Book, Paragraph

  1   I, 1 |              prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The
  2  II, 2 |               terms. For if we had to say which of the three is the
  3  II, 2 |               is the cause, we should say the first; surely not the
  4  II, 2 |            from" means "after" (as we say "from the Isthmian games
  5  II, 2 |              is what is meant when we say that from a learner a man
  6 III, 1 |          these questions, then, as we say, we must inquire, and also (
  7 III, 2 |           same thing in many ways, we say that he who recognizes what
  8 III, 2 |        question.~(4) Further, must we say that sensible substances
  9 III, 2 |               of substances, as those say who assert the existence
 10 III, 2 |        intermediates, with which they say the mathematical sciences
 11 III, 2 |           deal?-The sense in which we say the Forms are both causes
 12 III, 2 |              are perishable. For they say there is a man-himself and
 13 III, 2 |             but as Protagoras used to say it did, in his refutation
 14 III, 2 |                Now there are some who say that these so-called intermediates
 15 III, 3 |           matters, it is very hard to say, with regard to the first
 16 III, 3 |               Further, both those who say there are several elements
 17 III, 3 |        corporeal things and those who say there is one, say the parts
 18 III, 3 |           those who say there is one, say the parts of which bodies
 19 III, 3 |            And some also of those who say unity or being, or the great
 20 III, 3 |              again, it is not easy to say in what sense these are
 21 III, 4 |      knowledge of anything, unless we say that sensation is knowledge.
 22 III, 4 |           suppose this, it is hard to say in which cases we are to
 23 III, 4 |           gods and born of gods, they say that the beings which did
 24 III, 4 |              things should be as they say, evidently the principles
 25 III, 4 |              is; for he would seem to say it is love: at least, this
 26 III, 4 |               their being one. Others say this unity and being, of
 27 III, 4 |             made, is fire, and others say it is air. A similar view
 28 III, 4 |              one; for these also must say that unity and being are
 29 III, 4 |             all the things which they say are principles.~(A) If we
 30 III, 4 |              to be such that, as some say, number proceeds from unity-itself
 31 III, 5 |             are not, it baffles us to say what being is and what the
 32 III, 5 |           substance, it baffles us to say what being is and what the
 33  IV, 2 |               for this reason that we say even of non-being that it
 34  IV, 2 |              privation (for we either say simply that that thing is
 35  IV, 2 |              the primary one, we must say that this holds good also
 36  IV, 3 |              special inquiry tries to say anything about their truth
 37  IV, 3 |            this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute
 38  IV, 4 |              to be and not to be, and say that people can judge this
 39  IV, 4 |               these persons could not say what principle they maintain
 40  IV, 4 |             if our opponent will only say something; and if he says
 41  IV, 4 |               that our opponent shall say that something either is
 42  IV, 4 |          question), but that he shall say something which is significant
 43  IV, 4 |         necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he means
 44  IV, 4 |        difference even if one were to say a word has several meanings,
 45  IV, 4 |                For instance, we might say that "man" has not one meaning
 46  IV, 4 |               limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite
 47  IV, 4 |           Therefore, if it is true to say of anything that it is a
 48  IV, 4 |              at the same time true to say the same thing is a man
 49  IV, 4 |              as "man", again we shall say the same as what was said
 50  IV, 4 |               it is or is not true to say that this is a man, our
 51  IV, 4 |              And in general those who say this do away with substance
 52  IV, 4 |            and essence. For they must say that all attributes are
 53  IV, 4 |          Therefore our opponents must say that there cannot be such
 54  IV, 4 |             is a trireme, if, as they say, contradictory statements
 55  IV, 4 |            instance, if it is true to say of a man that he is not
 56  IV, 4 |          evidently it is also true to say that he is either a trireme
 57  IV, 4 |           saying what he professes to say, and also nothing at all
 58  IV, 4 |                But perhaps they might say this was the very question
 59  IV, 4 |            able either to speak or to say anything intelligible; for
