Book, Paragraph

  1  II, 2  |               nor infinitely various in kind. For neither can one thing
  2  II, 2  |                and so always some other kind should be produced. For
  3  II, 2  |               why changes of the former kind are not reversible, and
  4  II, 2  |                but changes of the other kind are reversible. But in both
  5  II, 2  |                 For terms of the former kind, being intermediates, must
  6  II, 2  |                 and terms of the latter kind change back into one another,
  7 III, 1  |                 these others are of one kind or there are several classes
  8 III, 1  |                 limited in number or in kind, both those in the definitions
  9 III, 1  |                and figures and points a kind of substance or not, and
 10 III, 2  |                 proved by means of this kind of cause, nor is there any
 11 III, 2  |               any demonstration of this kind - ’because it is better,
 12 III, 2  |                mentions anything of the kind. And so for this reason
 13 III, 2  |                have to be an underlying kind, and some of them must be
 14 III, 2  |               And are substances of one kind or are there in fact several
 15 III, 2  |                 with reference to which kind of existing things we must
 16 III, 4  |          principles. If they are one in kind only, nothing will be numerically
 17 III, 4  |                 syllable is the same in kind whenever it occurs, the
 18 III, 4  |                 it are also the same in kind; only in kind, for these
 19 III, 4  |               the same in kind; only in kind, for these also, like the
 20 III, 4  |                more letters of the same kind.~(10) One difficulty which
 21 III, 4  |             unit is precisely a certain kind of one.~But (B) if there
 22 III, 5  |              points are substances of a kind, or not. If they are not,
 23 III, 6  |              there are many of the same kind, so that their first principles
 24 III, 6  |               limited in number, but in kind, unless one takes the elements
 25 III, 6  |                 the members of the same kind are infinite in number),
 26 III, 6  |              one in number, but only in kind, nor will the first principles
 27 III, 6  |      determinate in number, but only in kind:-if then this must be so,
 28 III, 6  |               are one in number, not in kind, we have mentioned the impossible
 29  IV, 2  |             central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said
 30  IV, 2  |          concepts; for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference
 31  IV, 2  |         difference, and difference is a kind of otherness. Therefore,
 32  IV, 3  |                  But since there is one kind of thinker who is above
 33  IV, 3  |            substance. Physics also is a kind of Wisdom, but it is not
 34  IV, 3  |                 but it is not the first kind.-And the attempts of some
 35  IV, 4  |              not in cases of the latter kind, but only in cases of the
 36  IV, 4  |              only in cases of the other kind, so that not all terms will
 37  IV, 4  |              existing things is of this kind? And if he is not right,
 38  IV, 5  |            things there is also another kind of substance to which neither
 39  IV, 7  |                If it were of the latter kind, it could not change into
 40  IV, 7  |               that there will also be a kind of change intermediate between
 41   V, 2  |             those which are of the same kind some are causes in a prior
 42   V, 3  |               thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds; e.g. the
 43   V, 3  |            forms of speech different in kind from them. If they are divided,
 44   V, 3  |             their parts are of the same kind, as a part of water is water (
 45   V, 3  |               other things differing in kind; and whether the things
 46   V, 4  |                nature of a thing is one kind of essence.~From what has
 47   V, 5  |                 are necessary, and this kind of cause is a sort of necessity.
 48   V, 6  |           substratum does not differ in kind; it does not differ in the
 49   V, 6  |                the case of things whose kind is indivisible to sense.
 50   V, 6  |                 one, qua indivisible in kind; and, on the other hand,
 51   V, 6  | indistinguishable qua man, they are one kind of man; if qua animal, one
 52   V, 6  |                 man; if qua animal, one kind of animal; if qua magnitude,
 53   V, 6  |           animal; if qua magnitude, one kind of magnitude.-Now most things
 54   V, 6  |               what is one is to be some kind of beginning of number;
 55   V, 6  |                either in quantity or in kind. Now that which is indivisible
 56   V, 6  |                ultimate-is divisible in kind, others because the definitions
 57   V, 9  |                 matter is one either in kind or in number, and those
 58   V, 10 |                 contraries of the above kind, some because they are receptive
 59   V, 12 |              distinct.-Again, to either kind of capacity there is an
 60   V, 12 |               adunata in virtue of this kind of incapacity, while others
 61   V, 12 |                all refer to the primary kind of potency; and this is
 62   V, 12 |               definition of the primary kind of potency will be "a source
 63   V, 13 |                 quantum (for "a certain kind of quantum" is present in
 64   V, 13 |        modifications and states of this kind of substance, e.g. much
 65   V, 15 |             Relative terms of the first kind are numerically related
 66   V, 16 |               cannot be excelled in its kind; e.g. we have a complete
 67   V, 19 |               place or of potency or of kind; for there must be a certain
 68   V, 20 |                 20~"Having" means (1) a kind of activity of the haver
 69   V, 21 |        lightness, and all others of the kind.-(2) The actualization of
 70   V, 25 |               The elements into which a kind might be divided apart from
 71   V, 26 |              which implies that it is a kind whole) is true of a whole
 72   V, 28 |                plane of such and such a kind, and in the other a solid
 73   V, 28 |                solid of such and such a kind; and this is what underlies
 74   V, 28 |       continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the
 75   V, 28 |              mover which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (
 76  VI, 1  |          because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what
 77  VI, 1  |                one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the
 78  VI, 1  |               with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal
 79 VII, 2  |          mathematics-as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of sensible
 80 VII, 2  |            assuming principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers,
 81 VII, 3  |             must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is
 82 VII, 4  |         omission, of a determinant. One kind of predicate is not propter
 83 VII, 4  |                the same as a particular kind of formula; and this condition
 84 VII, 6  |             that to terms of the former kind the same argument will be
 85 VII, 7  |               one of the things of this kind, which we say are substances
 86 VII, 8  |                 begetter is of the same kind as the begotten (not, however,
 87 VII, 9  |               nature, and of the former kind some can move itself in
 88 VII, 10 |               in a sense not even every kind of letter will be present
 89 VII, 10 |                 in the formulae. In one kind of formula, then, the formula
 90 VII, 10 |          essence of a body of a certain kind (at least we shall define
 91 VII, 11 |                 bones and parts of this kind; are these then also parts
 92 VII, 11 |              said before; for while one kind of matter is perceptible,
 93 VII, 11 |                such substances, another kind of matter, and one should
 94 VII, 15 |                formula (I mean that one kind of substance is the formula
 95 VII, 15 |               the matter, while another kind is the formula in its generality),
 96 VII, 16 |                 them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (
 97 VII, 16 |             perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—’man-himself’
 98 VII, 17 |                us state what, i.e. what kind of thing, substance should
 99 VII, 17 |         substance would seem to be this kind of "nature", which is not
100 VIII, 2 |                these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed
101 VIII, 2 |                 the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas
102 VIII, 2 |                is and how it exists-one kind of it as matter, another
103 VIII, 2 |              actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed
104 VIII, 3 |                 like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can be defined
105 VIII, 3 |          formulated, i.e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible
106 VIII, 4 |           immobility of such and such a kind? Yes, but to what process
107 VIII, 6 |                its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially
108 VIII, 6 |                  as it is essentially a kind of being-individual substance,
109 VIII, 6 |                 is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a kind
110 VIII, 6 |                kind of unity as it is a kind of being-and so none of
111 VIII, 6 |              being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by
112 VIII, 6 |                 each is by its nature a kind of being and a kind of unity,
113 VIII, 6 |            nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, not as being in
114  IX, 1  |               have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions
115  IX, 1  |             originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies
116  IX, 1  |                reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an
117  IX, 1  |               itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted
118  IX, 1  |           itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility
119  IX, 5  |                 potencies of the latter kind, when the agent and the
120  IX, 5  |                 on, but with the former kind of potency this is not necessary.
121  IX, 6  |            Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is related
122  IX, 6  |                actuality-what, and what kind of thing, actuality is.
123  IX, 7  |                        7~What, and what kind of thing, the actual is,
124  IX, 7  |                  but there is a certain kind of thing which is capable
125  IX, 8  |          potency not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle
126  IX, 8  |               also; for it is a certain kind of life).~Obviously, therefore,
127  IX, 8  |               laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter
128   X, 1  |           movement that is of the first kind (i.e. local movement) and
129   X, 1  |         movement) and the first in that kind (i.e. circular movement),
130   X, 1  |                 thing is indivisible in kind or in number. (3) In number,
131   X, 1  |                 indivisible, and (4) in kind, that which in intelligibility
132   X, 1  |               be the first measure of a kind", and most strictly of quantity;
133   X, 1  |               quantity or in respect of kind. And the one is indivisible
134   X, 2  |                definite-some particular kind of thing-and similarly in
135   X, 3  |         different, and contrariety is a kind of difference. That we are
136   X, 4  |                same. But privation is a kind of contradiction; for what
137   X, 5  |                or something else of the kind. Therefore it is an incorrect
138   X, 7  |               between opposites of some kind; for only between these
139   X, 9  |                the ultimate indivisible kind. Callias is definition +
140   X, 10 |       imperishable must be different in kind.~Now so far we have spoken
141   X, 10 |             things must be different in kind.~Evidently, then, there
142   X, 10 |              but things which differ in kind are farther apart than those
143  XI, 1  |                perceptible things, as a kind of third set of things apart
144  XI, 1  |             raise the question, to what kind of science it belongs to
145  XI, 1  |                 These and others of the kind are the subjects that involve
146  XI, 2  |                 we seem to seek another kind of substance, and this is
147  XI, 2  |              the principles the same in kind or in number? If they are
148  XI, 3  |              this way by virtue of some kind of reference, in the one
149  XI, 4  |                or numbers or some other kind of quantity-not, however,
150  XI, 7  |                  And if there is such a kind of thing in the world, here
151  XI, 8  |                 accidental, of the same kind as there are of the essential;
152  XI, 9  |                e.g. "this-ness"-for one kind of it is "positive form",
153  XI, 9  |              and as regards quality one kind is "white" and the other "
154  XI, 9  |                 as regards quantity one kind is "complete" and the other "
155  XI, 10 |               or infinite in variety of kind. Finite they cannot be;
156  XI, 10 |               be; for then those of one kind will be infinite in quantity
157 XII, 1  |                movement); but the third kind belongs to another science,
158 XII, 4  |                disorder of a particular kind, bricks; the moving cause
159 XII, 7  |            motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this
160 XII, 8  |                 because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover
161 XII, 10 |               and go on to generate one kind of substance after another
162 XIII, 4 |             existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas.
163 XIII, 6 |            series similarly. Or (2) one kind of number must be like the
164 XIII, 6 |              named last must be a third kind.~Again, these kinds of numbers
165 XIII, 6 |             present in them)-either one kind and not another, or all
166 XIII, 6 |      Pythagoreans, also, believe in one kind of number-the mathematical;
167 XIII, 6 |          Another thinker says the first kind of number, that of the Forms,
168 XIII, 7 |            mathematical number-only one kind of number, and the Ideas
169 XIII, 7 |              also will be Ideas of some kind. And the same account applies
170 XIII, 10|           number and a "this" and not a kind possessed of a common name (
171 XIV, 1  |                        1~REGARDING this kind of substance, what we have
172 XIV, 1  |      indivisible, in the former case in kind, and in the latter to the
173 XIV, 1  |                is least of all things a kind of entity or substance,
174 XIV, 2  |      contradictory of these, and is one kind of being as "what" and quality
175 XIV, 3  |              that it is numbers of this kind whose genesis we must study.~
176 XIV, 5  |             somewhere, but not say what kind of thing their place is.~
177 XIV, 5  |               corporeal or of any other kind.~Number, then, whether it
178 XIV, 6  |               because the number is the kind of number it is, that the
179 XIV, 6  |                seasons and a particular kind of number go together; and