Dialogue

  1 Intro|          the dialogue. He is the true prophet who has an insight
  2 Intro|         the conventional and the true.~The greater part of the
  3 Intro|       that the perception may be true at any given instant. But
  4 Intro| expedient,’ if not ‘the just and true,’ belongs to the sphere
  5 Intro|   replies (2) that ‘knowledge is true opinion.’ But how is false
  6 Intro|  knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion; for the Athenian
  7 Intro|        the Athenian dicasts have true opinion but not knowledge.
  8 Intro|       knowledge? We answer (3), ‘True opinion, with definition
  9 Intro|       which are conceived in the true spirit of philosophy. And
 10 Intro|          Socrates, who, if he is true to his character, cannot
 11 Intro|          distinguish between the true and false analogy, and allow
 12 Intro|     great man if he lived.’ ‘How true that has been; how like
 13 Intro|        as Euripides would say?’ ‘True.’ ‘The thoroughbred Sophists,
 14 Intro|          distinguish between the true and the false in such cases?
 15 Intro|            My sensation alone is true, and true to me only. And
 16 Intro|     sensation alone is true, and true to me only. And therefore,
 17 Intro|         if sensations are always true, and one man’s discernment
 18 Intro|      that he judges is right and true, then what need of Protagoras
 19 Intro|        seeing perceiving?’ ‘Very true.’ ‘And he who sees knows?’ ‘
 20 Intro|        he sees and knows?’ ‘Very true.’ ‘But if he closes his
 21 Intro|      objects that Callias is the true guardian, but he hopes that
 22 Intro|   impressions of the sick are as true as the impressions of the
 23 Intro|   suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has
 24 Intro|     truly; and his truth will be true neither to himself nor to
 25 Intro|          his feet. ‘That is very true, Socrates.’ But when he
 26 Intro|         to become holy, just and true. But many live in the old
 27 Intro|        we say that ‘Knowledge is true opinion’? But still an old
 28 Intro| confident that this must be ‘the true falsehood,’ when a man puts
 29 Intro|          paradoxical expression ‘true falsehood,’ but passes on.
 30 Intro|        using them?’ Nay, but the true hero of dialectic would
 31 Intro|        repeats that knowledge is true opinion. But this seems
 32 Intro|       the orator cannot convey a true knowledge of crimes at which
 33 Intro|         and the judge may form a true opinion and truly judge.
 34 Intro|          and truly judge. But if true opinion were knowledge they
 35 Intro|          has heard: Knowledge is true opinion accompanied by definition
 36 Intro|       composed. A man may have a true opinion about a waggon,
 37 Intro|        is neither perception nor true opinion, nor yet definition
 38 Intro|          definition accompanying true opinion. And I have shown
 39 Intro|     sensible perception, nor any true word by which that or anything
 40 Intro|     could not at once define the true and pass beyond into the
 41 Intro|   examination of opinion.~But is true opinion really distinct
 42 Intro| unsatisfactory. The existence of true opinion is proved by the
 43 Intro|          knowledge, but may give true opinion. The rhetorician
 44 Intro|         an act. Here the idea of true opinion seems to be a right
 45 Intro|       better if he had said that true opinion was a contradiction
 46 Intro|  proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with definite or
 47 Intro|           The difference between true and false opinion is not
 48 Intro|       universal, but between the true universal and the false.
 49 Intro|        contingent matter. But no true idea of the nature of either
 50 Intro|         nothing to do with their true nature. They are universal
 51 Intro|       intersected are absolutely true in all their combinations
 52 Intro|          that we can only have a true idea of ourselves when we
 53 Intro| speculations arises out of their true nature not being perceived.
 54 Intro|         what limitations is this true? For we cannot use our senses
 55 Intro|           whether it has had any true growth is more doubtful.
 56 Intro|       Yet facts which are partly true gather around this fiction
 57 Intro|          to treat, first, of the true bases of Psychology; secondly,
 58 Intro|    cannot be all of them equally true (compare Cratylus). Yet
 59 Intro|      from within the mind in its true proportions. Hence the firmer
 60 Intro|         the other. Yet it may be true of this, as of other beginnings
 61  Thea|         if not, not?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And if this supposed
 62  Thea|        himself.~THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.~SOCRATES: Then
 63  Thea|        the two arts?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: But that, Theaetetus,
 64  Thea|       this or that.’~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Moreover, he
 65  Thea|       the praise be any the less true?~THEAETETUS: Certainly not.~
 66  Thea|       your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as
 67  Thea|         is not?~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: And by the use
 68  Thea|    unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true
 69  Thea|         true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker.~THEAETETUS:
 70  Thea|      then the discernment of the true and false birth would be
 71  Thea|        false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives,
