Dialogue

  1 Intro|       every conceivable theory of knowledge.~The direct indications
  2 Intro|       enquiry about the nature of knowledge is not new to him; long
  3 Intro|           a similar expression of knowledge in the abstract. Yet at
  4 Intro|        discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance with the
  5 Intro|        enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which is interrupted by
  6 Intro|         successive conceptions of knowledge are extracted from Theaetetus,
  7 Intro|          higher life. The idea of knowledge, although hard to be defined,
  8 Intro|  philosopher,—between opinion and knowledge,—between the conventional
  9 Intro|        definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower
 10 Intro|          confusion of the idea of knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge,—
 11 Intro|   knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge,—a confusion which has been
 12 Intro|       filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of definition
 13 Intro|       which Theaetetus proposes: ‘Knowledge is sensible perception.’
 14 Intro|         as good as another in his knowledge of the future; and ‘the
 15 Intro|           must ask again, What is knowledge? The comparison of sensations
 16 Intro|          are thus led to look for knowledge in a higher sphere, and
 17 Intro|   interrogated, replies (2) that ‘knowledge is true opinion.’ But how
 18 Intro|      opinion before we have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true
 19 Intro|         have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion; for
 20 Intro|         have true opinion but not knowledge. What then is knowledge?
 21 Intro|           knowledge. What then is knowledge? We answer (3), ‘True opinion,
 22 Intro|     things,’ with the other, ‘All knowledge is sensible perception’? (
 23 Intro|           based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (
 24 Intro|           say anything of his own knowledge, is increased by the circumstance
 25 Intro|         conceived a definition of knowledge to be impossible. But this
 26 Intro|           had outrun the means of knowledge; and through a spurious
 27 Intro|        severer logic, were making knowledge impossible (compare Theaet.).
 28 Intro|           out of them a theory of knowledge. The time at which such
 29 Intro|      unravel the whole subject of knowledge, if this had been possible;
 30 Intro|           rejects explanations of knowledge which have germs of truth
 31 Intro|      eagerness, he asks, ‘What is knowledge?’ Theodorus is too old to
 32 Intro|          Theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of Theodorus,
 33 Intro|          there are other kinds of knowledge— shoemaking, carpentering,
 34 Intro|       enumerated several kinds of knowledge, he has not explained the
 35 Intro|         to extend to all kinds of knowledge the same process of generalization
 36 Intro|           a similar conception of knowledge, though he has often tried;
 37 Intro|          my old question—“What is knowledge?” Take courage, and by the
 38 Intro|      answer.’ ‘My answer is, that knowledge is perception.’ ‘That is
 39 Intro|          real at the time. But if knowledge is perception, how can we
 40 Intro|      doctrine of Theaetetus that “Knowledge is perception,” have all
 41 Intro|            of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception?
 42 Intro|          ambush, and transfers to knowledge the terms which are commonly
 43 Intro|           a sharp and also a dull knowledge. While you are wondering
 44 Intro|         greater truth or superior knowledge. For the impressions of
 45 Intro|           other that they have no knowledge. We must trust to ourselves,
 46 Intro|         by asserting further that knowledge is and is not sensation;
 47 Intro|   Theaetetus of his conception of knowledge.) He proceeds to interrogate
 48 Intro|       further. When he says that ‘knowledge is in perception,’ with
 49 Intro|         therefore has no share in knowledge. But if so, knowledge is
 50 Intro|          in knowledge. But if so, knowledge is not perception. What
 51 Intro|          perception. What then is knowledge? The mind, when occupied
 52 Intro|        opinion—shall we say that ‘Knowledge is true opinion’? But still
 53 Intro|            as well as the path of knowledge. But may there not be ‘heterodoxy,’
 54 Intro|           or has no perception or knowledge of either—all these cases
 55 Intro|      first of all remarking, that knowledge may exist without perception,
 56 Intro|            and perception without knowledge. I may know Theodorus and
 57 Intro|         error when perception and knowledge correspond.~The waxen block
 58 Intro|           yet we do not know what knowledge is. ‘Why, Socrates, how
 59 Intro|            to have and to possess knowledge, and I distinguish ‘having’
 60 Intro|       describe different forms of knowledge;—there are some of them
 61 Intro|          exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion?
 62 Intro|         we are intending to grasp knowledge. But how can he who knows
 63 Intro|         he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance
 64 Intro|          there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them?
 65 Intro|          without having explained knowledge. What then is knowledge?
 66 Intro|           knowledge. What then is knowledge? Theaetetus repeats that
 67 Intro|           Theaetetus repeats that knowledge is true opinion. But this
 68 Intro|       orator cannot convey a true knowledge of crimes at which the judges
 69 Intro|          But if true opinion were knowledge they could not have judged
 70 Intro|           not have judged without knowledge.~Once more. Theaetetus offers
 71 Intro|    definition which he has heard: Knowledge is true opinion accompanied
 72 Intro|           of the statement, that ‘Knowledge is right opinion, accompanied
 73 Intro|       then, and then only, has he knowledge of a waggon when he is able
 74 Intro|       both can he be said to have knowledge as well as opinion. But
 75 Intro|        sign of difference, I have knowledge. But have I knowledge or
 76 Intro|        have knowledge. But have I knowledge or opinion of this difference;
