers, ‘
 98  Prot|              difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to
 99  Prot|              the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and
100  Prot|             a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for
101  Prot|              time. But having become good, to remain in a good state
102  Prot|          become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you,
103  Prot|        remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm,
104  Prot|            or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another
105  Prot|        another poet witnesses:—~‘The good are sometimes good and sometimes
106  Prot|               The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.’~But
107  Prot|            saying, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ Now there is a difficulty
108  Prot|             a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible:
109  Prot|          this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility—~‘For
110  Prot|              he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill
111  Prot|            But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort
112  Prot|            sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the
113  Prot|             well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge
114  Prot|            and in the second place a good physician; for he may become
115  Prot|        physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated
116  Prot|            must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem
117  Prot|           man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become
118  Prot|               but that he may become good and may also become bad;
119  Prot|          under the impression that a good man might often compel himself
120  Prot|            may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings,
121  Prot|              fault).~‘All things are good with which evil is unmingled.’~
122  Prot|              say that all things are good which have no evil in them,
123  Prot|             But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good
124  Prot|           good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love
125  Prot|           spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame
126  Prot|           that you have given a very good explanation of the poem;
127  Prot| understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand,
128  Prot|           who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for
129  Prot|           the power of making others good—whereas you are not only
130  Prot|             whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause
131  Prot|          would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing
132  Prot|            be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself
133  Prot|         right mind.~And is it partly good and partly bad, I said,
134  Prot|        partly bad, I said, or wholly good?~Wholly good, and in the
135  Prot|               or wholly good?~Wholly good, and in the highest degree.~
136  Prot|              to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly
137  Prot|             said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.~And do you,
138  Prot|              and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed
139  Prot|      disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant,
140  Prot|             that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil.
141  Prot|        pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some
142  Prot|             painful things which are good, and some which are not
143  Prot|               and some which are not good, and that there are some
144  Prot|           are some which are neither good nor evil.~And you would
145  Prot|           they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply
146  Prot|             imply that pleasure is a good in itself.~According to
147  Prot|             proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then
148  Prot|           what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded
149  Prot|              knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything
150  Prot|             highest of human things.~Good, I said, and true. But are
151  Prot|           these the things which are good but painful?’—they would
152  Prot|        agreed.~‘And do you call them good because they occasion the
153  Prot|          assented.~‘Are these things good for any other reason except
154  Prot|              pain when you call them good?’—they would acknowledge
155  Prot|           pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?’~
156  Prot|            an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem
157  Prot|          about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater
158  Prot|          when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that
159  Prot|     explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure,
160  Prot|           you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end
161  Prot|      knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at
162  Prot|            pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two
163  Prot|            them by two names— first, good and evil, and then pleasant
164  Prot|           been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we
165  Prot|            he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply;
166  Prot|            because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because
167  Prot|             he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy
168  Prot|              he will reply, ‘can the good be unworthy of the evil,
169  Prot|             evil, or the evil of the good’? Is not the real explanation
170  Prot|              exchange for the lesser good?’ Admitted. And now substitute
171  Prot|             of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, not as
172  Prot|              you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a question:
173  Prot|          that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of
174  Prot|             that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And
175  Prot|              work is also useful and good?~This was admitted.~Then,
176  Prot|               if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under
177  Prot|              evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature;
178  Prot|         already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions
179  Prot|       actions we have admitted to be good.~That is true; and to that
180  Prot|             to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?~The
181  Prot|              he replied.~And what is good and honourable, I said,
182  Prot|              And if honourable, then good?~Yes.~But the fear and confidence