(...) Phaedo
     Part
1501 Text |              containing power of the good they think nothing; and
1502 Text |             argument would have held good of fire and heat and any
1503 Text |              wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they
1504 Text |          Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at
1505 Text |         receive the rewards of their good deeds, each of them according
1506 Text |               I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who
1507 Text |             working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures
1508 Text |            the soul with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear Crito,
1509 Text |            of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed
1510 Text |              and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you
1511 Text |         would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now
1512 Text |               Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced


Phaedrus
     Part
1513 Intro|        knowledge, and of every other good, that he may have him all
1514 Intro|      correction under the earth, the good to places of joy in heaven.
1515 Intro|         being a bad one.~And what is good or bad writing or speaking?
1516 Intro|             earth.~The first rule of good speaking is to know and
1517 Intro|            which makes things appear good and evil, like and unlike,
1518 Intro|        pleasure. Prodicus showed his good sense when he said that
1519 Intro|              and that the aim of the good man should not be to please
1520 Intro|   fellow-servants, but to please his good masters who are the gods.
1521 Intro|            other men, he cannot be a good orator; also, that the living
1522 Intro|       speaking and the nature of the good; the Sophist between the
1523 Intro|            haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown. The
1524 Intro|           the abstract; in that, all good and truth, all the hopes
1525 Intro|            as dependent on their own good conduct in the successive
1526 Intro|   associations, which as a matter of good taste should be banished,
1527 Intro|             fellow-servants, but his good and noble masters,’ like
1528 Intro|             enthusiastic love of the good, the true, the one, the
1529 Intro|              are there any traces of good sense or originality, or
1530 Intro|             neither can there be any good prose. It had no great characters,
1531 Text |       PHAEDRUS: What do you mean, my good Socrates? How can you imagine
1532 Text |              SOCRATES: Very true, my good friend; and I hope that
1533 Text |        imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when
1534 Text |             and is desirous of solid good, and not of the opinion
1535 Text |           them, and is an earnest of good things to come.~Further,
1536 Text |     principle, we ought always to do good, not to the most virtuous,
1537 Text |         could make another speech as good as that of Lysias, and different.
1538 Text |              me in the tale which my good friend here desires me to
1539 Text |         words were as follows:—~‘All good counsel begins in the same
1540 Text |             desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the
1541 Text |             life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the
1542 Text |           another.~PHAEDRUS: That is good news. But what do you mean?~
1543 Text |           diviner, though not a very good one, but I have enough religion
1544 Text |            bad writer—his writing is good enough for him; and I am
1545 Text |             SOCRATES: Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter
1546 Text |            haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown—he
1547 Text |             sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved; if
1548 Text |         foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away.
1549 Text |      distinguished from the ordinary good man who gains wings in three
1550 Text |             first thousand years the good souls and also the evil
1551 Text |            and one of the horses was good and the other bad: the division
1552 Text |              be friendship among the good. And the beloved when he
1553 Text |          with you, if this be for my good, may your words come to
1554 Text |       speech-making, and not thought good enough to write, then he
1555 Text |            proposing?~PHAEDRUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: In good speaking
1556 Text |              Very good.~SOCRATES: In good speaking should not the
1557 Text |         judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only
1558 Text |           the place of a horse, puts good for evil, being himself
1559 Text |              with a horse, but about good which he confounds with
1560 Text |             PHAEDRUS: The reverse of good.~SOCRATES: But perhaps rhetoric
1561 Text |              great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in
1562 Text |            make the same things seem good to the city at one time,
1563 Text |          another time the reverse of good?~PHAEDRUS: That is true.~
1564 Text |              happen to afford a very good example of the way in which
1565 Text |           also the greatest possible good?~SOCRATES: Capital. But
1566 Text |               PHAEDRUS: You have too good an opinion of me if you
1567 Text |          voice, he would answer: ‘My good friend, he who would be
1568 Text |             You have hit upon a very good way.~SOCRATES: Yes, that
1569 Text |           why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them
1570 Text |           question is of justice and good, or is a question in which
1571 Text |           concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit,
1572 Text |             deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not
1573 Text |            his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore
1574 Text |            he who knows the just and good and honourable has less
1575 Text |           justice and injustice, and good and evil, and not to be