 77 Intro|           only opinion I have not knowledge; if I have knowledge we
 78 Intro|          not knowledge; if I have knowledge we assume a disputed term;
 79 Intro|       assume a disputed term; for knowledge will have to be defined
 80 Intro|     defined as right opinion with knowledge of difference.~And so, Theaetetus,
 81 Intro|   difference.~And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor
 82 Intro|         all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? If you have
 83 Intro|       saying of Theaetetus, that ‘Knowledge is sensible perception,’
 84 Intro|          of Empedocles, ‘affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.’
 85 Intro|          or not.~The theory that ‘Knowledge is sensible perception’
 86 Intro|  antithesis of that which derives knowledge from the mind (Theaet.),
 87 Intro|            Thus the doctrine that knowledge is perception supplies or
 88 Intro|          the parallel axiom, ‘All knowledge is experience.’ He means
 89 Intro|          II. The saying that ‘All knowledge is sensation’ is identified
 90 Intro|          assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? Or did
 91 Intro|  distinguished; the relativity of knowledge has been sometimes confounded
 92 Intro|      individual. In the same way, knowledge appears to be a body of
 93 Intro|          of relation.~But because knowledge is subjective or relative
 94 Intro|     measure of the proportions of knowledge. The nature of testimony
 95 Intro|           being dependent for his knowledge on others. But still this
 96 Intro|          truth.~The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was
 97 Intro|       Cynics, again, he discarded knowledge in any higher sense than
 98 Intro|          to forget, the immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies
 99 Intro|   disproved the existence both of knowledge and sensation. But I am
100 Intro|           common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by unintelligible
101 Intro|       there remains a truth, that knowledge is something more than sensible
102 Intro|     acquiring them, in the words ‘Knowledge consists not in the feelings
103 Intro|       rejected the doctrine that ‘Knowledge is perception,’ we now proceed
104 Intro|          look for a definition of knowledge in the sphere of opinion.
105 Intro|           there may be degrees of knowledge; and we may know and have
106 Intro|      general but not a particular knowledge, or we may know but not
107 Intro|       seeks for the definition of knowledge first in the sphere of opinion.
108 Intro|          that we should return to knowledge, and begin with that; and
109 Intro|      opinion really distinct from knowledge? The difference between
110 Intro|         courts, which cannot give knowledge, but may give true opinion.
111 Intro|         conclusion from imperfect knowledge. But the correctness of
112 Intro|           the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Theaetetus,
113 Intro|      Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with definite
114 Intro|          of those who assert that knowledge first begins with a proposition.~
115 Intro|       sense become the subject of knowledge when they are regarded as
116 Intro|           attributes, this is not knowledge, but a very rudimentary
117 Intro|     explain the new definition of knowledge still remain to be considered.
118 Intro|   therefore mere speech cannot be knowledge. And yet we may observe,
119 Intro|        attain to the certainty of knowledge. Plato does not mention
120 Intro|        satisfactory grounds, that knowledge must be distinguished from
121 Intro|          and in certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or
122 Intro|          having’ and ‘possessing’ knowledge, in which the answer to
123 Intro|        but objects of will and of knowledge which we contrast with them.
124 Intro|           takes the place of real knowledge.~Again, there is the illusion
125 Intro|    perceiving. But when the word ‘knowledge’ was found how was it to
126 Intro|        all things,’ and that ‘All knowledge is perception.’ This was
127 Intro|       they began to be aware that knowledge was neither sense, nor yet
128 Intro|          signification it was the knowledge, not of men, but of gods,
129 Intro|          higher philosophy to be ‘Knowledge of being or essence,’— words
130 Intro|          objects. Any pretence of knowledge which went beyond them implied
131 Intro|    Admitting that, like all other knowledge, they are derived from experience,
132 Intro|          our own the materials of knowledge. Regarded in any other point
133 Intro|         system and order into the knowledge of our being; and yet, like
134 Intro|          the limits of our actual knowledge on a subject which has given
135 Intro| deficiency of certain branches of knowledge; when science is able to
136 Intro|       thought, or affirm that all knowledge is derived from experience
137 Intro|           this first principle of knowledge is prior to experience.
138 Intro|      nature of reflection. As our knowledge increases, our perception
139 Intro|          should the doctrine that knowledge is sensation, in ancient
140 Intro|          the nature and origin of knowledge appear to be wholly disconnected
141 Intro|          the higher conception of knowledge. It is Protagoras who is
142 Intro|          one maintaining that all knowledge is sensation; the other
143 Intro|       examined.~By those who rest knowledge immediately upon sense,
144 Intro|           is nearest to sense. As knowledge is reduced to sensation,
145 Intro|        the narrower view of human knowledge. It seeks to fly but cannot:
146 Intro|           Why the theory that all knowledge is sensation is allied to
147 Intro|        conception of the mind, of knowledge, of conscience, of moral
148 Intro|          and disappointed. In our knowledge of them the gulf remains
149 Intro|        many imaginary subjects of knowledge of which enthusiastic persons
150 Intro|         there is a weary waste of knowledge, falsely so-called. There
151 Intro|           in which the desire for knowledge invents the materials of
152 Intro|          word, are a real part of knowledge and may be of great value
153 Intro|      adapted to new conditions of knowledge. It seeks to isolate itself