 60  IV, 4 |             things; for we should not say that two and three are equally
 61  IV, 5 |               these grounds, we shall say that in a sense they speak
 62  IV, 5 |               others.~And again, they say that many of the other animals
 63  IV, 5 |        physical alteration, that they say that what appears to our
 64  IV, 5 |        Democritus and, one may almost say, all the others have fallen
 65  IV, 5 |         supposed them to be. And they say that Homer also evidently
 66  IV, 5 |          speak plausibly, they do not say what is true (for it is
 67  IV, 5 |             did not think it right to say anything but only moved
 68  IV, 5 |               even once.~But we shall say in answer to this argument
 69  IV, 5 |         changeless. Indeed, those who say that things at the same
 70  IV, 5 |            not, should in consequence say that all things are at rest
 71  IV, 6 |           reasons named some time ago say that what appears is true,
 72  IV, 6 |             is one)-to these we shall say "yes, but not to the same
 73  IV, 6 |              sake of argument, should say that this is not true, but
 74  IV, 7 |            true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not,
 75  IV, 7 |             it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and
 76  IV, 7 |               or that it is not, will say either what is true or what
 77  IV, 7 |              be possible for a man to say what is neither true nor
 78  IV, 7 |          not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.~
 79  IV, 8 |            that nothing is true (for, say they, there is nothing to
 80  IV, 8 |           Evidently, again, those who say all things are at rest are
 81  IV, 8 |              right, nor are those who say all things are in movement.
 82   V, 2 |                Why does one walk?" we say; "that one may be healthy";
 83   V, 2 |              combination; e.g. we may say not "Polyclitus" nor "the
 84   V, 3 |             definition of them), some say the genera are elements,
 85   V, 4 |            objects, as with those who say the nature is the primary
 86   V, 4 |            are is already present, we say they have not their nature
 87   V, 5 |            and with reasoning.-(3) We say that that which cannot be
 88   V, 6 |               it is the same thing to say "Coriscus and what is musical",
 89   V, 6 |             one another, you will not say these are one piece of wood
 90   V, 7 |             accidental sense, e.g. we say "the righteous doer is musical",
 91   V, 7 |        musician is a man", just as we say "the musician builds", because
 92   V, 7 |           have mentioned; for when we say "the man is musical" and "
 93   V, 7 |             means that it is false to say it is.~(4) Again, "being"
 94   V, 7 |              complete reality. For we say both of that which sees
 95   V, 7 |            the case of substances; we say the Hermes is in the stone,
 96   V, 7 |           line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet
 97   V, 8 |     destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction
 98   V, 8 |              if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it
 99   V, 9 |    universally; for it is not true to say that every man is the same
100   V, 9 |               and therefore we do not say "every Socrates" as we say "
101   V, 9 |            say "every Socrates" as we say "every man".~Some things
102   V, 9 |            more than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same as itself;
103   V, 12|           intention; for sometimes we say of those who merely can
104   V, 12|           e.g. in instruments; for we say one lyre can speak, and
105   V, 15|               of course it is true to say this); in fact it is relative
106   V, 16|            the word to bad things and say a thing has been completely
107   V, 18|             senses as "cause"; for we say indifferently (3) in virtue
108   V, 23|               in a container; e.g. we say that the vessel holds the
109   V, 23|             natural philosophers also say. In this way also that which
110   V, 25|               it; for which reason we say the species are parts of
111   V, 29|              other people, just as we say things are which produce
112  VI, 2 |            has many meanings, we must say regarding the accidental,
113  VI, 2 |             the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental;
114  VI, 2 |               must, as far as we can, say further, regarding the accidental,
115  VI, 2 |           wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but
116  VI, 2 |               s art; and therefore we say "it was an accident", and
117 VII, 1 |             of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing
118 VII, 1 |           what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad,
119 VII, 1 |              it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say "