Philebus
     Part
1576 Intro|              present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may
1577 Intro|            correspond to the highest good, the sciences and arts and
1578 Intro|        Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus
1579 Intro|           opinion, the nature of the good, the order and relation
1580 Intro|             pleasure’ or ‘Concerning good,’ but should rather be described
1581 Intro|           been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked,
1582 Intro|      pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than
1583 Intro|           are related to this higher good. (2) Before we can reply
1584 Intro|              of the character of the good than either of them when
1585 Intro|              of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure;
1586 Intro|             V) the conception of the good. We may then proceed to
1587 Intro|            he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and Politicus
1588 Intro|       removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of the age of
1589 Intro|              have insisted that ‘the good is of the nature of the
1590 Intro|        things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are
1591 Intro|             find the idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the
1592 Intro|           abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear almost
1593 Intro|           and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he seems
1594 Intro|            highest expression of the good may also be described as
1595 Intro|             the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first
1596 Intro|             a category distinct from good. For again we must repeat,
1597 Intro|               that to the Greek ‘the good is of the nature of the
1598 Intro|       depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute.
1599 Intro|             as the sole principle of good. The comparison of pleasure
1600 Intro|     vestibule or ante-chamber of the good; for there is a good exceeding
1601 Intro|             the good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding
1602 Intro|     difficulty in apprehending. This good is now to be exhibited to
1603 Intro|          Phaedrus, or like the ideal good in the Republic, this is
1604 Intro|          then proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective
1605 Intro|             account of the nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction
1606 Intro|           own concrete conception of good against the abstract practical
1607 Intro|       against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or the abstract
1608 Intro|            the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his
1609 Intro|          wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried
1610 Intro|          victory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure
1611 Intro|             more akin to this higher good will have a right to the
1612 Intro|              pleasures of all kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish—
1613 Intro|     attribute a new predicate (i.e. ‘good’) to pleasures in general,
1614 Intro|             to indicate by the term ‘good’? If he continues to assert
1615 Intro|        abstract unities (e.g.‘man,’ ‘good’) and with the attempt to
1616 Intro|             knowledge is the highest good, for the good should be
1617 Intro|            the highest good, for the good should be perfect and sufficient.
1618 Intro|            character of the absolute good. Yes, retorts Socrates,
1619 Intro|           pleasure the nature of the good. But where shall we place
1620 Intro|         opinions may be described as good or bad. And though we do
1621 Intro|             sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of
1622 Intro|           essence is of the class of good. But if essence is of the
1623 Intro|           essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some
1624 Intro|            notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion,
1625 Intro|          absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or
1626 Intro|          affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be
1627 Intro|       knowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that
1628 Intro|              that we should seek the good not in the unmixed life,
1629 Intro|              at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three
1630 Intro|          ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and eternal
1631 Intro|            times nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure
1632 Intro|               Is pleasure an evil? a good? the only good?’ are the
1633 Intro|            an evil? a good? the only good?’ are the simple forms which
1634 Intro|               and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor
1635 Intro|             and some neither bad nor good?’ There are bodily and there
1636 Intro|              who maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In
1637 Intro|           that pleasure is the chief good, but that we should have
1638 Intro|             standards and motives of good and evil, and that the salvation
1639 Intro|          that ‘pleasure is the chief good.’ Either they have heard
1640 Intro|        nature. The pleasure of doing good to others and of bodily
1641 Intro|            affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some
1642 Intro|              civilized country, in a good home. A well-educated child
1643 Intro|             and the aspiration after good has often lent a strange
1644 Intro|         virtue and for every other.’~Good or happiness or pleasure
1645 Intro|           must live before he can do good to others, still the last
1646 Intro|         large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected,
1647 Intro|             acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is
1648 Intro|              commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly
1649 Intro|             should hardly say that a good man could be utterly miserable (
1650 Intro|             we insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall
1651 Intro|              is at variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further,
1652 Intro|           sacrifices himself for the good of others, does not sacrifice
1653 Intro|           notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best
1654 Intro|   philanthropist under that of doing good, the quietist under that
1655 Intro|         these aspects is as true and good as another; but that they
1656 Intro|             than the belief that the good of man is also the will
1657 Intro|        whatever does not tend to the good of men is not of God. And
1658 Intro|              strongest motives to do good to others.~On the other
1659 Intro|             discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better
1660 Intro|   conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many
1661 Intro|           evil may be diminished and good increased—by what course
1662 Intro|          which differ widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love
1663 Intro|            to this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law:
1664 Intro|            not wholly evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness.
1665 Intro|         content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true
1666 Intro|             ideas are to the idea of good. It is the consciousness
1667 Intro|             to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined;
1668 Intro|             to widen and deepen. The good is summed up under categories
1669 Intro|          made the first principle of good. Some of these questions
1670 Text |         feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas
1671 Text |           Pleasure.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: The awe which
1672 Text |            itself?~SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is