154 Intro|          with our own.~c. But the knowledge of the mind is not to any
155 Intro|          accurately defined man’s knowledge of himself and of the world.
156 Intro|          any detailed or accurate knowledge. Later arises the reflection
157 Intro|          shows how the increasing knowledge of nature and the increasing
158 Intro|        does not contribute to our knowledge of it. The methods of science
159 Intro|         it from other branches of knowledge.~a. First, we observe the
160 Intro|       They fill up the vacancy of knowledge; they are to the mind what
161 Intro|            Conscience, Will, Law, Knowledge, Internal and External Sense;
162 Intro|         other great source of our knowledge of the mind, the observation
163 Intro|           It is however a kind of knowledge which has a great interest
164 Intro|     experiment upon them, and the knowledge thus acquired is not easily
165 Intro|      comes back to us, not as new knowledge, but as a thing to which
166 Intro|      recover it. A long-forgotten knowledge may be easily renewed and
167 Intro|    regarded as a higher degree of knowledge when we not only know but
168 Intro|         world or from one pole of knowledge we may travel to the other
169 Intro|          not a connected unity of knowledge. Compared with the wealth
170 Intro|         as of other beginnings of knowledge, that the attempt to put
171 Intro|           faculties, the unity of knowledge, the unity of God and law.
172 Intro|          important element in our knowledge of it. It is not impossible
173 Intro|         of much importance to our knowledge of the mind from the investigations
174  Thea|       successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full
175  Thea|         different in any way from knowledge?~THEAETETUS: What?~SOCRATES:
176  Thea|         SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?~THEAETETUS:
177  Thea|           my satisfaction—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question?
178  Thea|           say what you think that knowledge is.~THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates,
179  Thea|        you just now mentioned—are knowledge; and I would include the
180  Thea|        each and all of, them, are knowledge.~SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus,
181  Thea|      wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not
182  Thea|          not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of
183  Thea|           or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of
184  Thea|          is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the
185  Thea|         the question is, ‘What is knowledge?’ and he replies, ‘A knowledge
186  Thea|    knowledge?’ and he replies, ‘A knowledge of this or that.’~THEAETETUS:
187  Thea|        you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear
188  Thea|        discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just
189  Thea|      ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.~
190  Thea|           bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.~THEAETETUS:
191  Thea|  matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely
192  Thea|         my old question, ‘What is knowledge?’—and do not say that you
193  Thea|          as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.~SOCRATES:
194  Thea|       mere wind-egg:—You say that knowledge is perception?~THEAETETUS:
195  Thea|          important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion
196  Thea|  existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?~THEAETETUS:
197  Thea|          can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to
198  Thea|           right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and
199  Thea|           premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus,
200  Thea|          is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point
201  Thea|          perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.~
202  Thea|           But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers,
203  Thea|         man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may
204  Thea|          then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one,
205  Thea|           begin, and ask ‘What is knowledge?’ and yet, Theaetetus, what
206  Thea|         also, who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception.~
207  Thea|           a sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know
208  Thea|           position, that sense is knowledge, he would have made an assault
209  Thea|         you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same
210  Thea|         and the other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed
211  Thea|        because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of
212  Thea|           creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health
213  Thea|          that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right;
214  Thea|         identified perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw
215  Thea|       SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus
216  Thea|        when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what
217  Thea|          no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?~
218  Thea|        knowledge than what is not knowledge?~THEODORUS: I suppose not.~
219  Thea|         neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly
220  Thea|           fear that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject
221  Thea|       shade the other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the
222  Thea|          of his conceptions about knowledge.~THEAETETUS: Very well;
223  Thea|        subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?~THEAETETUS:
224  Thea|         truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?~THEAETETUS:
225  Thea|         He cannot.~SOCRATES: Then knowledge does not consist in impressions
226  Thea|       therefore not in science or knowledge?~THEAETETUS: No.~SOCRATES:
227  Thea|          can never be the same as knowledge or science?~THEAETETUS:
228  Thea|        Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most distinctly
229  Thea|           to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not;
230  Thea|         for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but
