Dialogue

  1 Intro|            been wounded, and which may have taken place any time
  2 Intro|         Plato, that the Theaetetus may not have been all written
  3 Intro|  afterwards. Again, the Theaetetus may be connected with the Gorgias,
  4 Intro|          Schleiermacher); and both may be brought into relation
  5 Intro|       Socrates. The Philebus, too, may with equal reason be placed
  6 Intro|            language of Thrasyllus, may be called the Second Platonic
  7 Intro|        upon this view, the Sophist may be regarded as the answer
  8 Intro|          Any of these arrangements may suggest new views to the
  9 Intro|    Euclides’ house in Megara. This may have been a spot familiar
 10 Intro|            of the dialogue. Yet we may observe that Plato has himself
 11 Intro|             the invention of which may have been easily suggested
 12 Intro|          Corinth, in order that we may allow time for the completion
 13 Intro|           such a work (Muller). We may also remark that such a
 14 Intro|           chief respondent. But he may be fairly appealed to, when
 15 Intro|        Heraclitean fanatics, which may be compared with the dislike
 16 Intro|          his charge in the Laches, may be remarked by the way.
 17 Intro|          viz. that the philosopher may talk and write as he pleases.
 18 Intro|          reply that the perception may be true at any given instant.
 19 Intro|            in which this statement may be understood are set aside,
 20 Intro|      questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato had ‘
 21 Intro|      really too bad.’~The question may be raised, how far Plato
 22 Intro|       these persons, in whom Plato may perhaps have blended some
 23 Intro|             says Socrates, ‘that I may see in you, Theaetetus,
 24 Intro|            is a man of science, he may be a judge of our intellects.
 25 Intro|           our faces, and one of us may be hot and the other cold.
 26 Intro|           be formed; and the agent may become a patient, and the
 27 Intro|            serious objection which may be urged against this doctrine
 28 Intro|           as an instance:—Socrates may be ill or he may be well,—
 29 Intro|          Socrates may be ill or he may be well,—and remember that
 30 Intro|          friend Protagoras?’~‘What may that be?’~‘I like his doctrine
 31 Intro|     remember?’ ‘He does.’ ‘Then he may remember and not see; and
 32 Intro|           if seeing is knowing, he may remember and not know. Is
 33 Intro|            defence; and already he may be heard contemptuously
 34 Intro|      although I admit that one man may be a thousand times better
 35 Intro|           is no such thing; but he may be cured of the evil habit
 36 Intro|           place of Theaetetus, who may be wiser than many bearded
 37 Intro|            opposite. The multitude may not and do not agree in
 38 Intro|            him; like ourselves, he may be long or short, as he
 39 Intro|           twenty-fifth generation, may, if he pleases, add as many
 40 Intro|     philosopher and gentleman, who may be excused for not having
 41 Intro|           virtue in order that you may seem to be good. And yet
 42 Intro|           expedient, although this may be the intention of them.
 43 Intro|          as he ignorantly fancied, may be expected to fall down
 44 Intro|         possible?’ This difficulty may be stated as follows:—~Either
 45 Intro|         the path of knowledge. But may there not be ‘heterodoxy,’
 46 Intro|   transference of opinion;—I mean, may not one thing be supposed
 47 Intro|   inconceivable.~But perhaps there may still be a sense in which
 48 Intro|           we know: e.g. Theaetetus may know Socrates, but at a
 49 Intro|     Socrates, but at a distance he may mistake another person for
 50 Intro|       person for him. This process may be conceived by the help
 51 Intro|           must be excluded. But he may err when he confuses what
 52 Intro|          remarking, that knowledge may exist without perception,
 53 Intro|    perception without knowledge. I may know Theodorus and Theaetetus
 54 Intro|     Theaetetus and not see them; I may see them, and not know them. ‘
 55 Intro|        heart of a man’s soul, as I may say in the words of Homer,
 56 Intro|           the words ker and keros, may be smooth and deep, and
 57 Intro|           objection occurs to him:—May there not be errors where
 58 Intro|            in his thoughts, but he may err in the addition of five
 59 Intro|          are at our wit’s end, and may therefore be excused for
 60 Intro|           from ‘possessing.’ A man may possess a garment which
 61 Intro|            he does not wear; or he may have wild birds in an aviary;
 62 Intro|           for under this figure we may describe different forms
 63 Intro|           what we know, because we may know in one sense, i.e.
 64 Intro|           that in the aviary there may be flying about mock birds,
 65 Intro|       persuade them, and the judge may form a true opinion and
 66 Intro|            another alternative:—We may suppose that the syllable
 67 Intro|        parts. The all of the parts may not be the whole. Theaetetus
 68 Intro|           definition.’ Explanation may mean, (1) the reflection
 69 Intro|        anything is composed. A man may have a true opinion about
 70 Intro|            planks of Hesiod. Or he may know the syllables of the
 71 Intro|           But on the other hand he may know the syllable ‘The’
 72 Intro|            name Theaetetus, yet he may be mistaken about the same
 73 Intro|           right opinion. Yet there may be a third meaning of the
 74 Intro|         difference.~For example, I may see a man who has eyes,