120 VII, 1 |             say what it is, we do not say "white" or "hot" or "three
121 VII, 2 |        obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and
122 VII, 2 |          kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the
123 VII, 3 |           substance, it baffles us to say what else is. When all else
124 VII, 4 |               that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic
125 VII, 4 |               an equivocation that we say these are, or by adding
126 VII, 5 |            either it is impossible to say "snub nose" or the same
127 VII, 5 |            apart from animal. (When I say "by addition" I mean the
128 VII, 6 |             the same thing, as people say, so that the essence of
129 VII, 6 |             Ideas such as some people say there are, it will not be
130 VII, 6 |           meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is identical
131 VII, 7 |             And the something which I say it comes to be may be found
132 VII, 7 |         things of this kind, which we say are substances if anything
133 VII, 7 |         bricken (though we should not say without qualification, if
134 VII, 8 |             the bricks? Rather we may say that no "this" would ever
135 VII, 10|              Perhaps we should rather say that "part" is used in several
136 VII, 11|           things to numbers, and they say the formula of "line" is
137 VII, 11|                for in some cases they say the Form and that of which
138 VII, 11|               the case of "line" they say this is no longer so.~It
139 VII, 12|           feet. Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak rightly,
140 VII, 12|              does happen; for when we say "animal endowed with feet
141 VII, 14|       consequence confronts those who say the Ideas are substances
142 VII, 15|            Idea is, as its supporters say, an individual, and can
143 VII, 15|           were defining you, he would say "an animal which is lean"
144 VII, 15|               you. If any one were to say that perhaps all the attributes
145 VII, 16|            individuals.~But those who say the Forms exist, in one
146 VII, 16|               not right, because they say the one over many is a Form.
147 VII, 17|            not distinguish and do not say definitely that certain
148 VIII, 1|               some particular schools say that Forms and the objects
149 VIII, 1|              of mathematics; for some say these are substances as
150 VIII, 2|     potentially, it remains for us to say what is the substance, in
151 VIII, 2|         define a threshold, we should say "wood or stone in such and
152 VIII, 2|               to define ice we should say "water frozen or solidified
153 VIII, 3|      substances at all; for one might say that the nature in natural
154 VIII, 3|           this sense and not, as some say, as numbers of units. For
155 VIII, 3|              or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one
156 VIII, 3|             but similarly they cannot say what makes it one. And this
157 VIII, 3|           explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort of unit
158 VIII, 4|       material cause of man? Shall we say "the menstrual fluid"? What
159 VIII, 4|             is moving cause? Shall we say "the seed"? The formal cause?
160 VIII, 4|              this affection. Shall we say that it is the animal? Yes,
161 VIII, 4|            the whole animal? Shall we say that it is immobility of
162 VIII, 5|            nature. It is also hard to say why wine is not said to
163 VIII, 6|      especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a
164 VIII, 6|             difficulty. But if, as we say, one element is matter and
165 VIII, 6|             with the soul; and others say life is a "composition"
166  IX, 1 |            analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a "
167  IX, 1 |               lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.~
168  IX, 3 |                  3~There are some who say, as the Megaric school does,
169  IX, 3 |               or that it will be will say what is untrue; for this
170  IX, 3 |             getting up. But we cannot say this, so that evidently
171  IX, 3 |           other predicates. E.g. they say that non-existent things
172  IX, 4 |        evidently it cannot be true to say "this is capable of being
173  IX, 4 |            incapable of being-were to say that the diagonal of the
174  IX, 4 |             also must be real. For to say that B must be possible,
175  IX, 6 |          express by "potentially"; we say that potentially, for instance,
176  IX, 8 |              since it will be hard to say about the knowledge, as
177  IX, 8 |             such as the dialecticians say the Ideas are, there must
178  IX, 9 |                Everything of which we say that it can do something,