 72  Thea|          and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg:—
 73  Thea|          cold?~THEAETETUS: Quite true.~SOCRATES: Now is the wind,
 74  Thea|          perceives.’~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Then appearing
 75  Thea|        and exercise?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And what of the
 76  Thea|         has learned?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Then motion is
 77  Thea|           Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly
 78  Thea|       contrary?~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose
 79  Thea|      anomotos.)~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: The thoroughbred
 80  Thea|      equality.~THEAETETUS: Quite true.~SOCRATES: Thirdly, that
 81  Thea| Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature
 82  Thea|      coloured white. And this is true of all sensible objects,
 83  Thea|        appears.~THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.~SOCRATES: But
 84  Thea|        our minds at the time are true; and during one half of
 85  Thea|        of both.~THEAETETUS: Most true.~SOCRATES: And may not the
 86  Thea|       which of these opinions is true?~THEAETETUS: I do not think
 87  Thea|        to be unlike?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: If, then, anything
 88  Thea|      pleasant to me?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: For, as has been
 89  Thea|          percipient?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: There is no other
 90  Thea|    become different.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Neither can I
 91  Thea|     conclusion.~THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.~SOCRATES: Then,
 92  Thea|  SOCRATES: Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable
 93  Thea| determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we
 94  Thea|     everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend,
 95  Thea|          perception?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And if our recent
 96  Thea|         he has seen?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And if he closed
 97  Thea|         longer sees.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And seeing is
 98  Thea|    not-knowing?~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: Then the inference
 99  Thea|    supposition.~THEAETETUS: Most true.~SOCRATES: Thus, then, the
100  Thea|          perception.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And yet, my friend,
101  Thea|        feels; and this is always true. But as the inferior habit
102  Thea|     which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better,
103  Thea|       healthy sensations—aye and true ones; and the wise and good
104  Thea|        we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams, or
105  Thea|          others.~THEODORUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: Had Protagoras
106  Thea|          be at stake?~THEODORUS: True.~SOCRATES: Then let us obtain,
107  Thea|         is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to
108  Thea|       opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes
109  Thea|        always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In
110  Thea|          opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and
111  Thea|       always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For
112  Thea|         own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion
113  Thea|          he argues, that this is true to you. Now, if so, you
114  Thea|       judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not
115  Thea|    assert that what you think is true to you and false to the
116  Thea|        Protagoras wrote would be true to no one? But if you suppose
117  Thea|        truth is more untrue than true.~THEODORUS: That would follow
118  Thea|          opinions of all men are true.~THEODORUS: Certainly.~SOCRATES:
119  Thea|     those who think him false is true?~THEODORUS: Of course.~SOCRATES:
120  Thea|        that this opinion is also true.~THEODORUS: Clearly.~SOCRATES:
121  Thea|         that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say,
122  Thea|          doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any
123  Thea|         what appears to us to be true. And one thing which no
124  Thea|       leisure.~SOCRATES: That is true, and your remark recalls
125  Thea|          do, and what you say is true.~SOCRATES: And thus, my
126  Thea|          THEODORUS: That is very true, Socrates.~SOCRATES: But,
127  Thea|        discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived
128  Thea|          him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man, and
129  Thea|     manhood. For to know this is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance
130  Thea|          idiots.~THEODORUS: Very true, Socrates.~SOCRATES: Too
131  Thea|          Socrates.~SOCRATES: Too true, my friend, as I well know;
132  Thea|          future.~THEODORUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: Suppose now,
133  Thea|         he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so?~
134  Thea|      interests?~THEODORUS: Quite true.~SOCRATES: Then we may fairly
135  Thea|          opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there
136  Thea|          motion?~THEODORUS: Most true.~SOCRATES: Consider a further
137  Thea|          saying.~THEODORUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: Then when we
138  Thea|        of rest.~THEODORUS: Quite true.~SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus,
