Dialogue

 1 Intro|    containing an analysis of the real and apparent (Schleiermacher);
 2 Intro|         Megarian philosophy. The real intention of the preface
 3 Intro|      doubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose name survived
 4 Intro|         to think that there is a real change, both in the characters
 5 Intro|      Socrates of Plato, with the real person.~Returning then to
 6 Intro|        to be found; ‘he told the real truth’ (not in the book,
 7 Intro|         precise line between his real sentiments and those which
 8 Intro|          distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom.
 9 Intro|        but they are not the less real for that. He has no intention
10 Intro|       into the world at one time real children and at another
11 Intro|        the fancies of madmen are real at the time. But if knowledge
12 Intro|      multitude, can never be the real foundation of a system of
13 Intro|        letters’? For there is no real resemblance between the
14 Intro|        easily takes the place of real knowledge.~Again, there
15 Intro|     division by lines or points, real or imaginary. By the help
16 Intro|   supports, specious rather than real. It is partly sustained
17 Intro|          to the body: (d) of the real, though not unlimited, freedom
18 Intro|         sense of the word, are a real part of knowledge and may
19 Intro|        minds of individuals. The real Psychology is that which
20 Intro| processes of the mind, there are real differences corresponding
21 Intro|       education. But this is the real question. We cannot pursue
22 Intro|      illusion: as there may be a real freedom without consciousness
23  Thea|       into the world at one time real children, and at another
24  Thea|      anything invisible can have real existence.~THEAETETUS: Yes,
25  Thea|          is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore,
26  Thea|         Protagoras’ Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher
27  Thea|      knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and
28  Thea|          and would not touch the real question—it would be a mockery,
29  Thea|       his mind, and say that one real object is another real object.
30  Thea|       one real object is another real object. For thus he always