 75 Intro|          from any other man. Or he may have a snub-nose and prominent
 76 Intro|           is sensible perception,’ may be assumed to be a current
 77 Intro|            same as perception.’ We may now examine these words,
 78 Intro|   inductive portion of any science may be small, as in mathematics
 79 Intro|            and scientific facts he may be absolutely assured. And
 80 Intro|        change in himself or others may be deemed a philosopher.
 81 Intro|            speculation, or that we may do good without caring about
 82 Intro|   Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the egkekalummenos (‘
 83 Intro|     account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two elements—
 84 Intro|           not necessary, for there may be degrees of knowledge;
 85 Intro|       degrees of knowledge; and we may know and have forgotten,
 86 Intro|          and have forgotten, or we may be learning, or we may have
 87 Intro|          we may be learning, or we may have a general but not a
 88 Intro|        particular knowledge, or we may know but not be able to
 89 Intro|      explain;’ and many other ways may be imagined in which we
 90 Intro|          and sense, and yet errors may often happen. Hence he is
 91 Intro|          be no longer in error. We may veil our difficulty under
 92 Intro|           for ever in language. It may or may not be a ‘gracious
 93 Intro|        ever in language. It may or may not be a ‘gracious aid’
 94 Intro|            begin with that; and we may afterwards proceed, with
 95 Intro|         cannot give knowledge, but may give true opinion. The rhetorician
 96 Intro|            act of violence, but he may truly persuade them of the
 97 Intro|          proposition.~The elements may be perceived by sense, but
 98 Intro|   universal and the false. Thought may be as much at fault as sight.
 99 Intro|           is that they can; for we may know a compound, which we
100 Intro|            the parts, when united, may be more than all the parts
101 Intro|           be knowledge. And yet we may observe, that there is in
102 Intro|  illustrations of the second head, may be cited the remark of Socrates,
103 Intro|          degrees in which the mind may enter into or be abstracted
104 Intro|           this separation or union may be supposed to occur. And
105 Intro|          tree, a human being. They may be conceived as of themselves
106 Intro|          exactly define, though it may be necessary, is a fertile
107 Intro|            an experience, which we may gather, if we will, from
108 Intro|           or attend to them. Or we may assist the analysis by attempting
109 Intro|            is to say, space, which may be explained in various
110 Intro|       figures by which space is or may be intersected are absolutely
111 Intro|     infinite or the infinitesimal, may be made the subject of reasoning
112 Intro|        conceiving itself. The mind may be indeed imagined to contain
113 Intro|            of our minds.~Again, we may compare the truths of space
114 Intro|          of the consequences which may be inferred from them. We
115 Intro|            in which this necessity may be explained. We have been
116 Intro|           various ways in which we may trace the connexion between
117 Intro|         connexion between them. We may think of space as unresisting
118 Intro|    rarefied into space. And motion may be conceived as the union
119 Intro|          more strictly, arithmetic may be said to be equally applicable
120 Intro|            in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato, ‘What
121 Intro|         conditions of sensation we may proceed to consider acts
122 Intro|         acts of seeing and hearing may be almost unconscious and
123 Intro|          be almost unconscious and may pass away unnoted; they
124 Intro|            pass away unnoted; they may also leave an impression
125 Intro|            The act of recollection may be compared to the sight
126 Intro|           recollection.~And now we may suppose that numerous images
127 Intro|     rudimentary imagination, which may be truly described in the
128 Intro|        sense,’ an expression which may be applied with equal truth
129 Intro| imperceptibly into one another. We may indeed distinguish between
130 Intro|    withdraws from the seen that it may dwell in the unseen. The
131 Intro|           hold in their hands’) we may further observe that they
132 Intro|         Returning to the senses we may briefly consider two questions—
133 Intro|         our impressions of hearing may be affected by those of
134 Intro|           our impressions of sight may be corrected by the touch,
135 Intro|            a famous philosophy. We may if we like, with Berkeley,
136 Intro|         whatever uncertainty there may be in the appearances of
137 Intro|          on the level of sense.~We may, if we please, carry this
138 Intro|          sensations themselves. We may say with Protagoras and
139 Intro|       hypothesis or outline, which may be filled up in many ways
140 Intro|  complicated to be ascertained. It may be compared to an irregular
141 Intro|           own or in any other age, may be accepted and continue
142 Intro|          long they will last? They may pass away, like the authors
143 Intro|           a wrack behind;’ or they may survive in fragments. Nor
144 Intro|       pretensions. The study of it may have done good service by
145 Intro|   familiarized by language, yet it may have fallen into still greater
146 Intro|           of new investigations it may be wasting the lives of
147 Intro|          who are engaged in it. It may also be found that the discussion