231  Thea|         and once more say what is knowledge.~THEAETETUS: I cannot say,
232  Thea|     Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a
233  Thea|           venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion: let this
234  Thea|          false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?~THEAETETUS:
235  Thea|         the sphere of being or of knowledge?~THEAETETUS: Certainly not.~
236  Thea|            when a person has this knowledge, and is considering something
237  Thea|         but not the other, and my knowledge of him does not accord with
238  Thea|         perceives one of you, his knowledge coincides with his perception,
239  Thea|      knows and perceives, and the knowledge of whom coincides with his
240  Thea|           to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.~
241  Thea|           has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed
242  Thea|          when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the
243  Thea|       have or have not science or knowledge,’ as if we could understand
244  Thea|          we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment we are
245  Thea|      employ them when deprived of knowledge or science.~THEAETETUS:
246  Thea|         know’ as meaning ‘to have knowledge.’~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES:
247  Thea|      change, and say ‘to possess’ knowledge.~THEAETETUS: How do the
248  Thea|       possess’ and yet not ‘have’ knowledge in the sense of which I
249  Thea|       that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that when we were children,
250  Thea|           the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have
251  Thea|       which is the subject of the knowledge: and this is to know.~THEAETETUS:
252  Thea|          say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind
253  Thea|        resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed,
254  Thea| determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using
255  Thea|           it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular
256  Thea|      various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the
257  Thea|         capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store,
258  Thea|           can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become
259  Thea|         how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant
260  Thea|          but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an
261  Thea|       another thing;—that, having knowledge present with him in his
262  Thea|   blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.~THEAETETUS:
263  Thea|           in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there
264  Thea|         sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of
265  Thea|    ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing.~SOCRATES:
266  Thea|        think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?~THEAETETUS:
267  Thea|         ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of
268  Thea|          there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right
269  Thea|        opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained;
270  Thea|            what shall we say that knowledge is?—for we are not going
271  Thea|          What was it?~THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true
272  Thea|          them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded,
273  Thea|         opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect
274  Thea|       have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer
275  Thea|         combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which
276  Thea|          was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which
277  Thea|       truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give
278  Thea|        reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when
279  Thea|          then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have
280  Thea|          rational explanation, is knowledge?~THEAETETUS: Exactly.~SOCRATES:
281  Thea|      correct—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and
282  Thea|           right in our idea about knowledge?~THEAETETUS: Yes; I think
283  Thea|        indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some
284  Thea|          the most perfect form of knowledge.~THEAETETUS: We must not.~
285  Thea|         found to exist apart from knowledge.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES:
286  Thea|          who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning
287  Thea|          be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been
288  Thea|            and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked,
289  Thea|    instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon,
290  Thea|           conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one
291  Thea|        are in this condition have knowledge.~SOCRATES: When a person
292  Thea|          one has not yet attained knowledge.~SOCRATES: And in like manner
293  Thea|          he will still be without knowledge?~THEAETETUS: Yes.~SOCRATES:
294  Thea|        attain to the exactness of knowledge.~THEAETETUS: It would seem
295  Thea|           a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps
296  Thea|         not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we
297  Thea|      adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined
298  Thea|           definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.~
299  Thea|         of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty
300  Thea|         know is surely to acquire knowledge.~THEAETETUS: True.~SOCRATES:
301  Thea|        question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will
302  Thea|        answer ‘Right opinion with knowledge,’—knowledge, that is, of
303  Thea|          opinion with knowledge,’—knowledge, that is, of difference,
304  Thea|        when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only
305  Thea|       only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything!
306  Thea|     anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor
307  Thea|        that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?~THEAETETUS: