Book, Paragraph

  1  II, 1  |            every one says something true about the nature of things,
  2  II, 1  |            powers of thought. It is true that if there had been no
  3  II, 1  |             derivative truths to be true is most true. Hence the
  4  II, 1  |           truths to be true is most true. Hence the principles of
  5  II, 1  |          things must be always most true (for they are not merely
  6  II, 1  |            are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause
  7 III, 2  |           belong to inquire what is true and what is untrue about
  8 III, 2  |          same time not even this is true, that mensuration deals
  9 III, 5  |           And evidently the same is true of points and lines and
 10  IV, 3  |          use them, because they are true of being qua being and each
 11  IV, 4  |          admitted that something is true apart from demonstration (
 12  IV, 4  |          this at least is obviously true, that the word "be" or "
 13  IV, 4  |         things.-Therefore, if it is true to say of anything that
 14  IV, 4  |          should be at the same time true to say the same thing is
 15  IV, 4  |             whether it is or is not true to say that this is a man,
 16  IV, 4  |        contradictory statements are true of the same subject at the
 17  IV, 4  |   contradictory statements are both true. And we thus get the doctrine
 18  IV, 4  |              for instance, if it is true to say of a man that he
 19  IV, 4  |           man, evidently it is also true to say that he is either
 20  IV, 4  |            or to deny. For if it is true that a thing is a man and
 21  IV, 4  |         Again, either the theory is true in all cases, and a thing
 22  IV, 4  |         compatible or the theory is true of some statements and not
 23  IV, 4  |        which admittedly only one is true; but if of all, again either
 24  IV, 4  |         either the negation will be true wherever the assertion is,
 25  IV, 4  |     assertion is, and the assertion true wherever the negation is,
 26  IV, 4  |             or the negation will be true where the assertion is,
 27  IV, 4  |            the assertion not always true where the negation is. And (
 28  IV, 4  |            either be saying what is true when one separates the predicates (
 29  IV, 4  |           not. And if (i) it is not true to apply the predicates
 30  IV, 4  |        difference will be something true and peculiar to it. And (
 31  IV, 4  |            if when the assertion is true, the negation is false,
 32  IV, 4  |             false, and when this is true, the affirmation is false,
 33  IV, 4  |            nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time
 34  IV, 4  |           at the same time also not true. But if all are alike both
 35  IV, 4  |             truth to which the more true is nearer. And even if there
 36  IV, 5  |             doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. For on
 37  IV, 5  |        opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be
 38  IV, 5  |            must be at the same time true and false. For many men
 39  IV, 5  |            so, all opinions must be true; for those who are mistaken
 40  IV, 5  |   contradictories or contraries are true at the same time, because
 41  IV, 5  |            of these impressions are true and which are false is not
 42  IV, 5  |          for the one set is no more true than the other, but both
 43  IV, 5  |       appears to our senses must be true; for it is for these reasons
 44  IV, 5  |             they do not say what is true (for it is fitting to put
 45  IV, 5  |         about that which changes no true statement can be made, they
 46  IV, 5  |         everything which appears is true; firstly, because even if
 47  IV, 5  |            strong, and those things true which appear to the slee
 48  IV, 5  |            would exist is doubtless true (for they are affections
 49  IV, 6  |     everything that appears will be true; for that which appears
 50  IV, 6  |          all things that appear are true, makes all things relative.
 51  IV, 6  |            say that what appears is true, and therefore that all
 52  IV, 6  |          things are alike false and true, for things do not appear
 53  IV, 6  |           with these qualifications true. But perhaps for this reason
 54  IV, 6  |         should say that this is not true, but true for this man.
 55  IV, 6  |          that this is not true, but true for this man. And as has
 56  IV, 6  |            are not at the same time true, and (2) what consequences
 57  IV, 6  |          should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously
 58  IV, 7  |        place, if we define what the true and the false are. To say
 59  IV, 7  |           is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of
 60  IV, 7  |             will say either what is true or what is false; but neither
 61  IV, 7  | definition-whenever it says what is true or false. When it connects
 62  IV, 7  |           negation, it says what is true, and when it does so in
 63  IV, 7  |          man to say what is neither true nor untrue, and there will
 64  IV, 7  |        agree that the conclusion is true. This, then, is why some
 65  IV, 7  |            seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that
 66  IV, 7  |         cannot say anything that is true.~
 67  IV, 8  |          the theory that nothing is true (for, say they, there is
 68  IV, 8  |           theory that everything is true. These views are practically
 69  IV, 8  |            says that all things are true and all are false also makes
 70  IV, 8  |          means. If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other
 71  IV, 8  |           the contradiction must be true. Again, if it is necessary
 72  IV, 8  |             says that everything is true makes even the statement
 73  IV, 8  |       statement contrary to his own true, and therefore his own not
 74  IV, 8  |           and therefore his own not true (for the contrary statement
 75  IV, 8  |         statement denies that it is true), while he who says everything
 76  IV, 8  |              saying it alone is not true, while the latter excepts
 77  IV, 8  |             for that which says the true statement is true is true,
 78  IV, 8  |          says the true statement is true is true, and this process
 79  IV, 8  |           true statement is true is true, and this process will go
 80  IV, 8  |           statements will always be true and the same always false,-
 81  IV, 8  |             motion, nothing will be true; everything therefore will
 82   V, 2  |        given the cause. The same is true of all the means that intervene
 83   V, 7  |            mean that a statement is true, "not being" that it is
 84   V, 7  |           not being" that it is not true but falses-and this alike
 85   V, 7  |         musical" means that this is true, or "Socrates is not-pale"
 86   V, 7  |        not-pale" means that this is true; but "the diagonal of the
 87   V, 9  |          universally; for it is not true to say that every man is
 88   V, 11 |          the whole. And the same is true in all other cases.~
 89   V, 12 |            contrary is of necessity true, e.g. that the diagonal
 90   V, 12 |            the contrary is not only true but also necessary; that
 91   V, 12 |        false; in one, that which is true; in one, that which may
 92   V, 12 |           in one, that which may be true.-A "potency" or "power"
 93   V, 12 |         particular way. The same is true of the things that are incapable.
 94   V, 15 |              though of course it is true to say this); in fact it
 95   V, 26 |         them. For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is
 96   V, 26 |         that it is a kind whole) is true of a whole in the sense
 97   V, 29 |            than that of which it is true; e.g. the account of a circle
 98   V, 29 |           the same man is false and true is misleading. For it assumes
 99  VI, 2  |         accidental, and another the true (’non-being’ being the false),
100  VI, 2  |             a patient in a fever is true for the most part.) But
101  VI, 4  |            is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense
102  VI, 4  |   contradictory judgements (for the true judgement affirms where
103  VI, 4  |             not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself
104  VI, 4  |            is in the sense of being true must be dismissed. For the
105 VII, 4  |            predicate may fail to be true of a subject propter se,
106 VII, 5  |          instances.) And if this is true, coupled terms also, like "
107 VII, 6  |             two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is
108 VII, 11 |             why the same may not be true, just as if all circles
109 VII, 11 |       universally in a way which is true of every case, and also
110 VII, 15 |           what has now been said is true.~
111 VIII, 2 |            matter); and the same is true of the kind of definitions
112 VIII, 3 |             mixing. And the same is true in all other cases; e.g.
113  IX, 4  |              evidently it cannot be true to say "this is capable
114  IX, 6  |            thought (while it is not true that at the same time we
115  IX, 6  |   incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time a
116  IX, 7  |            a house; and the same is true of all other things the
117  IX, 10 |             thirdly in the sense of true and false. This depends,
118  IX, 10 |     statement comes to be false and true, and it is possible for
119  IX, 10 |        opinions are not at one time true and at another false, but
120  IX, 10 |            same opinions are always true or always false.~But with
121  IX, 10 |            whether our judgement be true or false, it is implied
122   X, 1  |           application. This is also true of "element" or "cause",
123   X, 2  |            be one, the same must be true of substances also; for
124   X, 2  |          substances also; for it is true of all cases alike.~That
125   X, 4  |     contraries are also necessarily true. For not only is (1) the
126   X, 4  |             it is enough if this is true of the first-i.e. the generic-contraries,
127  XI, 1  |           the world the same is not true of the other things of which
128  XI, 3  |   productive of it. And the same is true in the other cases. Everything
129  XI, 3  |        things—geometry)—the same is true with regard to being. For
130  XI, 5  |          the affirmation is no more true than the negation, he who
131  XI, 5  |             statements can never be true of the same subjects. But,
132  XI, 5  |           if what is said by him is true, not even this itself will
133  XI, 5  |          the affirmation is no more true than the negation, in the
134  XI, 5  |         affirmation will be no more true than the negation. Further,
135  XI, 5  |          assertion that there is no true affirmation. But if a true
136  XI, 5  |          true affirmation. But if a true affirmation exists, this
137  XI, 6  |             opposite statements are true, because often a particular
138  XI, 6  |    contradictory statements are not true at the same time, as these
139  XI, 6  |             we have put together is true of it, and this is the contradictory
140  XI, 6  |             cannot be false nor all true, both because of many other
141  XI, 6  |            are false it will not be true to say even this, and if
142  XI, 6  |           even this, and if all are true it will not be false to
143  XI, 8  |           is" in the sense of being true or of being by accident,
144  XI, 9  |       movement. That what we say is true, is plain from the following
145  XI, 11 |         which is in the full sense (true, the not-white or not-good
146  XI, 11 |            is accidental, yet it is true to say that "not-being"
147  XI, 12 |             relative term which was true of the other thing ceases
148  XI, 12 |            other thing ceases to be true, though this other does
149  XI, 12 |            of coming to be. What is true of the later, then, must
150  XI, 12 |            the later, then, must be true of the earlier; e.g. if
151 XII, 7  |              and (2) if it were not true, the world would have proceeded
152 XIII, 3 |      indivisibles. Thus since it is true to say without qualification
153 XIII, 3 |          that mobiles exist), it is true also to say without qualification
154 XIII, 3 |        mathematicians. And as it is true to say of the other sciences
155 XIII, 3 |        their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us
156 XIII, 6 |              and either (a) this is true of the units without exception,
157 XIII, 8 |           impossible. For it is not true to speak of indivisible
158 XIII, 8 |        those alternatives should be true. Clearly it cannot be infinite;
159 XIII, 9 |           in the particular animal. True, if the universal is not
160 XIII, 10|             statement is in a sense true, although in a sense it
161 XIV, 2  |          which we are now saying is true universally-that no substance
162 XIV, 2  |    arithmeticians will all be found true even of sensible things,
163 XIV, 3  |             the axioms would not be true of sensible things, while
164 XIV, 3  |       statements of mathematics are true and "greet the soul"; and
165 XIV, 3  |             not even is any theorem true of them, unless we want
166 XIV, 5  |            to say that this is also true of the first principles