179  IX, 9 |     contraries, e.g. that of which we say that it can be well is the
180  IX, 9 |             And therefore we may also say that in the things which
181  IX, 10|           because you are pale we who say this have the truth. If,
182   X, 1 |          state the matter so, and not say that the measure of numbers
183   X, 1 |            number; we ought indeed to say this if we were to use the
184   X, 1 |              and perception, which we say are the measures of objects.
185   X, 2 |              as both the Pythagoreans say in earlier and Plato in
186   X, 2 |             since it is not enough to say that its nature is just
187   X, 5 |         difficulty supports those who say the unequal is a "two"),
188   X, 6 |            opposed to the one. For we say "one or many", just as if
189   X, 6 |                just as if one were to say "one and ones" or "white
190   X, 6 |          since it is not one, as some say, but two, that make a few.~
191   X, 8 |                being indivisible); we say "being indivisible", for
192  XI, 1 |             If not all, it is hard to say which; but if, being one,
193  XI, 1 |              in general it is hard to say whether perchance the science
194  XI, 1 |             exist. (But it is hard to say, even if one suppose them
195  XI, 1 |          other hand it is not as they say, with what sort of things
196  XI, 2 |              it is in general hard to say whether one must assume
197  XI, 2 |      perishable things, it is hard to say why in the world, if there
198  XI, 2 |             how can they be right who say that the first principle
199  XI, 2 |            this point neither do they say anything nor is it easy
200  XI, 2 |            anything nor is it easy to say anything. But if we are
201  XI, 6 |               the other must not. And say the same of good and bad,
202  XI, 6 |          false it will not be true to say even this, and if all are
203  XI, 6 |               it will not be false to say all are false.~
204  XI, 8 |              accidental really is. We say that everything either is
205  XI, 9 |                movement. That what we say is true, is plain from the
206  XI, 9 |          evident from what all others say about movement, and from
207  XI, 9 |              evident from what people say. Some call it otherness
208  XI, 10|               simple-neither, as some say, something apart from the
209  XI, 11|         accidental, yet it is true to say that "not-being" is predicable
210 XII, 1 |           would be being; at least we say even these are, e.g. "there
211 XII, 2 |               has two senses, we must say that everything changes
212 XII, 2 |            Democritus-it is better to say "all things were together
213 XII, 2 |             nor is it satisfactory to say that "all things were together";
214 XII, 4 |          analogically; i.e. one might say that there are three principles-the
215 XII, 6 |              natural philosophers who say that "all things were together",
216 XII, 6 |         Leucippus and Plato; for they say there is always movement.
217 XII, 6 |              this movement is they do say, nor, if the world moves
218 XII, 6 |              strife, and by those who say that there is always movement,
219 XII, 6 |             Therefore it is better to say "the first". For it was
220 XII, 7 |             most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a
221 XII, 7 |          complete being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there
222 XII, 8 |              those who speak of Ideas say the Ideas are numbers, and
223 XII, 8 |             of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable
224 XII, 8 |            some of the mathematicians say, that our thought may have
225 XII, 8 |          utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form
226 XII, 8 |               other animals, and they say other things consequent
227 XII, 10|               them one. And those who say mathematical number is first
228 XIII, 1|          there is anything which they say wrongly, we may not be liable
229 XIII, 1|         nature, while (3) some others say that the mathematical substances
230 XIII, 1|             sensible objects, as some say, or separate from sensible
231 XIII, 3|              Thus since it is true to say without qualification that
232 XIII, 3|            exist), it is true also to say without qualification that
233 XIII, 3|  mathematicians. And as it is true to say of the other sciences too,
234 XIII, 3|             the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful
235 XIII, 3|             error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about
236 XIII, 3|        definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing
237 XIII, 4|            for the Forms are, one may say, more numerous than the
238 XIII, 4|              relations, of which they say there is no independent