148 Intro|          us. The imaginary science may be called, in the language
149 Intro|          most naturally assume.~We may preface the enquiry by two
150 Intro|          few of these, though they may sometimes appear to be truisms,
151 Intro|         real part of knowledge and may be of great value in education.
152 Intro|       great value in education. We may be able to add a good deal
153 Intro|         our own experience, and we may verify them by it. Self-examination
154 Intro|            his individual mind. He may learn much about his own
155 Intro|           of view. But though they may have shaken the old, they
156 Intro|            statements and opinions may be obtained a nearer approach
157 Intro|          growth of the mind, which may be traced in the histories
158 Intro|        with the greater and, as it may be termed, the most sacred
159 Intro|           course of ages ‘that God may be all and in all.’ E pollaplasion,
160 Intro|        mind in a special sense, it may also be said that there
161 Intro|          the body; or better, they may be compared to instruments
162 Intro|           new Psychology, whatever may be its claim to the authority
163 Intro|        body at a glance. Yet there may be a glimpse round the corner,
164 Intro|     distinguished. The same remark may be made about figures of
165 Intro|         the progress of Physiology may throw a new light on Psychology
166 Intro|             But however certain we may be of the connexion between
167 Intro|   principal subjects of Psychology may be summed up as follows:—~
168 Intro|           distinct processes which may be described by the words, ‘
169 Intro|           appear and reappear, and may all be regarded as the ever-varying
170 Intro|           long-forgotten knowledge may be easily renewed and therefore
171 Intro|            in childhood not a word may be remembered, and yet,
172 Intro|      exists in various degrees. It may be imperceptible or hardly
173 Intro|          or hardly perceptible: it may be the living sense that
174 Intro|           is an illusion: as there may be a real freedom without
175 Intro|      consciousness of it, so there may be a consciousness of freedom
176 Intro|            without the reality. It may be regarded as a higher
177 Intro|      inattention, sleep, death. It may be illustrated by its derivative
178 Intro|  capricious and uncertain sort. It may be briefly described as
179 Intro|           sight or name of a house may recall to our minds the
180 Intro|         who once lived there. Like may recall like and everything
181 Intro|       together in the mind. A word may bring back a passage of
182 Intro|           one pole of knowledge we may travel to the other in an
183 Intro|    noticeable that the new thought may occur to us, we cannot tell
184 Intro|           one to the other. Yet it may be true of this, as of other
185 Intro|           that some numerical laws may be found to have a place
186 Intro|           is or has in it harmony’ may in some degree be realized.
187 Intro|            can discover, or nature may have rebelled against the
188  Thea|           is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced
189  Thea|          EUCLID: And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.~
190  Thea|            personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all
191  Thea|        Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself
192  Thea|         blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not,
193  Thea|          and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other
194  Thea|   instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each
195  Thea|   THEAETETUS: Clearly.~SOCRATES: I may add, that breathless calm,
196  Thea|        height and taller than you, may within a year, without gaining
197  Thea|       stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured
198  Thea|            after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that
199  Thea|            them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your
200  Thea|      considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and
201  Thea|         easily raised, since there may even be a doubt whether
202  Thea|           Most true.~SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of
203  Thea|           is the child, however he may turn out, which you and
204  Thea|           inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge
205  Thea|   knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know,
206  Thea|      commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater
207  Thea|      acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same
208  Thea|         non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better
209  Thea|         firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow
210  Thea|       argument, or if you like you may put questions to me—a method
211  Thea|            dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as
212  Thea|       philosophy, in order that he may become different from what
213  Thea|        from any argument which you may weave for him. But I am
214  Thea|          is not here, and some one may accuse us of speaking without
215  Thea|          meaning, for a great deal may be at stake?~THEODORUS:
216  Thea|          not.~SOCRATES: And he, as may be inferred from his writings,
217  Thea|      Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser
218  Thea|            the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one
219  Thea|        hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the
