Book, Paragraph

  1  II, 2 |       cannot be reduced to another definition which is fuller in expression.
  2  II, 2 |       expression. For the original definition is always more of a definition,
  3  II, 2 |     definition is always more of a definition, and not the later one;
  4 III, 2 |        stones, and the form is the definition. To judge from our previous
  5 III, 3 |          we know each thing by its definition, and the genera are the
  6 III, 3 |            the essence is one; but definition by genera will be different
  7  IV, 2 |          are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference
  8  IV, 3 |            since it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible
  9  IV, 4 |     limited in number; for to each definition there might be assigned
 10  IV, 4 |            of which would have one definition, viz. "two-footed animal",
 11  IV, 4 |          and "dress" are, if their definition is one. And if "being a
 12  IV, 4 |        that there cannot be such a definition of anything, but that all
 13  IV, 7 |             as is obvious from the definition.-Again, the process will
 14  IV, 7 |            with all such people is definition. Now the definition rests
 15  IV, 7 |      people is definition. Now the definition rests on the necessity of
 16  IV, 7 |         word is a sign will be its definition.-While the doctrine of Heraclitus,
 17  IV, 8 |          that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity
 18   V, 2 |          form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the
 19   V, 2 |          the parts included in the definition. (3) That from which the
 20   V, 3 |       indivisible (for there is no definition of them), some say the genera
 21   V, 6 |           are called one, when the definition which states the essence
 22   V, 6 |           indivisible from another definition which shows us the other (
 23   V, 6 |             though in itself every definition is divisible). Thus even
 24   V, 6 |    diminishing is one, because its definition is one, as, in the case
 25   V, 6 |           of plane figures, is the definition of their form. In general
 26   V, 6 |          in time or in place or in definition, are most of all one, and
 27   V, 6 |        continuity or in form or in definition; for we count as more than
 28   V, 6 |            not one, or those whose definition is not one.~While in a sense
 29   V, 6 |             in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to
 30   V, 8 |          the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance
 31   V, 11|           things that are prior in definition do not coincide with those
 32   V, 11|     relation to perception. For in definition universals are prior, in
 33   V, 11|     perception individuals. And in definition also the accident is prior
 34   V, 11|          to "musical man", for the definition cannot exist as a whole
 35   V, 12|    incapable. Therefore the proper definition of the primary kind of potency
 36   V, 13|         quantum" is present in the definition which states what it is),
 37   V, 18|          animal" is present in his definition; Callias is a particular
 38   V, 25|             4) The elements in the definition which explains a thing are
 39   V, 29|           number by the use of the definition of two.~These things, then,
 40  VI, 1 |          of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry
 41 VII, 1 |            in every sense - (1) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (
 42 VII, 1 |         only substance. And (1) in definition also this is first; for
 43 VII, 1 |          this is first; for in the definition of each term the definition
 44 VII, 1 |        definition of each term the definition of its substance must be
 45 VII, 4 |          things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition
 46 VII, 4 |          definition. But we have a definition not where we have a word
 47 VII, 4 |           even the Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula
 48 VII, 4 |          one; but there will be no definition nor essence.~Or has "definition",
 49 VII, 4 |    definition nor essence.~Or has "definition", like "what a thing is",
 50 VII, 4 |       facts; this is evident, that definition and essence in the primary
 51 VII, 4 |         not follow that there is a definition of every word which means
 52 VII, 4 |          there can be a formula or definition even of white man, but not
 53 VII, 4 |          sense in which there is a definition either of white or of a
 54 VII, 5 |          an added determinant is a definition, whether any of the terms
 55 VII, 5 |           is either no essence and definition of any of these things,
 56 VII, 5 |           some other way or, as we definition and essence must be said
 57 VII, 5 |          sense nothing will have a definition and nothing will have an
 58 VII, 5 |          have them. Clearly, then, definition is the formula of the essence,
 59 VII, 10|                         10~Since a definition is a formula, and every
 60 VII, 10|        wood),-of these there is no definition, but they are known by the
 61 VII, 11|           to define any thing; for definition is of the universal and
 62 VII, 11|           formula are parts of the definition, and why the definition
 63 VII, 11|            definition, and why the definition is one formula (for clearly
 64 VII, 12|          Now let us treat first of definition, in so far as we have not
 65 VII, 12|         formula of which we call a definition, as for instance, in the
 66 VII, 12|          all the attributes in the definition must be one; for the definition
 67 VII, 12|    definition must be one; for the definition is a single formula and
 68 VII, 12|            There is nothing in the definition except the first-named and
 69 VII, 12| featherless", and similarly if the definition includes more terms. And
 70 VII, 12|            out of it), clearly the definition is the formula which comprises
 71 VII, 12|     substance of the thing and its definition, since it is not right to
 72 VII, 12|     Therefore it is plain that the definition is the formula which contains
 73 VII, 13|           There cannot, then, be a definition of anything; or in a sense
 74 VII, 15|             also, there is neither definition of nor demonstration about
 75 VII, 15|            of necessary truths and definition is a scientific process,
 76 VII, 15|           so too demonstration and definition cannot vary thus, but it
 77 VII, 15|       clearly there can neither be definition of nor demonstration about
 78 VII, 15|           will no longer be either definition or demonstration. And so
 79 VII, 15|            must recognize that his definition may always be overthrown;
 80 VII, 15|  supporters of the Ideas produce a definition of an Idea? It would become
 81 VIII, 1|      essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the essence,
 82 VIII, 1|           reason we have discussed definition and essential predication.
 83 VIII, 1|   essential predication. Since the definition is a formula, and a formula
 84 VIII, 1|    substance are also parts of the definition. Further, too, neither the
 85 VIII, 2|         foot requires such complex definition. We must grasp, then, the
 86 VIII, 3|         cannot be defined (for the definition so called is a "long rigmarole")
 87 VIII, 3|     something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter
 88 VIII, 3|            numbers of units. For a definition is a sort of number; for (
 89 VIII, 3|        taken away or added, so the definition and the essence will no
 90 VIII, 3|          one out of many); and the definition is one, but similarly they
 91 VIII, 6|          other such quality. And a definition is a set of words which
 92 VIII, 6|           in their usual manner of definition and speech, they cannot
 93 VIII, 6|             round bronze" were the definition of "cloak"; for this word
 94  IX, 5 |       which must be present in the definition), and since some things
 95  IX, 6 |             and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content
 96   X, 1 |            are one are those whose definition is one. Of this sort are
 97   X, 1 |          others the thought or the definition is indivisible.~But it must
 98   X, 1 |          to be one and what is the definition of it, should not be assumed
 99   X, 1 |       predicable and to render the definition of the word. For in a sense
100   X, 3 |            indivisible, so that in definition plurality is prior to the
101   X, 3 |          same if it is one both in definition and in number, e.g. you
102   X, 3 |      matter; and again, (3) if the definition of its primary essence is
103   X, 3 |        both their matter and their definition are one (so that you are
104   X, 5 |         intermediate, or, from its definition, can be so; for it would
105   X, 9 |           And since one element is definition and one is matter, contrarieties
106   X, 9 |     contrarieties which are in the definition make a difference in species,
107   X, 9 |            species, because in the definition there is no contrariety.
108   X, 9 |       indivisible kind. Callias is definition + matter, the pale man,
109   X, 9 |            is a contrariety in the definition. But does the matter not
110   X, 9 |            is a contrariety in the definition. For while there is a contrariety
111  XI, 1 |           of universals; for every definition and every science is of
112  XI, 3 |      privation is not of the whole definition, but of the infima species.
113  XI, 3 |          every case have the whole definition denied of him, but may be
114  XI, 7 |            how he should state the definition of the essence-whether as
115  XI, 7 |         concave". For of these the definition of "snub" includes the matter
116  XI, 7 |            so that we look for its definition without eliminating the
117  XI, 7 |           nose. Evidently then the definition of flesh also and of the
118  XI, 9 |         absolutely the same in its definition, the complete reality of
119  XI, 10|         following argument. If the definition of a body is "that which
120 XII, 2 |         contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is
121 XII, 5 |           while in their universal definition they are the same. And if
122 XII, 8 |       matter; for one and the same definition, e.g. that of man, applies
123 XII, 8 |         first mover is one both in definition and in number; so too, therefore,
124 XII, 9 |           theoretical sciences the definition or the act of thinking is
125 XIII, 2|             that they are prior in definition. Still not all things that
126 XIII, 2|           things that are prior in definition are also prior in substantiality.
127 XIII, 2|            but things are prior in definition to those whose definitions
128 XIII, 2|           prior to the pale man in definition, but not in substantiality.
129 XIII, 2|    sensibles in being, but only in definition, and that they cannot exist
130 XIII, 3|          things which are prior in definition and simpler, our knowledge
131 XIII, 4|           the problem of universal definition (for of the physicists Democritus
132 XIII, 4|            arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned
133 XIII, 4|         and the other parts of the definition apply to the circle itself,
134 XIII, 4|            to all the parts of the definition? For all the elements in
135 XIII, 8|   determinate and in virtue of its definition; but in a sense the acute
136 XIII, 8|      substance as expressed in the definition, the right angle, and the
137 XIII, 8|           what is expressed in the definition, though in generation it
138 XIII, 8|          in different ways, one in definition and the other in time. In
139 XIV, 1 |   distinction that they are one in definition, but not in number. But