139  Thea|        assert, that knowledge is true opinion: let this then be
140  Thea|        two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and
141  Thea|       define knowledge to be the true?~THEAETETUS: Yes, according
142  Thea|      holds a false and another a true opinion, as though there
143  Thea|       excluded.~THEAETETUS: Most true.~SOCRATES: Suppose that
144  Thea|       when he thinks what is not true.’—That will be our answer?~
145  Thea|        THEAETETUS: That again is true.~SOCRATES: And does not
146  Thea|          as another?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: But must not
147  Thea|        is the other?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Neither, if he
148  Thea|        is the other?~THEAETETUS: True; for we should have to suppose
149  Thea|       which we know?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Let us make the
150  Thea|       own mind.~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: Then, first of
151  Thea|      which he knows.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And that which
152  Thea|         THEAETETUS: That is also true.~SOCRATES: See whether you
153  Thea|         do not know.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: In the third
154  Thea|       case supposed.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: But there was
155  Thea|          and becomes alternately true and false;—true when the
156  Thea|      alternately true and false;—true when the seals and impressions
157  Thea|    liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have
158  Thea|      Certainly.~SOCRATES: And of true opinion also?~THEAETETUS:
159  Thea|      same time.~THEAETETUS: Most true.~SOCRATES: Then false opinion
160  Thea|         be different if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O
161  Thea|          knowledge.’~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: I should like
162  Thea|          he pleases.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Once more, then,
163  Thea|         in his mind?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And he can reckon
164  Thea|     amounts to?~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: And so he appears
165  Thea|         in his mind.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: That was my reason
166  Thea|      what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the
167  Thea|    opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about
168  Thea|        think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that
169  Thea|   Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion
170  Thea|          to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring,
171  Thea|          light.~THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try.~
172  Thea|        from report they attain a true opinion about them, they
173  Thea|         And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and
174  Thea|       forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason,
175  Thea|           and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore,
176  Thea|     therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without
177  Thea|          allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition
178  Thea|        apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is
179  Thea|      from them.~THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion
180  Thea|         all the six?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Again, in speaking
181  Thea|        entire thing?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And the number
182  Thea|          is the all?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Then the whole
183  Thea|     other parts.~SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore,
184  Thea|    indivisible form?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: But do you remember,
185  Thea|        as the whole?~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: But if it be
186  Thea|       position.~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: And is the education
187  Thea|      from knowledge.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore,
188  Thea|          your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge;
189  Thea|    attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration
190  Thea|          way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon;
191  Thea|          rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of
192  Thea|         explanation.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Then, my friend,
193  Thea|        maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational
194  Thea|      will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to
195  Thea|          difference.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: But when I had
196  Thea|          to another.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: Tell me, now—
197  Thea|      re-called?~THEAETETUS: Most true.~SOCRATES: Then right opinion
198  Thea|   acquire knowledge.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES: And so, when
199  Thea|     THEAETETUS: That seems to be true.~SOCRATES: But how utterly
200  Thea|         is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition
201  Thea|        accompanying and added to true opinion?~THEAETETUS: I suppose
202  Thea|    bringing up?~THEAETETUS: Very true.~SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus,