Book, Paragraph

  1 III, 1  |         highest genera, e.g. is animal or man the first principle
  2 III, 6  |  animals-himself and "man" and "animal", if each of these indicates
  3  IV, 4  |         let this be "two-footed animal"; by having one meaning
  4  IV, 4  |    definition, viz. "two-footed animal", while there might be also
  5  IV, 4  |         it must be a two-footed animal (for this was what "man"
  6  IV, 4  |       that time be a two-footed animal; for this is what "being
  7  IV, 4  |       essentially a man" or "an animal". For if there is to be
  8   V, 2  |       e.g. "man"-or in general "animal"-is the cause of the statue,
  9   V, 2  |         is a man, and man is an animal. Of accidental causes also
 10   V, 5  |       food are necessary for an animal; for it is incapable of
 11   V, 6  |         one kind of man; if qua animal, one kind of animal; if
 12   V, 6  |         qua animal, one kind of animal; if qua magnitude, one kind
 13   V, 8  |      soul is of the being of an animal.-(3) The parts which are
 14   V, 14 |         essence, e.g. man is an animal of a certain quality because
 15   V, 18 |         in virtue of himself an animal. For "animal" is present
 16   V, 18 |         himself an animal. For "animal" is present in his definition;
 17   V, 18 |         Callias is a particular animal.-(3) Whatever attribute
 18   V, 18 |         has more than one cause—animal, two-footed—but yet man
 19  VI, 1  |          bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and,
 20  VI, 2  |       by accident that he is an animal. And that the builder produces
 21 VII, 5  |       but as "male" attaches to animal and "equal" to quantity,
 22 VII, 5  |       but not female apart from animal. Therefore there is either
 23 VII, 5  |    female be defined apart from animal. (When I say "by addition"
 24 VII, 6  | good-itself, and the essence of animal from animal-itself, and
 25 VII, 7  |    produced, e.g. a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so is
 26 VII, 8  |     brazen sphere", but man and animal to "brazen sphere" in general.
 27 VII, 9  |         be, but the wood or the animal of that size. But we may
 28 VII, 9  |      which produces it, e.g. an animal if an animal is produced;
 29 VII, 9  |        it, e.g. an animal if an animal is produced; but it is not
 30 VII, 10 |        the finger a part of the animal, the acute angle will be
 31 VII, 10 |       of them, to the concrete "animal", and so too with each individual
 32 VII, 10 |        too with each individual animal; and the body and parts
 33 VII, 10 |    angle and the circle and the animal are prior, or the things
 34 VII, 10 |        if even bare soul is the animal or the living thing, or
 35 VII, 10 |       is not identical with the animal, even so some parts must,
 36 VII, 11 |         to make in the case of "animal" is not sound; for it leads
 37 VII, 11 |     case is not similar; for an animal is something perceptible,
 38 VII, 11 |      body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both
 39 VII, 12 |        case of man, "two-footed animal"; for let this be the formula
 40 VII, 12 |        one, and not many, viz. "animal" and "two-footed"? For in
 41 VII, 12 |          e.g. the first may be "animal", the next "animal which
 42 VII, 12 |      may be "animal", the next "animal which is two-footed", and
 43 VII, 12 |         two-footed", and again "animal which is two-footed and
 44 VII, 12 |      genus; e.g. in "two-footed animal" "animal" is genus, and
 45 VII, 12 |         in "two-footed animal" "animal" is genus, and the other
 46 VII, 12 |      feet" is a differentia of "animal"; again the differentia
 47 VII, 12 |       again the differentia of "animal endowed with feet" must
 48 VII, 12 |        happen; for when we say "animal endowed with feet and two-footed"
 49 VII, 12 |        said nothing other than "animal having feet, having two
 50 VII, 12 |         of that of man, saying "animal which is two-footed and
 51 VII, 13 |    which is the way in which an animal underlies its attributes-or
 52 VII, 13 |       be present in this; e.g. "animal" can be present in "man"