220  Thea|         merely in order that a man may seem to be good, which is
221  Thea|            true.~SOCRATES: Then we may fairly argue against your
222  Thea|       opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is
223  Thea|      nonsense about them; for they may be unassailable, and those
224  Thea|          are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which
225  Thea|       openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them,
226  Thea|         addition to my own, that I may err, if I must err, in your
227  Thea|        undergoes any other change, may not this be properly called
228  Thea|             I suspect that quality may appear a strange and uncouth
229  Thea|            Of course.~SOCRATES: We may leave the details of their
230  Thea|      subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is
231  Thea|          as in Homeric language he may be called;—him I should
232  Thea|            And I am afraid that we may not understand his words,
233  Thea|          understand his words, and may be still further from understanding
234  Thea|         subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by
235  Thea|           knowledge, because there may be a false opinion; but
236  Thea|        discussions of this kind we may take our own time?~SOCRATES:
237  Thea|        What do you mean?~SOCRATES: May we not suspect the simple
238  Thea|         whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?~
239  Thea|       Certainly not.~SOCRATES: But may not the following be the
240  Thea|        THEAETETUS: What?~SOCRATES: May we not suppose that false
241  Thea|            of heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his
242  Thea|            aim of his thoughts, he may be truly said to have false
243  Thea|         and get away from them, we may regard them only as the
244  Thea|      suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a
245  Thea|   assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favourable
246  Thea|         another form, which may or may not have a favourable issue;
247  Thea|           right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one
248  Thea|          THEAETETUS: Certainly you may.~SOCRATES: And another and
249  Thea|            which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise
250  Thea|            they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you better;
251  Thea|            you.~SOCRATES: A person may think that some things which
252  Thea|         time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them
253  Thea|           to understand that a man may or may not perceive sensibly
254  Thea|       understand that a man may or may not perceive sensibly that
255  Thea|          we now say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both,
256  Thea|        that.~SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false
257  Thea|          should say that a mistake may very likely arise between
258  Thea|           not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;—
259  Thea|           I think that the attempt may be worth making.~THEAETETUS:
260  Thea|            SOCRATES: Perhaps there may be no difference; but still
261  Thea|          to hear my view, that you may help me to test it.~THEAETETUS:
262  Thea|    possessing’: for example, a man may buy and keep under his control
263  Thea|        expression.~SOCRATES: Well, may not a man ‘possess’ and
264  Thea|        which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught
265  Thea|          the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases.~
266  Thea|            to follow?~SOCRATES: We may suppose that the birds are
267  Thea|            a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have learned
268  Thea|          when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and
269  Thea|            the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know them.~THEAETETUS:
270  Thea|      THEAETETUS: I have.~SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image
271  Thea|       known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the
272  Thea|           we care nothing?—any one may twist and turn the words ‘
273  Thea|        that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about
274  Thea|           opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not
275  Thea|        thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties
276  Thea|          well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness
277  Thea|  THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making
278  Thea|       foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he
279  Thea|          forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which
280  Thea|          rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly
281  Thea|         perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been
282  Thea|            Exactly.~SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that
283  Thea|           nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be
284  Thea|   THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.~SOCRATES:
285  Thea|           first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one’s thought
286  Thea|    SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing
287  Thea|          your name?~THEAETETUS: He may.~SOCRATES: And in that case,
288  Thea| explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will
289  Thea|         such a requirement; and we may be truly described as the
290  Thea|     already have, in order that we may learn what we already think,