Dialogue

 1 Intro|          proposes: ‘Knowledge is sensible perception.’ This is speedily
 2 Intro|    detained even for an instant? Sensible perception, like everything
 3 Intro|         other, ‘All knowledge is sensible perception’? (b) Would he
 4 Intro|     hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet perhaps
 5 Intro|         these in his soul, and a sensible impression of neither; or
 6 Intro|   Theaetetus, that ‘Knowledge is sensible perception,’ may be assumed
 7 Intro|        of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato
 8 Intro|        theory that ‘Knowledge is sensible perception’ is the antithesis
 9 Intro|        But he has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato
10 Intro|         at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor any true
11 Intro| knowledge is something more than sensible perception;—this alone would
12 Intro|       philosophy, applied to the sensible world, and again used in
13 Intro|          is no connexion between sensible appearance and probability,
14 Intro|  thinkers, amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed
15 Intro|    weaker in the recollection of sensible impressions as they are
16 Intro|         looking or listening the sensible impression prevails over
17  Thea|          And this is true of all sensible objects, hard, warm, and
18  Thea|      which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things,
19  Thea|     seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both, I fail