 53 VII, 13 |        for the universal, e.g. "animal", will be the substance
 54 VII, 13 |          for instance, that no "animal" exists apart from the particular
 55 VII, 13 |         the particular kinds of animal, nor does any other of the
 56 VII, 14 |         if the Forms exist and "animal" is present in "man" and "
 57 VII, 14 |        which he consists, e.g. "animal" and "two-footed", must
 58 VII, 14 |      and substances; therefore "animal", as well as "man", must
 59 VII, 14 |      this sort.~Now (1) if the "animal" in "the horse" and in "
 60 VII, 14 |         one, and how will this "animal" escape being divided even
 61 VII, 14 |       implied when one says the animal is two-footed or possessed
 62 VII, 14 |       things whose substance is animal’; for it is not by accident
 63 VII, 14 |        accident that "man" has "animal" for one of its elements.
 64 VII, 14 |    animal-itself". For (i) the "animal" in each species will be
 65 VII, 14 |        this is impossible. The "animal", then, present in each
 66 VII, 14 |     Further, from what is this "animal" in each species derived,
 67 VII, 14 | animal-itself? Or how can this "animal", whose essence is simply
 68 VII, 15 |  defining you, he would say "an animal which is lean" or "pale",
 69 VII, 15 |      elements; e.g. "two-footed animal" belongs to animal and to
 70 VII, 15 |   two-footed animal" belongs to animal and to the two-footed. (
 71 VII, 15 |   Secondly, we must reply that "animal" and "two-footed" are prior
 72 VII, 15 |         in being to "two-footed animal"; and things which are prior
 73 VII, 15 |        the Idea consists, e.g. "animal" and "two-footed", should
 74 VII, 17 |       can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature.
 75 VIII, 3 |        twoness", and whether an animal is soul in a body’ or "a
 76 VIII, 3 |        actuality of some body. "Animal" might even be applied to
 77 VIII, 3 |       by the former. Nor is man animal + biped, but there must
 78 VIII, 4 |     Shall we say that it is the animal? Yes, but the animal in
 79 VIII, 4 |        the animal? Yes, but the animal in virtue of what, i.e.
 80 VIII, 4 |       subject, not of the whole animal? Shall we say that it is
 81 VIII, 5 |         it is the matter of the animal that is itself in virtue
 82 VIII, 5 |       the corpse comes from the animal, and vinegar from wine,
 83 VIII, 5 |         a corpse is produced an animal, the corpse first goes back
 84 VIII, 5 |        and only then becomes an animal; and vinegar first goes
 85 VIII, 6 |       he one and not many, e.g. animal + biped, especially if there
 86 VIII, 6 |        in-one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general
 87 VIII, 6 |        but more than one thing, animal and biped?~Clearly, then,
 88  IX, 5  |     whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will
 89   X, 8  |       to both; e.g. if it is an animal other in species, both are
 90   X, 8  |      its own nature one sort of animal, and the other another,
 91   X, 9  |         why a female and a male animal are not different in species,
 92   X, 9  |      this difference belongs to animal in virtue of its own nature,
 93   X, 9  |          male" belong to it qua animal. This question is almost
 94   X, 9  |      modifications peculiar to "animal", are so not in virtue of
 95  XI, 5  |       and a horse, or any other animal.~While, then, there is no
 96 XIII, 3 |      attributes peculiar to the animal qua female or qua male (
 97 XIII, 4 |        essence are Ideas, e.g. "animal" and "two-footed". Further,
 98 XIII, 5 |  therefore several Forms; e.g. "animal" and "two-footed", and also "
 99 XIII, 7 |         man" is different from "animal" and "two-footed".~Again,
100 XIII, 8 |        for the various forms of animal will outnumber them. At
101 XIII, 9 |       that is in the particular animal. True, if the universal
102 XIII, 10|         nor that this man is an animal, unless every man is an
103 XIII, 10|          unless every man is an animal.~But if the principles are
104 XIV, 6  |      the life and prime of each animal. Why, then, should not some