239 XIII, 5|              senses of "from". And to say that they are patterns and
240 XIII, 5|              or a ring) of which they say there are no Forms. Clearly
241 XIII, 5|              the things of which they say there are Ideas can both
242 XIII, 6|              which confront those who say that numbers are separable
243 XIII, 6|             than just number, as some say, it follows that either (
244 XIII, 6|          associable with any, as they say is the case with mathematical
245 XIII, 6|               exist. And of those who say that the 1 is the beginning
246 XIII, 6|         besides those mentioned. Some say both kinds of number exist,
247 XIII, 6|           sensible things; and others say mathematical number alone
248 XIII, 6|               mathematical; only they say it is not separate but sensible
249 XIII, 6|        magnitude, they seem unable to say.~Another thinker says the
250 XIII, 6|                alone exists, and some say mathematical number is identical
251 XIII, 6|            make the Ideas numbers nor say that Ideas exist; and others
252 XIII, 6|              mathematically; for they say that neither is every spatial
253 XIII, 6|             at random make 2. All who say the 1 is an element and
254 XIII, 7|           successive numbers, as they say "2,3,4" for the units in
255 XIII, 7|          others successively. (And to say both things at the same
256 XIII, 7|          succeeding numbers, but they say 4 came from the first 2
257 XIII, 7|            for the indefinite as they say, received the definite 2
258 XIII, 7|             composite, e.g. one might say that animals are composed
259 XIII, 7|            those who hold these views say that not even two units
260 XIII, 7|              the reason why they must say that when we count thus – "
261 XIII, 7| difficulty-whether, when we count and say —1,2,3-we count by addition
262 XIII, 8|              is first of 1’s, as they say, but not a 2 which is first
263 XIII, 8|          rather be what Plato used to say, and there must be a first
264 XIII, 8|            goes only up to 10 as some say, firstly the Forms will
265 XIII, 8|               is not divisiable, they say; but both the universal,
266 XIII, 8|         differentiated units, as they say), but not in complete reality;
267 XIII, 9|               who express these views say, it is not easy to solve
268 XIII, 9|               a part of plurality. To say that the unit is a plurality
269 XIII, 9|              any rate, then, let them say out of what each of the
270 XIII, 9|         mentioning. Since, then, some say that the Ideas and the numbers
271 XIII, 9|             regarding these what they say and in what sense they say
272 XIII, 9|            say and in what sense they say it.~Those who posit numbers
273 XIV, 1 |             small. But as it is, they say one of these things but
274 XIV, 1 |               these things but do not say the other. Others oppose
275 XIV, 1 |          compound of great and small, say what is very far from being
276 XIV, 2 |             is necessary, then, as we say, to presuppose for each
277 XIV, 3 |           things. Those, however, who say that mathematical number
278 XIV, 3 |         according to their hypotheses say anything of this sort, but
279 XIV, 3 |            that the rival theory will say the contrary of this, and
280 XIV, 3 |             neither have said nor can say how mathematical number
281 XIV, 3 |             men have nothing sound to say. And the very elements-the
282 XIV, 3 |              to them or not; for they say plainly that when the one
283 XIV, 4 |                      4~These thinkers say there is no generation of
284 XIV, 4 |         question in the negative, and say that both the good and the
285 XIV, 4 |             which confronts those who say, as some do, that the one
286 XIV, 4 |            with this inasmuch as they say that not those who are first
287 XIV, 4 |          unchangeable substances some say the One itself is the good
288 XIV, 4 |          nature is good. Therefore to say that the first principle
289 XIV, 4 |               plurality; while others say inequality is the nature
290 XIV, 5 |            what leads this thinker to say that this is also true of
291 XIV, 5 |          objects are nowhere), and to say that they must be somewhere,
292 XIV, 5 |            must be somewhere, but not say what kind of thing their
293 XIV, 5 |             their place is.~Those who say that existing things come
294 XIV, 6 |          stars in both. Nay they even say that X, Ps and Z are concords
295 XIV, 6 |           assigned to GP. But if they say that each of these three
296 XIV, 6 |              neglect great ones. Some say that there are many such
297 XIV, 6 |              the left eight. And they say that the distance in the
298 XIV, 6 |              sensible things, as some say, and that they are not the