1673 Text |              all pleasant things are good; now although no one can
1674 Text |       pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them all good,
1675 Text |          good; but you call them all good, and at the same time are
1676 Text |            quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which
1677 Text |             designate all of them as good.~PROTARCHUS: What do you
1678 Text |           asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion
1679 Text |              that some pleasures are good and others bad?~SOCRATES:
1680 Text |            what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are
1681 Text |             the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case
1682 Text |           the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring
1683 Text |         pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third
1684 Text |           one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which
1685 Text |            with questions.~SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin
1686 Text |              the like were the chief good, you answered—No, not those,
1687 Text |            the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which
1688 Text |            lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified
1689 Text |           are they?~SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect?~PROTARCHUS:
1690 Text |         things.~SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient?~PROTARCHUS:
1691 Text |         beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch
1692 Text |          eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not
1693 Text |          which is not accompanied by good.~PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable.~
1694 Text |          either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to
1695 Text |           cannot really be the chief good.~PROTARCHUS: Impossible.~
1696 Text |              neither of them has the good, for the one which had would
1697 Text |       regarded as identical with the good?~PHILEBUS: Neither is your ‘
1698 Text |           Neither is your ‘mind’ the good, Socrates, for that will
1699 Text |         neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined
1700 Text |      imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further
1701 Text |              mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar
1702 Text |     PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend?~SOCRATES: I say
1703 Text |      pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite
1704 Text |              pleasure some degree of good. But now—admitting, if you
1705 Text |          tire of you.~SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus,
1706 Text |            ability.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Let us then understand
1707 Text |          have described?~PROTARCHUS: Good.~SOCRATES: Let us next assume
1708 Text |              being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and
1709 Text |           admitting of the nature of good.~PROTARCHUS: You say most
1710 Text |            SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms.~
1711 Text |          shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?~
1712 Text |             a man.’~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Or again, he
1713 Text |       SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the
1714 Text |          mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.~PROTARCHUS: True.~
1715 Text |              may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods,
1716 Text |           their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they
1717 Text |             false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?~PROTARCHUS:
1718 Text |        SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far
1719 Text |          assertion.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Then now, like
1720 Text |          were not changed either for good or bad?~SOCRATES: Yes.~PROTARCHUS:
1721 Text |             nor pain.~SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not
1722 Text |      SOCRATES: To them we will say: ‘Good; but are we, or living things
1723 Text |            neither.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: Now, can that
1724 Text |           pain, which is of itself a good, and is called pleasant?~
1725 Text |              delight.~SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then
1726 Text |            demands.~PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains
1727 Text |          whiteness.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: How can there
1728 Text |        SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave
1729 Text |            be placed in the class of good, and that which is done
1730 Text |              in some other class, my good friend.~PROTARCHUS: Most
1731 Text |             other class than that of good?~PROTARCHUS: Quite right.~
1732 Text |           notion of pleasure being a good.~PROTARCHUS: Assuredly.~
1733 Text |             believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities,
1734 Text |        arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or
1735 Text |              anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and
1736 Text |              only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure;
1737 Text |          understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really
1738 Text |            the soul, is not really a good?—and is there not yet a
1739 Text |           same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry
1740 Text |               Socrates, and hope for good luck.~SOCRATES: We have
1741 Text |           sciences.~PROTARCHUS: Very good.~SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus,
1742 Text |            even thrice that which is good.~PROTARCHUS: Certainly.~
1743 Text |        moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two
1744 Text |              and that the two names ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ are correctly
1745 Text |            more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this
1746 Text |           was it?~SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things.~
1747 Text |              the being who possesses good always everywhere and in
1748 Text |    universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either
1749 Text |          ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately,
1750 Text |              which leads towards the good?~PROTARCHUS: What road?~
1751 Text |              that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life
1752 Text |             former.~PROTARCHUS: Very good and right.~SOCRATES: If,
1753 Text |          manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of
1754 Text |             pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible;
1755 Text |            in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe,
1756 Text |             what is the true form of good—there would be great want
1757 Text |             of the habitation of the good?~PROTARCHUS: I think that
1758 Text |             And now the power of the good has retired into the region
1759 Text |             are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with
1760 Text |             and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion
1761 Text |             more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among
1762 Text |            knowledge.~SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains
1763 Text |           are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is.~PROTARCHUS:
1764 Text |            always and absolutely the good.~PROTARCHUS: I understand;
1765 Text |              mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven
1766 Text |           that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts


Protagoras
     Part
1767 Intro|              we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish
1768 Intro|          says,~‘Hard is it to become good,’~and then reproaches Pittacus
1769 Intro|              said, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ How is this to be reconciled?
1770 Intro|          Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good
1771 Intro|             good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult
1772 Intro|            saying, ‘Hard is it to be good:’ and Simonides, who was
1773 Intro|            Pittacus; not ‘hard to be good,’ but ‘hard to become good.’
1774 Intro|           good,’ but ‘hard to become good.’ Socrates proceeds to argue
1775 Intro|            flute-girls, to come into good society. Men’s own thoughts
1776 Intro|             is in the highest degree good:—~The courageous are the
1777 Intro|             pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil?
1778 Intro|             that ‘some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,’ which
1779 Intro|               But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition
1780 Intro|      pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the
1781 Intro|              the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance.
1782 Intro|             form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure.
1783 Intro|           e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure—Plato is inconsistent
1784 Intro|             He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits
1785 Intro|           parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be,
1786 Intro|             is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false,
1787 Intro|   explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons; (
1788 Intro|           that ‘pleasure is the only good,’ Protagoras deems it more
1789 Intro|              some pleasures only are good;’ and admits that ‘he, above
1790 Intro|              the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere exchange of a
1791 Intro|        pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced.~
1792 Text |           and do you bring any news?~Good news, he said; nothing but
1793 Text |           news, he said; nothing but good.~Delightful, I said; but
1794 Text |               I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too
1795 Text |         which you commit yourself be good or evil.~I certainly think
1796 Text |            to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you
1797 Text |          than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends
1798 Text |             understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely
1799 Text |             friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken,
1800 Text |        announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the
1801 Text |         certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not
1802 Text |             friends to hear us?~Very good, he said.~Suppose, said
1803 Text |              you promise to make men good citizens?~That, Socrates,
1804 Text |        instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet
1805 Text |          never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger.
1806 Text |            be taught. Will you be so good?~That I will, Socrates,
1807 Text |              a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful
1808 Text |          case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to
1809 Text |        reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is
1810 Text |              man is wanting in those good qualities which are attained
1811 Text |             by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason
1812 Text |               What is the reason why good men teach their sons the
1813 Text |            what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught
1814 Text |            And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened
1815 Text |          which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the
1816 Text |              why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill?
1817 Text |           Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more
1818 Text |           would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones?
1819 Text |      flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn
1820 Text |              of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players would
1821 Text |           all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of
1822 Text |          which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their
1823 Text |             you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons,
1824 Text |       fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers,
1825 Text |            human care could make men good; but I know better now.
1826 Text |       Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already
1827 Text |         other.~And is there anything good?~There is.~To which the
1828 Text |          admitted.~And temperance is good sense?~Yes.~And good sense
1829 Text |              is good sense?~Yes.~And good sense is good counsel in
1830 Text |               Yes.~And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?~
1831 Text |            of goods?~Yes.~And is the good that which is expedient
1832 Text |     inexpedient, and yet I call them good.~I thought that Protagoras
1833 Text |          that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient
1834 Text |           and do you call the latter good?~Certainly not the last,
1835 Text |          example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the
1836 Text |           that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of
1837 Text |          hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands
1838 Text |              think that the ode is a good composition, and true?~Yes,
1839 Text |              true?~Yes, I said, both good and true.~But if there is
1840 Text |               can the composition be good or true?~No, not in that
1841 Text |             man: Hardly can a man be good’? Now you will observe that
1842 Text |        Hardly can a man become truly good’; and then a little further
1843 Text |           says, ‘Hardly can a man be good,’ which is the very same
1844 Text |        Hardly can a man become truly good’?~Quite right, said Prodicus.~
1845 Text |              hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be
1846 Text |              but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus
1847 Text |              hardly can a man become good, For the gods have made
1848 Text |             of calling that which is good ‘awful’; and then he explains
1849 Text |             for saying, ‘Hard is the good,’ just as if that were equivalent
1850 Text |    equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.~Yes, he said, that was
1851 Text |        surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards
1852 Text |              he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation,
1853 Text |              wise, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ And Simonides, who was
1854 Text |              say only that to become good is hard, he inserted (Greek) ‘
1855 Text |            on the one hand to become good is hard’); there would be
1856 Text |             saying ‘Hard is it to be good,’ and he, in refutation
1857 Text |               Pittacus, is to become good, not joining ‘truly’ with ‘
1858 Text |            not joining ‘truly’ with ‘good,’ but with ‘hard.’ Not,
1859 Text |            hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some
1860 Text |         though there were some truly good men, and there were others
1861 Text |           there were others who were good but not truly good (this
1862 Text |              were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple
1863 Text |          Pittacus, ‘hard is it to be good,’ and Simonides answers, ‘
1864 Text |              difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to
1865 Text |              the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and
1866 Text |             a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for
1867 Text |              time. But having become good, to remain in a good state
1868 Text |          become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you,
1869 Text |        remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm,
1870 Text |            or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another
1871 Text |        another poet witnesses:—~‘The good are sometimes good and sometimes
1872 Text |               The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.’~But
1873 Text |            saying, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ Now there is a difficulty
1874 Text |             a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible:
1875 Text |          this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility—~‘For
1876 Text |              he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill
1877 Text |            But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort
1878 Text |            sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the
1879 Text |             well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge
1880 Text |            and in the second place a good physician; for he may become
1881 Text |        physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated
1882 Text |            must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem
1883 Text |           man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become
1884 Text |               but that he may become good and may also become bad;
1885 Text |          under the impression that a good man might often compel himself
1886 Text |            may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings,
1887 Text |              fault).~‘All things are good with which evil is unmingled.’~
1888 Text |              say that all things are good which have no evil in them,
1889 Text |             But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good
1890 Text |           good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love
1891 Text |           spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame
1892 Text |           that you have given a very good explanation of the poem;
1893 Text | understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand,
1894 Text |           who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for
1895 Text |           the power of making others good—whereas you are not only
1896 Text |             whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause
1897 Text |          would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing
1898 Text |            be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself
1899 Text |         right mind.~And is it partly good and partly bad, I said,
1900 Text |        partly bad, I said, or wholly good?~Wholly good, and in the
1901 Text |               or wholly good?~Wholly good, and in the highest degree.~
1902 Text |              to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly
1903 Text |             said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.~And do you,
1904 Text |              and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed
1905 Text |      disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant,
1906 Text |             that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil.
1907 Text |        pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some
1908 Text |             painful things which are good, and some which are not
1909 Text |               and some which are not good, and that there are some
1910 Text |           are some which are neither good nor evil.~And you would
1911 Text |           they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply
1912 Text |             imply that pleasure is a good in itself.~According to
1913 Text |             proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then
1914 Text |           what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded
1915 Text |              knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything
1916 Text |             highest of human things.~Good, I said, and true. But are
1917 Text |           these the things which are good but painful?’—they would
1918 Text |        agreed.~‘And do you call them good because they occasion the
1919 Text |          assented.~‘Are these things good for any other reason except
1920 Text |              pain when you call them good?’—they would acknowledge
1921 Text |           pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?’~
1922 Text |            an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem
1923 Text |          about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater
1924 Text |          when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that
1925 Text |     explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure,
1926 Text |           you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end
1927 Text |      knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at
1928 Text |            pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two
1929 Text |            them by two names— first, good and evil, and then pleasant
1930 Text |           been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we
1931 Text |            he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply;
1932 Text |            because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because
1933 Text |             he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy
1934 Text |              he will reply, ‘can the good be unworthy of the evil,
1935 Text |             evil, or the evil of the good’? Is not the real explanation
1936 Text |              exchange for the lesser good?’ Admitted. And now substitute
1937 Text |             of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, not as
1938 Text |              you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a question:
1939 Text |          that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of
1940 Text |             that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And
1941 Text |              work is also useful and good?~This was admitted.~Then,
1942 Text |               if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under
1943 Text |              evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature;
1944 Text |         already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions
1945 Text |       actions we have admitted to be good.~That is true; and to that
1946 Text |             to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?~The
1947 Text |              he replied.~And what is good and honourable, I said,
1948 Text |              And if honourable, then good?~Yes.~But the fear and confidence


The Republic
     Book
1949 1    |              men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do
1950 1    |          insist, that we must. ~Very good, I replied. ~Accordingly
1951 1    |           are fled away; there was a good time once, but now that
1952 1    |              since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time
1953 1    |              may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot
1954 1    |           say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had
1955 1    |            friend ought always to do good to a friend, and never evil. ~
1956 1    |       justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies. ~
1957 1    |           And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil
1958 1    |             do harm to his enemy and good to his friend? ~In going
1959 1    |      inference. ~Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider
1960 1    |         Certainly. ~Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also
1961 1    |         keeper of anything is also a good thief? ~That, I suppose,
1962 1    |              Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is
1963 1    |              at keeping money, he is good at stealing it. ~That is
1964 1    |         practised, however, "for the good of friends and for the harm
1965 1    |            love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom
1966 1    |              persons often err about good and evil: many who are not
1967 1    |           and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely? ~
1968 1    |              true. ~Then to them the good will be enemies and the
1969 1    |          they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to
1970 1    |             the evil and evil to the good? ~Clearly. ~But the good
1971 1    |             good? ~Clearly. ~But the good are just and would not do
1972 1    |          suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to
1973 1    |             harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to
1974 1    |              to be or who is thought good. ~And how is the error to
1975 1    |            who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only
1976 1    |            who seems only and is not good, only seems to be and is
1977 1    |             You would argue that the good are our friends and the
1978 1    |         first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm
1979 1    |        further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they
1980 1    |            our friends when they are good, and harm to our enemies
1981 1    |               that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not
1982 1    |              are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not
1983 1    |          speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad? ~
1984 1    |            Clearly not. ~Nor can the good harm anyone? ~Impossible. ~
1985 1    |     Impossible. ~And the just is the good? ~Certainly. ~Then to injure
1986 1    |         repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just
1987 1    |           say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm
1988 1    |            get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing
1989 1    |            of someone else. ~Why, my good friend, I said, how can
1990 1    |            therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is,
1991 1    |            argument. ~Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying
1992 1    |              this he assented with a good deal of reluctance. ~Then,
1993 1    |         physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but
1994 1    |          what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the
1995 1    |             with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself
1996 1    |              own good and not to the good of himself or his master;
1997 1    |             are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest
1998 1    |             with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or
1999 1    |              concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has
2000 1    |          life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects;